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1. Introduction
This thesis is concerned with one specific 
area of British political activity, in its 
domestic and external aspects, over a relatively 
short period of time. Its object is to make a 
systematic examination of a recent exercise in 
multilateral diplomacy, of the content and 
method of a particular phase of international 
bargaining.
Two foci are involved in the study, the 
domestic policy-process and the international 
environment. Treatment of both the home and the 
international arenas produces a study of 
* linkage * politics. What analytical elements 
are involved?
The international system may be discussed 
in terms of giving and taking across juridical, 
political and economic boundaries. All giving 
and taking equals the * international system*•
With time halted, one seeks the contributing 
components, the configuration of the ensemble; 
over time, one studies performance, change and 
development. Thus, international relations as 
a study involves attention to systems structure 
and systems performance.
The evaluation of transformation, of 
stability and chEinge, in the international system, 
may involve the broad historical survey (•the 
growth of European civilization*) or the narrower 
study (’Britain and post-war European integration* ). 
The process of integration is, in fact, specially 
relevant here. Integration - or community- building, or federalism, or supranationality -
designates a relationship among units in which
they have become mutually interdependent and 
jointly produce system properties which they had 
separately lacked. Integration may also 
describe the process by which such a 
relationship among formerly separate units 
is attained. The process of integration reveals 
the bargaining stages. In studying integration , 
actors, domain, and range or scope of activity - 
one Bitxy find a community of conflict, where 
outcomes rewarding for A are frustrating or 
penalizing for B, or a community of interest, 
where rewards run parallel.
For the outside observer, there is 
difficulty in setting limits to foreign policy 
analysis. The foreign policy of country A is 
not merely the resultant of certain processes of 
deliberation within the governmental 
institutions of A. It is also the resultant, 
remote or immediate, of the foreign policies 
of countries B, 0 and D with which A interacts 
internationally - situational compulsions 
originate in the activities of foreign 
governments
A traditionalist view would hold that 
intergovernmental order comes from co mitment 
to the idea of the sovereign state (the end), 
from international law (the rules of the game), 
and from diplomacy (the method of operation).
In being given its place in the maintenance of 
intergovernmental order, diplomacy can be 
variously defined; the conduct of relations 
between states by official, accredited 
representatives - more narrowly, by permanent 
professionals in residence; or, the carrying on 
of relations between and among states where 
there occurs negotiation, agreement or
oonpronlaet or, an elomont of national power 
whieh influenoea, threaten», force* or manipu­
late*, Foreign policy looks to ends and 
purpose*, diplomacy to means and methods(l).
Traditionally diplomacy has been bilateral 
save for rare congresses t traditionally actors 
have been diplomats and plenipotentiaries.
Today, diplomacy is increasingly multilateral and 
chiefs of government walk the stage, Summitry 
may lend * openness* to diplomatic proceedings 
but suzmit meetings - now in fashion, now out of 
f^hion - are only the tip of the multilateral 
iceberg. Because of the many technical issues 
which need to be discussed by a large number of 
states, conference diplomacy is supplemented by 
a great amount of diplomatic work performed in 
the seminar atmosphere of working parties and 
committees, on a permanent or on a ad hoc basis.
To move, briefly, from analytical elements 
to * practical politics*, one may say that the 
days of the nation state, the * vertical oover- 
eign*, operating within limited territory, ore 
ended. Operations are now too wide for 
national machinery and domestic affairs depend 
heavily on external conditions,
The post«war period has been one of sub­
stantial commitments to collective governmental 
action, leading to the need for agreement of
(1) Pejoratively, diplomacy becomes "tact carried to the point of guile" but the dog*s bad name rightly belongs to its master - foreign policy, (Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, 1955 p.l68)
And, with thoughts of processt the bulk of all diplomacy, multilateral as well as bilateral, is cobbling rather than creation, (Lord Strang, op,oit,«P,144)
foreign polielos and etratogio dootrlnee and, 
in the économie field, to the subaieeion of 
national policlee to international diecueeicn#
The average elector aoeumee that deciaione are 
made, and should be made, in Westminster and 
Whitehall, Yet the activities of the individu 
ual citisen and the degxree of freedom available 
to hie rulers are both increasingly dependent 
upon forces and institutions that transcend 
national frontiers - this is an age of the 
penetrability of states,
The proliferation of international 
organisations has led the Germans to talk of 
*die iolitik der Buohsiaben*, which might be 
translated as *Alphabet Ioiltics*. As Busk
renarks#
"In the sodem world we are inundated by acronyms, among which even the most knowledgeable swimaers risk drowning,"(2)
Here, one may refer to treaty or alliance pre­
ferences or to general international co-operative 
activity.
At home, the Cabinet and the Defence and 
Overseas iolioy Committee work in a world where 
wages policy has implication for monetary policy 
planned in Basle, and Special Jiramixic Bights 
agreed in Stockholm have repercussions on 
industrial development in Yorkshire,
To describe the context of the present study 
one ale^t state the following# since 1945 the 
world has experienced an era of unresolved conr- 
flictsi in a period neither relaxed nor cecure.
1967, p.24»
Europe*8 future is un8ure(3)| the central 
fact to note is that both Britain and Europe 
have loot status - the years since 1945 have 
witnessed the end of the "Vasco da Gaoa epoch*, 
There has occurred a * relance européenne* but 
no •relance britannique* - we here study Britain*a 
first attempt to integrate with the European 
Economic Oommunity and her tentative admission 
of loss of "vertical sovereignty*•
+ The examination of a political eyetern 
Involves attention to many variables(4}• In the 
present study no attempt will be made to make an 
exhaustive application of all possible analytical 
elements to the domestic policy-snaking process - 
for example, the "public battle", although it 
cannot be neglected, is not a main focus of 
attention (see pp. 6i and ).
Aims are articulated through foreign policy 
and accommodations are found through diplomacy. 
Who formulates the desired outcome? Who is the 
decision-maker?
(3) See Buchan, A* (Ed,); Europe*o Futures. Europe*o Choices. 1969
(4) Attention to political culture and to patterns power, interest, and policy rapidly involvesa further subdivision as analysis of variables proceeds.
6"The standard convention is to reserve the term decision-maker for one who has formal res ponsibiliiies for formulating the policies of an organization, usually an institution of government. Decision­making, however, denotes the dynamic “ * process of interaction among all parti­cipants who determine a particular policy choice, officials as well as non- officials* Decision-making studies are studies that focus on all factors relevant to a policy choice and not just on the formal-legal relationships of decision-makers."(5)
An adequate description of a décision- 
situation will involve more than a listing of the 
decisional "units* - prime minister, cabinet, 
party or interest group. Does the occasion for 
decision involve action or reaction, response 
to internal planning or to external Initiative? 
What degree of anticipation has been possible?
Do the decision-makers have ample time, or are 
they working against an impending deadline? 
Decision may involve routine or marginal con­
sequences or high risks: here one may study the
scope and domain of values involved - the number 
and quality of values, the number of persons and 
groups interested. roliticiaiis may not be able 
to concentrate their attention on single problems. 
The idea of a "political agenda* leads one to 
examine competing claims on time and energy.
Recent contributions to theory reflect a 
shifting interest, a departure from attention to 
international balances and structures towards 
the processes of relations between states, from 
the forms of institutions to the processes of 
politics. This shifts attention from decisions 
as the outcome of deliberate acts of choice made 
by individuals or groups in institutional settings 
to the outcome of a complex of inter-dependent
(5) Fye, lucianW.t "Decision-Making", in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences.1964
decieiona and events. At its extreme, for 
example, the n%w view would hold that there 
is no such thing as "British foreign policy*, 
only a "British foreign policy prooess*.
Thus, one moves from decision-making to 
policy-making:
"Policy-making involves a long series of aore-or-less related activities. rather than a single, dieorete decision taken in Downing Street, Westminster, Whitehall .. It thus covers far more than the term decision-making. The: study of deoision-making usually involves analysing the intentions of polioy-makore up to and including the point at which oinding governmental action is taken .. the polioy-saaking process may be said to begin when unoort&inties arc consciously articu­lated in the form of political demands, or registered by observant civil eer** vants noting that the instructions they have been given to carry out no longer have quite the consequences that their authors intended" .{6}
For the policy-maker, the link between intention 
and event is not a simple causal one. Action 
may be taken sucoeoefully without oourees being 
fully plotted or understood, a settled course 
may ipso facto fail.
In the sphere of foreign-policy-formation 
the beet a government can do, perhaps, is to 
maintain a strategic purpose through a sequence 
of changing tactical goals. The identifioation 
of key variables in a situation and the defini­
tion of tactical goals will require the selec­
tion, verification and interpretation of both 
domestic and external environmental phenomena.
t nifTf~r^T~r-ihrt~»f— n i
(6) aos«(^*t folloy-44aklng in Britain 1969, pp. x-xl.
The polloy-makore, in this activity, are con- 
cemed with matters over which their control is 
doubtful and of which their knowledge is 
imperfect - their took is one of the harsh and 
continuous selection of topics on which to con­
centrate. The foreign |>olitical scene is 
indeterminate, and it is not immediately possible 
to descry causal relations between perceived 
phenomena:
"To the statesman, guiding a difficult programme to success may .. resemble the art of driving an automobile over an icy road: his problem la toanticipate the skids quickly enough so that he can still control them by small corrections at the steering wheel, where slowness of the action or oversteering would provide worse skids and might \freok the car." (7)
f Britain is moving through a period of 
Transformation: her post-wat dilemma, not
quickly realised, has been to find an identity.
The Aoheson apophthegm will long survive in the 
tezt-booksi "Great Britain has lost an empire 
and has not yet found a role" (8).
In this period of transformation there has 
been considerable dissatisfaction with national 
performance. In an age of technological fore­
casting, surpriee-free projections, normative 
relevance trees and scenarios, British foreign 
policy-making has been severely judged. In 
reviewing the natural history of decision-making 
the observer sees events rather than decisions, 
snap judgments rather than analyses, guesses 
instead of plana. In the making of British 
foreign policy there has been a lack of prescience 
causing a lack of adaptivity.
(7) Deut80h,K.V.$ "Oosimunioation Models and Decision Systems", in Charlesworth, J.O. ContePiwary iolitical Analysis, p.281
(8) Aoheson,D.; West Xoint Speoch. 12th December, 1962.
1Defensively it might be said that the 
decisionHEaoking process is not defectives politi­
cal man is by nature incoherent, confused, 
haphazard} political issues are unpredictable and 
all that decision-makers can do is to react to 
events to keep the ship afloat* This panders to 
the tribal gods of prudence and pragmatism and 
neglects the need, mentioned above, for strategic 
purpose*
In what follows we are concerned with the 
activities of international actors and national 
decision-makers, with interaction (or demand- 
respcnse) analysis and the domestic policy-process*
The sources of evidence embodied in this 
research are given in the bibliography (p. ),
A problem of data analysis - the securing of 
•primary facts* and the composition of a framework 
into which these facts may be fitted - arises from 
the multiplicity of compononts(9)« In connection 
with Britain*8 relations with the European 
Economie Community in the early "Sixties, an 
infinite number of activities occurs internally 
and externally but cannot be accommodated in a 
sequential order* In what follows, as far as is 
possible, activities in the domestic and European 
and international arenas are outlined in their 
separate sections and kept in time order.
A first task is to describe the post-war 
international arena, the development of European 
integration, and United Kingdom reactions to
(9) An addition of components produces a greater addition of channelstMo tern withese ooiiLonents: 2 3 4 5 6 7
Potential inter­action channels: 1 3 6 9 19 21
I c/
International co-operative activity in general 
and to European integration in particular 
(Chapter 2). Second, and in the light of these 
reactions, a description of Whitehall organization 
and activity in this period is attempted 
(Chapter 3)#
The essential aim of the thesis is to pene­
trate the * organization for negotiation*, to 
estimate the activities of Whitehall and the 
Brusi^els Team concerned with the United Kingdom* a 
first attempt to join the European Economic 
Communlty(lO). A chapter outlining the factors 
related to the reorientation of the Macmillan 
government*s views on Europe in the period from 
1959 to July 1961 (Chapter 4) is followed by the 
main exposition on the negotiations proper 
(Chapter 5} and the results of those negotiations 
(Chapter 6).
(10) For comment on the private nature of public life - which exists because of party discipline, civil service secretivonoss, legal limitation, as well as self- censorship on the part of many who participate in the communication business - read Ely Devons on "Government on the Inner Circle* (The listener. 27th March,1936.How included Ini dalmcross. Sir, S. (ed)i Ely Devonst Papers on Hanning and Economic m^L^ernent. i W o T f e ô E o s î e r T OPress).
2. lüdUkda t* 1959, a search for IdanUty
2*1 The International arenai alphabet politics*
even a brief rehearsal of the origins and 
development of post-war European and North Atlantio 
political organisations is difficult; it is not 
easy to separate out the political, economic and 
military intentions* (1) A^ >art from the question 
liB to whether one can moke valid distinctions bet­
ween such intentions at this level, there is the 
fact that many of the organisations aspired to 
activity in several directions*
The proliferation of organisations inevitably 
created problemst
"It WEU9 undeniable that there was a good deal of overlapping* For instance, defence was the rcsi^onsibility of H.A.T.O* and of W*S*17* and was discussed in the W*S*U* Assembly* But the Council of Europe discussed general questions of foreign policy, that is to say, the reasons for defence and the throats against which defence was nooeooary* On the coo- nonio side, the Council of Europe discussed the right of establishment, the relation of welfare systems to the migration of labour, and quoetiono of tourism, while all these things were being handled at the inter­governmental lovel by the 0*3.B.C**" (2)
By the mid-*Fifties continental parliamentarians 
had to man delegations to three assemblies - to 
B*C*9.G*, the Council of Europe, and \I*B*U**
The British attended the two last named and both 
British and continentals attended the unofficial 
#,A*T*0* Iarliamentarions' Conference*
(1) Ses ?*%*!.# European Unity - oo-operation and IntegratlFn.
(2) Beloff* M*t New Dimensions in Foreiai lollov. 1961,' pllir ---
(1
In 1932 Britain supported disouosion of the 
poBOible amalgamation of N#A#T.O. and O.S.3,0.# 
the aid-dietributing function of the latter was 
coming to an end and the organieatione were jointly 
preoccupied with the inflationary effects of 
rearmament. (But what was to be done with Germany 
and the 'neutrals' within O.S.S.O.?) '
The Eden flan of March 1932 sought to remodel 
the Council of Europe to enable the organs - partic­
ularly its Assembly - to serve the needs of B.C.B.C. 
and the proposed European Defence Community.
(Certain links between the first two named did 
result.)
In December 1936 Selwyn Lloyd produced his 
'grand design' for rationalizationt
"High political and military direction would be given by N.A.T.O., with V.S.U. functioning within its framework.Economic co-operation would be carried out under, and in association with, the O.B.B.O.. Finally, there would be an assembly on parliamentary lines, with powers and functions still to be assigned to it, which could complete the institu- . tions of the Atlantic Community."(3)
The Assembly, divided into a number of commissions, 
would be like a chest of drawers - each nation 
could choose whether to be present when any 
particular drawer was pulled out.
In May 1957, David Ormsby-Goro, Minister-of- 
Stato at the Foreign Office, outlined British aims 
before the Council of Europe - to bring the activi­
ties of the various Buropeon and Atlantic 
organisations to the attention of the people; to 
exi^oe inter-govemmental aotivitiea to constructive
(3) Beloff, M. I RRjlSmSI* ^ p. 112
parllaaentary orltielSQt; and to stimulate member 
gOYemnenta.
Thus, through the early- and nid-'Piftiee 
Britain vroa suffioiently concerned with Europe to 
put forward varloua plana for the rationalisation of 
the many orgonisatione in which she was quite 
extensively involved. The stated intention was to 
improve the effectiveness and reputation of the 
organizations but tho member-states of the future 
'Six*, after 1930, tended to assume that British 
efforts were aimed at a dilution of the Kuroi>ean 
impulse. Ideas of rationalisation fell into the 
background as the Euro M a n  Economic Coranunity took 
the centre of the stage.
2.2 >ntropoan intefgratiwi
The poob-war history of the development of the 
•supranational triptych' began with a number of 
oongreseeoCl). The 'JBuropeons' exhibited open 
differences and their aims were ambivalents
"The Suropean idea was .. originally neutral in foreign policy between a third force concept and the Atlantio alliance, undecided in trade policy between region­al ism and multilateralism, ambivalent in its attitude to the problems of emergent nations in Africa and Asia, silent in cultural and educational matters between Catholicism and anti-clericalism, and neutral also in economic policy between laisser-faire liberalism and socialistpIanHng7”v2T
(1) For the story of tho 'Campaign of the European Congresses' - Montreux (1947), the Hague (1948), Lausanne (1949) - see de Rougenont, Denist Covcmoent and opi osition. April - July, 1^7, pTFSs
(2) Xitzinger, U.i The European Common Market an^ Oozamunity. 1967, p,7.
But the first praotioaX step taken - to establish 
the Goal and Steel Coomunity - was firm enough.
The United States having decided that German 
industry could not be controlled or contained.
Prance performed a volte face in policy.
Schuman outlined his plan for a European Coal 
and steel Community in May 1950, a treaty was rati­
fied in April 1951 and came into force in Auguat 1952. 
The principal institutions of B.C.S.C. were a 
Council of fjinistere and a High Authority. The 
treaty emphasised utilitarian power; the organisation 
was compact in membership, epeeifio in purpose, and 
aimed at a relatively low level of supranationality.
In prescribed fields the High Authority could over­
ride national govomnents, elsewhere it was to act 
in consultation with, and with the consent of, the 
Council of Ministers. The preamble to the treaty 
pointed to further European integration.
In March 1953 M« Spaak offered tho Six a draft 
statute for a political community, which would have 
involved the assimilation of a European Defence 
Community and B.C.S.C.. No decision was reached 
before the French killed 5.B.C. in August, 1954.
The defence community idea failed because national 
loyalties remained too strong. With tho end of 
Korean hostilities and the death of Stalin world 
tension had e^ ised. Unfavourable British reactions 
also played a part - France did not savour "being 
locked alone in a closet with fifty million Germans".
These failures v/ere a oheck upon the growth of 
the 'Buropean idea* but the relance européenne was 
not long delayed. In 1953 and 1954 the Six bad 
examined the Bey en I Ion for a common market and 
customs union. The Meaalna Conference of foreign 
ministers took place in May 1955 and led to the
/S
Home Treaty of 1957. Following the f^ ay Mosaina 
Conferenoe, the Spaak studies took plaoe in 
Brueeels between July cmd December,1955. In April 
1956 Spaak made his report and on 29th and 30th May 
in Venice tho Six took their basic decisions. The 
g.B.C. inetltutiona were to be a Council of Ministers, 
a Commission, and a European larliament. The 
Commission was not to be as independent as the 
B.C.S.C. High Authority and this represented a 
certain retreat from supranationality.
The Treaty of Rome contained a gradualist 
strategy and this controlled subsequent integrative 
efforts. In the early post-war years those who 
founded the Council of Europe aimed high and accom­
plished little - they took on a maximal assignment 
with minimal powers. The foundation of the 
European communities, briefly sketched above, did 
not mean that integrationiate were to have an easy 
path to follow. In 1959 a crisis arose relating 
to supranationality. France demanded a dilution of 
B.C.S.C. independence to bring it into line with 
that of the European Economie Community.
2.3 Britain and Europe
Britain came through the war quite well (1)
(1) in her finest hour Britain had stoodalone. She was undefeated, she escaped occupation, she had not known bitter internal cleavages, she had no feelings of guilt, but came through with greater self- confidence, greater pride in her national virtues and national institutions than she had known for years." (Kitzinger, U.i The European Common Market and Community. 1567, p.2.
"^e had not lost faith In ourselves and we had 
the illusion that the national otate oould sur­
vive on its own"(2). The impact of war on
Britain was not as great as upon Europe. In 
Europe, national institutions were shattered and 
national self-confidence shaken. However, Britain 
did come out of the war burdened by debt and 
available economic resources were to be severely 
strained. As Keynes said, when fighting for life 
over three continents good housekeeping had not 
applied. In 1947, the 'freeze year*, grim 
realities began to obtrude but there was no 
general readiness to accept that Britain was now 
merely a major power of the second order.
For fifteen years after the war Britain 
pretended to a global military capability and, 
over-ombitiously, clung to the 'three circles* 
foreign policy. Perhaps Britain'S strongest 
enthusiasm was for the American connection(3).
That Britain was not compulsorily deflated after 
1945 was to a large degree because of American 
policy. The United States cushioned Britain 
against realityt Britain was an interlocutor, she 
displayed a reaction to world events similar to 
America's, she shared the burden of common defence 
(and was afforded special distinction in receiving 
nuclear information).
Adherence to the Ooramonwealth connection has 
not meant that Britain had a Oommonwealth policy. 
Diverse in race, wealth and attitude to world 
politics, its members have Interests elsewhere - in 
N.A.T.O. or in Pan Africanism, Conservatives in 
particular have felt little intimacy with the 'New*
(2) Duncan sandys. Interview
(3) See below, p.
I I
Oomaonwealth. The OoEU&onwealth has been a 
vehlole for faith and oonvlotion rather than hard 
achievement, and yet it has not been * foreign*.
As for the third, European# circle, the 
effects of Britain's insularity have been often 
quoted(4)« After 1943 Britain retained her insula­
rity from Europe. In the wartime period of global 
planning - which resulted in U.H.O. and the 
Bretton Woods organisations I.B.R.D. and I.M.P. - 
Europe had received little attention. In the early 
post-war years both U.S.A. and Britain regarded 
European regional action as a temporary expedient, 
as a framework for the recovery programmée. Europe, 
for Britain, was a geographical expression not a 
goal.
Britain, once the initial i ost-war economic 
problems were overcome, saw little need for a 
European community-system and adhex'sd to a strong 
preference for functional oo-operation. Official 
Britain desired to build something leas than comm­
unity through economic and social programmes while, 
in Europe, there occurred an overestimation of the 
strength of British federalists. Europe moved 
while Britain held back, preferring to take an
(4) "Although always vitally interested inEurope and anxious to prevent the danger of its domination by any state which could men­ace her security, Britain was no longer part of Europe ever since her rulers lost Calais, their last continental possession, in 1338. She became sea-oriented, built the most powerful navy in the world and the largest colonial empire, and developed the largest international trade. Her two traditional concerns were to maintain the balance of power in Europe and to keeo the sea-lanes free', the former by skilful diplomacy and occasional military intervention, the latter through the possession of a huge navy."J.t Htteynational Relation.. 1969P«46.
active part in those international institutions 
whose foundation was based on the principle of 
leaving executive responsibility to national 
governments. The British attitude precluded her 
participation in the building of a base for 
European economic union - federal discussionsin 
Europe were carried on in terms beyond the range 
of British thinking, which continued to take for 
granted the existence and responsibilities of the 
nation's own political system.
The British wrote-off the 'Europeans* as 
cranky and unrepresentative(5) and yet isolation 
was not possible - there existed a fear of an 
inward-looking, protectionist regional trade group. 
But Britain did abdicate leadership;
"Approached from very diverse points of view European unity seemed to make sense to continental leaders, to small but highly articulate pressure groups, and to many of the post-war generation; it would give greater scope to Europe for whatever policy aims were envisaged. On some of these issues Britain could have turned the scales between rival concepts - if only she had not stood al&of."(6)
A Bank of England official outlines the situa­
tion in the early post-war years as follows;
"I had virtually represented the Treasury in the international negotiations of 194b- 1948 which had aimed at setting up an international trade charter of rathur wide scope, but had ultimately to be content with the strictly trade portion of it which is now known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At the beginning of these negotiations the Americans seemed to hope that they might be able to
(5) As seen above, p . *3 , post-war European feder- alsim was not a clear and unambiguous conception
(6) Kitzinger,U.; The European Common Market and Community. Ï96T, p.7.
n
dlmlodce U0 from the Ottawa Treatieswiiich had eytabliahed Coniaon\.’caXtU ^reference before the v;ar. But they had fairly soon recognised that that would be impossible and and therefore allowed raocial provision to be made covering the diacrininatory aspects of oorjaonwealth xreference, on con­dition that wo accepted full non- discrimination throughout the rest of the world. There were somewhat simi­lar irranrements in the International onet.ary Fund to cover the sterling Area on the monetary side.
"Other ai'ticloo with G.-i.A.T. con­tained a provision to 'allow discrimination fit^ iln genuine Customs Uiu.o:is or re©Y r . i d c  . . r e a a  - provided .nlv/ y s  that full non-discrinination a* .lied outside tho Union or i i*eo Trade Area; but, when thevîo latter articles on a Customs Union wore being drafted (I tJiinI; in 1U47) we regarded them as irrelevant to our own position .»• tho Benelux countricü first proposed then and .pot aoae ou>. ort from sundry Latin .American countries. At any rate, this pcurtioular provision aeemed to ua, and I think the -jj too, to be a matter of do-niniiflia.
"Tho result of the any genent into which we had entered under G. L.T.T. v/as that v/o ware free to maint .in Uo:m:or.A/e .1th preference or to join a Ouotoias Union or Free Trade Area. But ,c could not do both. In those days the ide., of drop­ping Comiuon.vealth trade tlsa in favour of a ;/aroicrin grou^ would h*ive been politically impossible. i^ enCG the embarrassment of our position when the uropcans finally decided «. to embark on tho work of creatiîig a 'uropean ■ u-atotae Union - I remember saying at the time that in classic.il days the truite of Teasiaa had been called the p>asoa..e of acylla and Aharybdls, and that we would have good reason to appreoi-te why."(7)
(7) Letter, i.x. Thonpson--cdaualand (Rank 
o f .ngland ; ,  2nd Jonufiry , 1571
4- Following the Schuman propoealx, Britain was 
not allowed to attend the proposed conference 
without a prior commitment to the supranational 
ideas involved (8). Requests for preliminary 
collective discussions were rejected, although 
British ideas were considered(9).
Britain's self-exclueion from B.C.S.C. - 
seen by Uwe Kitzlnger as the 'great divide*-was 
welcomed with considerable relief in Britain by 
those who recognized that Europe was starting down 
the road to federalism. Others regretted the 
rupture: "It was a great misfortune that we did
not go in b^tthe British people wore not ready" 
(Duncan Sandys). The Conservative Opposition 
attacked the Government (see House of Commons 
debate, 26th and 27th June, 1930} but, back in 
office, they reconsidered the treaty only to 
reject it (10).
(8) Chance factors attended Britain's exclusion from the treaty-drafting: "There were tem­porary difficulties on the side of the British Government in handling the propoa&l thus thrust at them, in that Bevin himself was ill in hospital, and both Attlee and Cripps were away. Herbert Morrison, who was temporarily in charge of the Foreign Office, felt that we could not go in to a conference if the outoome had thus been settled in advance. (Beloff,M.i pp.cit.. p.89)
(9) ü^ hite laper: Anfclo-Prench Discussions
European coal. Iron and Steel Industries, gmia? 797ÏÏ'," TSSff.  ------------------
(10) The British Government set up a delegation to B.C.S.C. in September 1952 and, after negotia­tions in Luxembourg, came to an agreement on a form of aosoclation (Ciond. 9346). This was signed on 21st December 1954, approved in the Commons 21at February 1955, and came into effect on 20th September 1955. There was establisheda Standing Council of Association. (Duncan Sandys declares that ho negotiated the whole thing with Monnet, who was 'very tough', prior to the public conference.)
In the third volume of hie memoirs, 
Macmillan reveals a concem, occurring very soon 
after the Conservative post-waar return to power, 
for the course of European integration:
"Early in 1952 I was much distressed by a memorandum compiled in the Foreign Office on European integration, wliioh was given a wide circulâtion. It seemed to me to be based upon a ooraplete misappre­hension of the reality and strength of the movement for TCuropean unity. It indeed treated the whole of the these efforts with a certain amount of levity and contempt."(11)
He also reveals a concern over Churchill's 
strange unwillingness to defend the ideas and 
ideals which he hod done so much to promote while 
in opposition:
"Dunoan Sandys, who was most helpful to mo behind the scenes, eaid that Churchill seemed somewhat dazed and unable to realise the degree of disillusionment throughout Europe, Everyone had hoped that the new Government would sot a new tone. But nothing n^w had emerged, from either side of Downing Street,"(12)
Maomillan feared a united Europe without 
Britain and thought in terns of confederation, of 
a limited commitment. In a direct quotation from 
his diary for 10th Maroh, 1952 he declares:
"Vi'hat folly there has been during the vital and formative years! The absurd constitu­tion-making of Schuman and Monnet on the one side; the isolationism of Bevin and the Foreign Office on the other, have brought this about."(13)
(11) Tides of Fortune. 1959, p.468
(12) Op. cit.. p.471
(13) Op . Pit., p.471
Surely we ought now to announce the broad 
outline of the kind of European Union Britain 
would be prepared to Join?
Instead Britain pressed the Eden Plan (14) 
for a strengthening of European structure through 
the organization of E.O.S.C. and E.D.O. institu­
tions in connection with those of the Council of 
Europe. Maomillan feared the absorption of the 
Council of Europe into a new body and the exclusion 
of a Britain having little power or influence. He 
even contemplated resignation from the Governments
"Yhen the Cabinet met on 13th March 1952 to discuss my views on Europe, 1 received i^yal support from David Maxwell Pyfe j@ome Office and Welsh AffairaZ# But itwas clear that Eden, although not himself present owing to illness, would gain the almost unanimous support of his colleagues.The discussion was of some value and mi^t perhaps have some useful effect at a later stage. On the more restricted issue,Eden's proposals for the reorganization of Strasbourg were formally agreed. I asked for my dissent to be noted in the minutes. Churchill, not unkindly, observed that this was not necessary. * views would be on record. Altogether it was an unpleaseuit experience. I still did not know what to do. During the next few days I seriously con­templated resigning from the Government.My resignation would have been a blow - but by no means so powerful a blow as at a later stage, when I had proved myself a successful Housing Minister."(15;
Sir Michael Fraser finds this resignation story 
plausible, but Duncan Sandys discounts it.
(14) Above, p. I %
(15) Op .cit.. pp.471-472
L  ^
Macmillan* s interview with Re6B*Mogg(16) 
reveals a regret that the Churchill Government 
had not taken a lead in Europe and sees reference 
to a *poat-war relapee of energy*• A cynical 
view of Churchill in oppoeition might be that he 
sought a European platforra in case of an extended 
period of Labour rule. Sir Michael Praser, at the 
Conservative Research Deimrtment at the time, says 
that speeches at Zurich and elsewhere did not 
make Churchill a European of the Lunoan Sandys 
type - the leader of the Opposition wanted a 
United Europe, but with Britain maintaining her 
* three circles* connections. Macmillan*s memotts 
reveal the limitations of his own European commit­
ment - greater than Churchill*s but still a tactical 
rather than a philosophical commitment.
AS a member of the recently-formed Western 
European Union, Britain sent a delegation to 
Brussels for discussions about the establishing of 
a European Economic Community. British members 
sat as observers in each of the Expert *3paak 
Groups* (see above, p.fS" ) but, finally, Britain 
was unwilling to make a commitment and participation 
ended after December 1955. Britain, enjoying a 
considerable technological lead, also rejected the 
supranational Euratom - she was particularly 
anxious not to jeopardize her connection with the 
United States (although little co-operation 
occurred between the two before 1958).
In the two years before he became Prime 
Minister in January 1957, Wacmillan occupied 
several senior appointments - Minister of Defence 
(18th October, 1954)5 forei^ Secretary 
(7th April 1955); Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(20th December 1955). He was thus intimately 
connected with the important oommunity-developments 
in Europe.
(16) Below, p.4-1
Haomlllan was to expand a good deal of 
government time on a free trade area plan with­
out revealing any commitment to the Europe of 
the Communities. There still existed misunder­
standing as to the force of *Europoanism* and 
an attempt was made to find am easy alliance with 
the new Europe.
At a meeting of the O.B.E.C. Council of 
Ministers in July 1956, Macmillan, as Chancellor, 
said that the United Kingdom would welcome free 
trade in industrial goods between O.B.E.C. 
countries. In the same month the Council of 
O.B.B.G. decided to study the possibility of an 
association between the Six and the remaining 
members of the organization. On 26th November 
1956 the House of Commons was informed that talks 
were in progress, although in fact those were in 
abeyance while the Rome Treaty negotiations were 
in progress. After Macmillan became irime 
Minister in January 1957 British interest in 
Europe quickened and, in February, her proposal 
for a Free Trade Area, was published(17). There 
was considerable commitment to the idea of a Free 
Trade Area in Britain in the months that followed.
In February 1957 O.B.E.C. set up three 
working parties to examine the details of possible 
trade links. Peter Thomeycroft was Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers when this decision was 
taken. Work was held up due to E.E.C. Treaty 
ratification and the committees did not report 
until October 1957, when Reginald Maudling took
(17) Cmnd. 72
up chairmanship of a steering oomittee(18).
A further twelve months* work produced nothing.
A major dispute in O.E.5.0. over 3.B.C. 
quota arrangements preceded the breakdown of 
the Free Trade Area talks in November 1958.
(The Rome Treaty had been signed in March 1957 
and come into force in January 1958. Britain* s 
free trade initiative thus came before the 
emergence of S.B.C. and free trade proposals 
were examined at the same time as t>ie Six 
organized themselves.) And a change of regime 
had ooou3rred in France.
De Gaulle had assumed power in May 1958. 
Prior to this he had castigated those who 
favoured a Common Market. Now, with the devalu­
ation of the franc and the subsequent austerity - 
verite et severite - French industry suddenly 
found Itself to be highly competitive. But the 
competition which would bo afforded by a wider 
free trade area was feared. De Gaulle saw a way
(18) Peter Thomeycroft remained as principal co-ordinator. Reginald Maudling, lay- mastor General, and from 17th September 1957 in the Cabinet, undertook actual negotia­tions - all the tine working with interested ministers at home and reporting to the Prime Miniater. Maudling* s assumption of office as Chairman of the 0.3.B.C. steering commi­ttee may have been unwise. "Diplomatists should seldom be allowed to frame policy and politicians seldom to conduct negotia­tion." (Busk.D.% The Craft of Dlidooacyp. 241) The minis ter ialappoljitmonl was adeparture for Britain designed to enoure speed and to reduce paper work. After the failure of talks, however, it seemed;that we had committed too much of the Government* s prestige to the enterprise while weakening Maudling* s position as an advocate of the British point-of-view.
in
to settle aooounts with the Anglo-Saxons,
(In September he h/.d written a memorandum to 
Elsenhower demanding a share, with Britain, 
in the direction of Western strategy). On 
14th November 1958 a French ministerial state­
ment announced that France would not accept any 
formal association which did not include a pro­
vision for a single tariff between the Six and 
the rest of the world. .T7-i§. j
The resignation of Peter Thomeycroft as 
Ohancellor of the Exchequer (on the public 
spending issue) on 6th January 1958 is a factor 
to be considered in the Free Trade Area failure - 
this removed from the British team the minister 
most alive to the continental point of view that 
the negotiations were not merely about technical 
economic arrangements but involved 3urope*s 
political future•
in
3. Dlplomaoy. R.Bareaontal;loa and Adalnlatratiwi
3*1 Interdepartaental Co-ojrdinatlon
Diploniatio relations today involve summit 
and pexmanent conferences; those with comprehen­
sive agendas and those arranged on an ad hoc 
basis; and, global, regional and bi-lateral 
working parties. The complexity of internat­
ional political life demands that diplomacy 
a deux be supplemented by a considerable amount 
of multilateral activity, public and private(l). 
The great public international forums like the 
n,N«0. are merely the tip of the diplomatic 
iceberg.
(1) "What is new is the array of internationalorganizations which meet regularly to review the current situation in the field of their own responsibility. Montagu Norman was one of the earliest to see the need for develop­ing this kind of thing when he took the lead in setting up the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. The International Monetary Fund was a later step la the came direction but, apart from occasional special activities, is not, perhaps, a leading ex­ample of the nev/ type arrangements for routine review of the situation by an inter­national organization. The O.E.O.D. in Paris, and especially its Working Party Three would be better examples, though the Bank for International Settlements remains, in its field, a very good instance of a body which meets regularly for the purpose of routine international review. Certainly the mone­tary committee of the S.S.C. is another good example, but, apart from the impression one gains from knowing all its leading members, we 80 far have no direct experience of it. There are. of course, other very important examples in the United Hationa , and military fields." (L.l. Thoznp8on-4IcCausland. Bank of England. Letter, 24th January, 1970;
'ZS
Following the Marshal Aid offer, the 
Oocmittee of European Economie Co-operation was 
set up to dreift a report. Thio represented the 
first joint action of the Western Kuroi>ean states#
The O.B.E.C# began work in laris on 16th July 1947 
under the ohalnaanship of Sir Oliver Franks, who had 
with him a strong British team, ultimately about 
fifty strong. Subsequently pemanent United 
Kingdom delegations, responsible to the Foreign 
Secretary, were accredited to U.N.O. (in Now York 
and Geneva); to O.B.E.C. in Paris; to the 
Brussels Treaty Organization, and to the High 
Authority of B.C.S.0. in Luxembourg. (In point 
of technical status the last-named of the five 
delegations was different from the others, for the 
body to which it was accredited as unique - the first 
supranational community ever to come into existence. 
Our permanent representation was thus accredited as 
a normal diplomatic mission to a foreign sovereign.)
A new burst of interdepartmental activity, 
at home and abroad, occurred in the period when a 
Free Trade Area was discussed. The work Whitehall 
had to perform during the 1957-1958 period v/as con­
siderable and the scale of the machinery involved 
in investigation was greater than a decade earlier. 
Between the launching of the idea and the suspension 
of negotiations in November 1958, eight departments 
of govommont were heavily and continuously concerned#
4- Although the increasing role of economic 
affairs in foreign policy formulation created 
problems of co-ordination, interdepartmental co­
operation largely disappeared after the first world 
war#
A partial explanation of this lies in the story 
of Sir Warren Fisher*s successful attempt in 1919 to 
have himself designated as *Head of the Civil Service*
and in the resultant Treasury-Foreign Offioe 
antagoniam* Trouble existed between the depart­
ments before 1919, but in the inter-war years, 
there occurred an intensification of friction.
Further explanation must be found in ministerial 
differences over policy.
Interdepurtmental co-operation survived the 
second war. Belief that pre-war errors had to some 
extent represented a failure in co-ordination was 
present in the minds of those who shaped machinery.
The 1943 Bden proposals - Proposals for the 
Reform of the Foreign Service. Cmnd. 6420, para,5 - 
stated that the Foreign Office would in future be 
regarded as the headquarters of the Foreign Service, 
rather than as a department of the home civil 
service. In seeking to explain the post-war 
relaxation between the Foreign Office and ths 
Treasury one must further add that the latter depart­
ment functioned in a world where public expenditure 
was not abhorred.
The problem as to whether the Foreign Offioe 
should be primarily an instrument of negotiation 
or a department responsible for conducting the 
nation* s affaire in all branches of external rela­
tions - economic and cultural as well as political - 
hoa not arisen in the post-war world.
There was a period when the claims of the 
Foreign Office, advanced by Mr. Bevin, for a major 
say in foreign economic policy were of considerable 
importance. With the move of Crlpps to the 
Treasury this period came to an end. Once the new 
international machinery for economic recovery had 
been set in motion, the Foreign Secretary 
concentrated on the question of increasingly tense
Bast-West relations and the Treasury was free 
to exercise its talents $
With the coming into operation of those 
bodies mentioned at the beginning of this section 
- and with the operation of G.A.T.T., I.M.P,, and 
I.B.R.D# - British policy-making demanded a con­
siderable degree of co-ordination. By 1950 a 
fairly elaborate organization had come into exist­
ence to deal with the burden. On the ministerial 
side a Cabinet committee under the Lord President 
of the Council dealt with economic policy. On 
the official aide bilateral, country-by-couhtry 
negotiations looked after by the Overseas 
Negotiating Committee (1947), while Europe was 
looked after by the *London* Committee. This 
interdepartmental committee, established in 
July 1947, had representatives from the Foreign 
Office, the Board of Trade, the Ministries of Food 
and Agriculture, Fuel and lower and Supply, and 
from the Economic Planning Staff.
A departure from the more formal methods of 
conducting relations between the Foreign Office and 
other departments had occurred. Arising from both 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations an easy 
inter-departmental relationship with no serious 
worry over precedence developedt
"By the end of the period /t95STf it was possible to claim that, at any rate in the economic field, British foreign policy could be looked at as an operation carried out by government as a whole, with no single department claiming priority.It was hold that the problems of inter­departmental rivalry, noted in earlier periods in Britain and still extant in other countries, had largely disappeared."(2)
(2) Beloff, M.t New Dimensions in Foreign Policy. 1961, p.24.CSee Chepier,D .N . % F .È .G .
W illson»The O rganization of B r i t i s h  Centra l 
Government 1914-1964«2nd E d , ,1 9 6 3 ,Table X V I,  Oversees Representative© of Departments Other 
than Those Concerned E x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  E xternal  A ffa irs  & Defence, p .20 0 ,)
3.2 The Department*
In September 1947 it was announced that 
Sir Stafford Grippe would take up the nev/ poet 
of Minister for Econonio Affairs. Re was to 
have, not a department, but a small personal staff. 
At this point it might have been guessed that 
economic planning both domestic and foreign would 
be given to a Ministry of Economics, separate from 
the Treasury; the Dalton resignation and the move 
of Grippe to the Chancellorship, less than two 
months after the appointment mentioned above, 
removed this possibility. The effect was to bring 
within the Treasury most of the existing machinery 
for économie planning and co-ordination.
The Chancellor took with him to the Treasury 
a Second Secretary whose competence was broadened 
to cover the European Recovery Programme, includ­
ing the * London* Committee (see above). This work 
was kept somewhat apart from the rest of the 
Treasury machine. The Second Secretary regarded 
himself as having a triple responsibility - to the 
Chancellor, to the Foreign Secretary, and to the 
President of the Board of Trade - he made 
necessary submissions to all three and was available 
to report to any one of them(l).
By 1952 the big O.B.E.C. operations, the 
division of dollar aid, the creation of European 
Payments Union, and the liberalisation of intra- 
European trade had been completed. Treasury 
activity declined and its organisation reflected 
the diminution of the importance of Europe in 
British policy.
(1) Beloff, M.i OP.Pit.. p .41
The Bank of England in pre-war years 
enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy and, 
in post-war years, has retained significant 
influence(2). In the work of international 
financial institutions the Bank works in close 
partnership with the Treasury and other depart­
ments, not merely in preparatory work but in 
operations. The external side of the Bank*s work 
is necessarily bound up with other aspects of 
external economic policy thus co-operation with 
the Treasury, in particular, must be close* The 
Bank*8 power derives from its technical expertise - 
what is teohnioally feasible sets limits in policy 
decisions. The Bank has to be taken into account 
as a locus of activity but its mode of operation 
reveals little(3).
The Department of Overseas Trade was abolished 
in 1946 and its immediate successor was the Export 
Promotion Department of the Board of Trade. There
(2) On 28th April 1925 Churchill, as Chancellor, announced Britain* s return to the Gold Stan­dard. Re had put up a long and Intensive fight against Sir Otto Rlemeyer, Controller of Finance at the TresLsury, and Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank. The struggle was revealed when Treasury papers were made available in 1969. (See Skidelsky, H. in The Times. 17th March, 19690
(3) In 1959 the Radcliffe Committee's Report on th. y.ryiy, of Jh. M o y  tary SystentrcâBii. M l  ) deolared that the Bank was far too secretive and should publish fuller monetary informa­tion. Witness also the struggle of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries to investigate the Bank against Government wishes (Commons debate 11th February 1969). Complaint continues. See Croome,D. and Johnson, R.i Money in Britain. 1959-1969
waa also a Oonsaeroial Relations and Treaties 
Department and, on 1st January 1949, these two 
merged into the Commercial Relations and Exports 
Department. This department of the Board of 
Trade accomodated work connected with O.B.E.C. 
trade liberalization, then with E.E.C. and free 
trade area Initiatives.
It must be noted that the President of the 
Board of Trade, Sir David Ecoles, was not given 
control of the Free Trade Area negotiations in 
1957-58. (See above, p. 25^. )
Hot until October I960 did the Board of Trade 
establish a new Export Council of Europe - "the 
most rapidly developing market in the world", to 
quote the department's head.
Although the formal independence of the 
Foreign Offioe had been declared (above), this was 
not to occasion a separation of its work from that 
of govemmont as a whole. The formal duty of 
delegations abroad was to report through the Foreign 
Office and this department adapted its ori^anization 
to meet the increasing burden.
The internal organization of the Foreign 
Offioe had to be constantly revised so as to see 
that the departments into which it was divided 
apportioned work in a rational manner. Throu^ 
the Bevin era and beyond there occurred a rapid 
adaptation of organization. A growth of work 
showed itself in the development of departments 
dealing with economic relations and with European 
and Atlantic institutions, ao compared with the 
geographic departments. In February 1948 the 
European Recovery Department was set up (to relieve 
the Economic Relations Department) to become, in 
1951, the Mutual Aid Department.
By 1959 the departments in the Office mainly 
concerned with European and Atlantic organization 
were* the Mutual Aid Department, the Nestem 
Department, the Economic Relations Department and 
the Cultural Relations Department.
Foreign Service staff expanded greatly after 
the wart in 1960-61 over eleven thousand people 
were employed at home and abroad - a threefold 
increase over 1939(4). But Foreign Office 
resources during the period were strained.
The Foreign Office has been likened to an 
octopus - superbly equipped to receive impreaions.
But the octopus's power of reaction is deficient. 
Taking a Icnger-tem view than domestic depart­
ments, thinking in words and not in figures, it has 
had a reputation for detachment while it has con­
tinued to produce its memoranda - facts blanket ted 
by oplnions(5). This in spite of a common 
atmosphere of urgency - a staff under constant 
pressure but working in a ministry not designed 
to plan or ip make positive moves.
The Foreign Office has done little to build 
up machinery for long-range planning either as 
regards its own functioning or in respect of the 
kind of international problems it may have to face(6).
(4) Bishop, B.C. I The Administration of British Foreign Relations. 1961. p.^lj
(5) On detachment, cf. Claud Cockbum's first view of The Times editorial rooms".. a suD-edïtor was translating a passage of Plato's Phaedo into Chinese for a bet."I. Claud. London, Penguin, 1967, p.70
(6) Since 1884 the telegraphic address of the Foreign Office and of all British embassies has been 'Prodrome', which derives from the classical Greek 'Forerunner'. (Busk,D.,OP.cit.. p.254 0
3^
On the morrow of Dunoon(7), The Times could 
remark that the Foreign and Commonwealth Offioe 
had adapted smoothly to its reduced circum­
stances and had taken well to the idea that Europe 
was more important to Britain than Asia or Africa. 
Some hard thinking had occurred;
the pressure upon the Foreign Office made it difficult for it to deal with long-term planning. The research Depart­ment, which had largely sprung from duties undertaken in wartime, was given increased responsibilities towards the end of our pexaod [i.e. to 195$). By this time the Foreign Office was recruiting specialists for this department and bringing in senior experts concerned with areas which were thought to be of special importance. The department now produced forward-looking papers, containing estimates of future devel­opment, as well as acting in the nature of a reference department upon which the other sections could call."(8)
But Beloff notes bleaklyt
".. it would obviously be wrong to imagine that any internal re-organisation within the Foreign Offioe could enable plans for a number of years ahead to be made, and this was particularly the case in our period in relation to the European organisation since continental opinion seemed to be evolving at an unexpectedly rapid pace." (9)
(7) R.poyt o| ^  Reyl^ Compltt.. on Qvemeem Representation. 1968-69 (
forward-planning. A small planning and co­ordination section in the Permanent Secretary's Department operated under the supervision of a Steering Committee composed of senior officials.)
(9) Beloff,*.; op.cit.. p.l26
-3^
Diacuasion of departmental arrangements and 
of Interdepartmental co-ordination is not all.
If nearly all departments are now directly con­
cerned with fields of activity of an international 
kind (and this includes the boards of the nation­
alized industries) and if the basic structure of 
interdepartmental co-ordination (seen in the 
'London' Committee) has been worked out one must 
still say that operational bases depend on people. 
Dilettante staffs are inadequate.
The Foreign Office has been geared, tradit­
ionally, to the use of embassies abroad as the 
channels for contact with other countries. 
Negotiators abroad in earlier days had a great deal 
of freedom because the apparatus for communication 
with home was difficult. But the 'inner circle' 
of ambassadors - in Paris, Bonn, Rome, Moscow and 
Washington - are no longer eminent. In the post­
war world the most influential diplomats have been 
a group of senior men in London (10) and:
"Probably the growth of the Office's advisory func­
tion has in practice fully offset the decline in 
independence of the contemporary and (more or less) 
telegraphically-controlled British emissary 
abroad."(11)
What may be referred to as 'ambassadorial 
dispensability' should not be taken to signify 
that London is all-imi)ortant. From traditional
representation by embassy, the Foreign Offioe has 
had to develop à competence in permanent and semi-
(10) Sir Patrick Reilly. Sir Evelyn Shuokburgh, Sir Francis Rundall, Sir Roger Stevens.Sir Hugh Stephenson, Sir Roderick Baroiay, Ralph Murray.
(11) Lord Strang, The Foreign Office. 1955,p.170
Ipermanent conference diplomacy, in the setting­
up of delegations with varieties of okille. 
Delegations tod;iy evolve policy on the spot in a 
seminar atmosphere. The man on the spot is 
still important and;
"For diplomatic education.• permanent delegations are probably the best training schools that exist."(12)
But pressure on individuals can be great - hence 
attention to, among other things, the 'human 
time-clock' - and the price can be high#
"The representative at Ü.K.O. or on the Disoxmament Commission in Geneva may thus fare better than his counterparts on a normal mission. Principals, however, probably pay the price for the training of their 'bag-carriéra'I the very success of the new process is beginning to put ouch a mirden on individuals that it may soon begin to defeat its own purpose."(13)
At home in Britain decision-making is becoming 
slower - no matter how urgent the problem, more and 
more people have to be consulted(14).
Busk deplores the fact that Foreign Office 
personnel dealing with economic, financial and com­
mercial affaire are often amateurs# "It is not easy 
to find Deputy or Assistant Secretaries who are 
fully trained in economics and who ... are really 
keen on the work. The flair that is so essential 
a quality in all forms of diplomacy does not suff­
ice in economic affairs."( 15) And The Times# "In 
general, Whitehall suffers appallingly from a 
Byzantine superstructure of co-ordination super­
imposed on all too narrow an operational base."(16)
(12) Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, p.143
(13) L.F. Thompson-MoOausland, letter
(14) Busk,D. % The Craft of Diplomacy, p.239
(15) OD.olt.. P.245(16) 2nd November 1967
4* Reorientation 1959-1961 
4,1. Development of the B.B.C.
By I960 British scepticism about the B.B.O.'e 
success had declined and fear of exclusion from 
the enterprise became evident. Before coming to 
the story of these changes it seems appropriate 
to deal with developments in Europe.
In I960 the B.B.C. was still at the begin­
ning of the road to a customs union and the 
Treaty's gradualist strategy demanded comparatively 
little in the way of integration(l). However, as 
Britain thought anew about Europe, confident 
references were being made in Europe to the 
'Oommunity method'(2)
(1) The 3.B.C. treaty provided for a build-up of integrating power and for an accelera­tion of economic unity. But the treaty amplified close targets and underplayed the more remote. Removal of qualitative trade controls was to be gradual; tariffs among the member-nations were to be removed over a twelve- or fifteen-year period; there would be a step-by-step harmonization of external tariffs, and the formation of a common agricultural policy would wait until the first transition stage was completed. In all this the person­ality of Monnet was important; after earlier failures the astute tactician joined the enthusiast - 'Federation Now!' became 'A customs union in twelve to fifteen yAara!'
(2) "The 'Community method' is difficult to characterize in a few words, partly because it is a concept which has changed somewhat over time, partly because it connotes a complex of institu­tions, procedures, objectives and attitudes. Perhaps the essential chara­cteristics of the 'Community Method' are(1) the giving of wide powers of initia­tive to an independent body, (2) the delegation of real, if, at first, limited powers to an independent body, (3) legis­lative emd judicial control over the exercise of the delegated powers.
<n
During the first five years' operation of 
the B.B.O., economic development, as Illustrated 
in industrial production and trade figures, was 
markedly more favourable than in Britain(3)«
A clear trend vas certainly not evident in 
1960—61 and firm statistical evidence of the 
disparity of perforxoance was not available 
suffioiently early to constitute a postive influ­
ence on Macmillan. No doubt an impression of 
Suropean expansion was evident.
The first tariff reductions and quota 
enlargements in the B.B.C. took place on 
1st January, 1959• On 1st January, 1961, in 
accordance with the aocel ration decision of the 
previous Kay, the Six cut tariffs on internal 
trade by a further ten percent, thus bringing 
the total reduction to forty percent. Much 
more important was the first step taken to 
align their individual national tariffs with the 
agreed common external tariff - they started the 
process of turning themselves into a customs 
union, (a second acceleration agreement was 
decided on 15th May, 1962. This acceleration 
may have been facilitated by fear of British
(3) contd. (4) majority voting, if, again, only on a limited basis, among the participating governments, and (5) and most imx>ortant, the progressive replacing of policies which are national in scope and purpose by comon policies 80 that within the participating countries certain national policies are superceded by oommunity policies and for certain purposes the participating countries act externally not as a coalition but as a single entity."
(3) Kitainger,U.i The Second Try, p.326 and p.329
•dilution' of market impetus. Certainly, 
during the negotiations leading to the 
9th July 1961 association agreement with Greece, 
France took a very firm line on tariff quotas, 
desiring to avoid precedents useful to the 
United Kingdom.)(4)
These developments were seen as a severe 
threat to British trade and the New Statesman 
declared that the first aooeleration presented 
Britain with its most serious economic challenge 
since the Great Depression(5).
One must not forgst the B.B.C.'s ultimate 
aim of political union. The statesmen who 
proposed the three European Communities saw them 
as parallel roads towards political union. 
Follov/ing French soundings, the Six opened poli­
tical discussions in September I960. The 
'Little Summit* took place on 10th and 11th 
February 1961 and the Dutch - perhaps encouraged 
by London - suggested that Britain might join in 
talks relating to the political development of 
the oommxmity. (On 16th February, in the 
Commons, Macmillan said that Britain was ready 
to participate.) The most tangible z^sult of 
the B.B.C. suxomit was a decision to appoint a 
committee of representatives to try to formulate 
precise proposals. The Fouchet Committee, to 
become later the Cattani Committee, was set up 
and, after a second summit meeting, the Bonn 
Declaration was published on 18th July 1961.
In this the Six restated their determination to 
achieve the political union implicit in the 
community treaties. They agreed to hold regular
(4) See Ixyce, R.t "Common Market Timetable", in John Calmann(Ed.) Uestem Europe - a handbook, p.583
(5) 9th April, I960
meetinga of Heads of State, and of Foreign 
Ministers, and to hold periodic meetings of the 
ministers responsible for education, cultural 
matters and research. They also asked the 
committee to work out proposals for giving a 
statutory character to political union.
4.2 British Attitudes
(i) Westminster. The evolution of the British 
attitude towards Europe has already been traced 
with reference to llacmillan ( a b o v e , p p . . 
Rees-Mogg reports from an interview with Macmillan 
that there were four major aims of his administra­
tion: first, to re-establish the Amoricon
connection after the Suez disaster; second, to 
bring the Soviet Union into the European world 
and, with Kennedy, to end the Gold War; third, 
to encourage independence in Africa; and, fourth, 
to take Britain into Burope(l). As one has seen 
Macmillan was no 'European'•
The first major attempt to secure a closer 
connection with the Europe of the communities 
ended in failure, the Free Trade Area was never 
established.
"This was a shock for the British Govomnent, though at this distance of time it is hard to understand how they could possibly have hoped to see their plan succeeding. It Is probable that their negotiator, Reginald Maudling, able though he was, did not entirely grasp the political signifi­cance of the E.E.C. In any cose his efforts to play off the Germans against the French wore cleai ly doomed to failure. Moreover they aroused great, and it is to be feared, enduring
(1) The Times. 9th February, 1964
suspicion of British motives among the members of the newly-formed European Commission in Brussels#"(2)
In preparation for the 1959 Election, 
Macmillan established a committee under 
B.A.B, Butler with Lord Hailsham (Party 
Chairman) and Edward Heath (Chief Whip) among 
its members. Sir Michael Fraser, the committee's 
secretary, states that seventeen meetings were 
held from 23rd December 1957. The question of 
Europe was not to the fore. The October 1959 
Election yielded the Conservatives a majority 
of a hundred without Europe being discussed.
The 1959 Election was a great victory for 
the Conservatives and the winning of Brighouae 
and Spenborough from Labour in March I960 was a 
welcome postscript. And yet, as the 'Sixties 
began the Conservatives had run out of energy 
and had to discover new lines of political 
advance. This need did not arise because 
earlier aims had been adliieveds the tasks 
acknowledged in the 1951 manifesto, Britain 
Strong and Free - to attack the sise of public 
expenditure, to simplify the administrative
(2) Lord Gladvrynt De Gaulle's Europe. 1969,p.50
machine, to defeat inflation and to improve 
industrial relations - had not been 
accomplished.
The anti-planning philosophy of the 
'Fifties had yielded only disillusionment and 
January I960 saw the introduction of a 'stop' 
phase of 'stop-go'.(3) In February I960 a new 
formula for the control of defence expenditure 
was announced - it was to be limited to seven 
percent of G$N#F. In April, with the can­
cellation of Blue Streak, it became evident 
that Britain oould no longer enjoy a truly 
independent armoury. As Kitzinger notesi
"In the case of Harold Macmillan, the year I960 had proved instructivei the abandonment of Blue Streak and with it Britain's independent deterrent; the fiasco of the Paris summit conference and with it the failure of perhaps Britain's last major initiative on the world's diplomatic stage; and yet another serious balance of payments crisis from which the central banks of the continent saved us in early 1961 - these displayed the premises tliat led to our firet attempt to join /Surope/."(4)
Rethinking in the economic sphere led to the 
founding of the National Economic Development 
Oouncil and to the National Incomes Commission. 
"Neo-liberalism seemed to be worked-out," says 
Sir Michael Fraser, Chairman of the Conservative 
Party Organisation, "so we turned to indicative 
planning."(5) The volte face on planning was 
sudden - Central Offioe literature sneered at 
'growthoanship' as new policies were announced.
With the arrival of the young Kennedy, 
Macmillan'8 oervioeB as an international broker
(3) Sec Note A, p.
(4) Kitalnger,U.i The Second Try. 1968, p.ll
(5) Interview
were no longer neoaseary and, after the euxnzalt 
failure, Britain needed a new external mission, 
new avenues of influence. Sir Brio Holl's(6) 
coment on Macmillan's European initiative is 
crude# the Oonservativea needed political 
'oomph' for the future. As Britain surveyed 
her unoplendid isolation at the end of I960 and 
reappraised her international posture opportunism 
was in the fidr. "I would not want to leave you 
with the impression that it is merely the 
collapse of the Siuamit Conference which has made 
European unity so imperative," said John irofumo 
before the W.B.U. Conference in Paris on 
2nd June, I960.
+ On 30th May, I960 the political corres­
pondent of The Times noted# the last week 
has been rich in signs of the shift in emphasis 
from hopes of a dramatic détente at the summit 
to the mending or tightening of Britain's 
relations with Europe, and especially with 
France." Macmillan's task was not easy - his 
recent efforts at summitry had profoundly 
annoyed both France and Oezrusmy.
On 21st June, I960, in answer to a written 
question, Macmillan declared that our aim was to ^ 
secure a partnership between the two European 
groupings in a common system of trade, consistant 
with G.A.T.T.
A Conservative Early Day Motion of 
23rd June, I960 urged the Government to,
".. conault our partners in E.P.T.A. and in the 
Commonwealth, and to put forward firm proposals 
for subsequent negotiations with the Six."(7)
(6) Interview. And see below, p. f
(7) Commons Order Paper, Col.4109, E.D.%. No.99
Six of the twenty-eeven signatories wore 
members of the party's Foreign Affaire 
Oomznittee* Aubrey Jones (Minister of Fuel and 
lower 1955 - 1957 and Minister of Supply 
1957 - 1959) declared that, eventually, we would 
have no choice but to enter Europe and to reject 
the idea of a special relations/with the United 
States.(8)
Belwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary, initiated 
the Commons debate of 25th July, I960 by moving 
the motions
"That this House recognicea the need for political and economic unity in Europe and would welcome the con­clusion of suitable srrangeuenta to that end, satisfactory to all the Governments concerned."(9)
The motion expressed a general objective while 
being vague as to methods of achievement of ends.
Maudling, President of the Board of Trade, 
who summed up for the Government, cautiously 
wondered whether a * course less drastic than 
joining E.E.C. was open. rrinclpal Labour 
speakers were not sanguine. Wilson declared 
that the case for entry waa formidable but the 
decision oould not be clear or simple - the 
nation was faced with a choice of evils.
Healey believed that no-one in the House would 
hold it inconceivable that Britain should enter 
B.B.C. but believed also that we should wait. 
Labour was thus with the Government, being 
aomewhat cooler than the Foreign Secretary but 
more realistic than the President of the Board
(8) The Guardian. 18th July, I960
(9) 627 |WLJ)sb., Col. 1099
H'’
of Trade on the availability of middle 
courses.(10) The debate lacked drama and made
no impact in Europe, where leaders could be 
forgiven for detecting no shift of emphaeie in 
British feeling.
The Conservative Conference of I960 
(like the Liberal Assembly) passed a motion in 
favour of entry with a large majority.
During the Debate on the Queen's Speooh 
on 4th November, I960, Heath said that nogotia- 
tions with the Six should not begin until there 
existed a genuine prospect of suooese - Europe 
oould not risk (mother attempt ending in failure.
By the end of I960 very little positive 
progress had been made towards an agreement with 
the Six. Ideas of 'bridge-building' were 
giving way to concepts of a modified customs 
union, perhaps on the basis of an inner and 
outer Europe. In the first halt of 1961 some 
government opinion betrayed a willingness to 
contemplate acceptance of the essential features
(10) In the period until mid-1961 the weightof Labour opinion remained undecided about Europe - there was a general disinclination towards joining combined with a wait-and-see attitude. It is noteworthy that for nine months after the July,I960 debate Labour bad little time, even at conference, for the European debate. The party was too much occupied by unilateralism. And yet opinions were voiced. Labour signatories of the Early Day Motion of 26th May, I960 expressed a willingness to accept some sacrifice of sovereignty through entry to K.E.C. In the summer of I960, George Brown, declaring a chan^^e of mind on Europe, said that Britain should think what she could offer to Europe in order to find her way back. In I960 Douglas Jay began his career of opposition to Europe on grounds of hard coat. Denis Healey wrote on the subject of federalism# inside E.B.O., the United Kingdom would have no more influence than California or Massachusetts in the U.S.A.
of the Treaty of Rome# In February Macmillan 
declared that Britain was ready for political 
consultations, (11) while Heath said that no 
arrangement would be satisfactory which did not 
involve a political as well as an economic link. 
On May 18th 1961 in the Commons Heath made 
evident that he himself favoured full member­
ship of B.B.C.
After the activity of the winter, particu­
larly after the prolonged private exchah.ee 
betv/een governments, (12) tension was almost 
tangible in London by the spring of 1961. It 
was summer before matters came to a head;
"Some lAinisters are known to believe that only a negotiation of some kind with the Six. whether it is called formal or informal, will settle whether the safeguards and precondi­tions Britain, E.P.T.A., and the Commonwealth need are to be had from the Six. Other Ministers do not conceal that their minds M v e  still to be made up whether a negotiation would be worthwhile."(13)
(11) At this time the Six were examining the possibility of political union. (See above, p. (f<o.)
(12) See fpés--éq.
(13) The Times. 21st July, 1961
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(11) The Civil üervioe* J?Pon 1945 the 
Aiaerloan conneotion had been the sheet-anchor 
of British policy, saye Sir Frank Lee (see 
below). In the early stages Bnrope was dis­
organized and hard up and might have battened 
upon Britain, The Buropeano - Monnet, Marjolln, 
and so on - "did not cut any Ice", The Foreign 
Office under Eden was a solid force against 
Burope(l), During the later •Fifties many 
middle—range officials were for entry Into 
Europe but the •special relationship^ ( b e l o w , p . ) 
was still strong. The Office^exhibited a 
conspicuous lack of interest during the long 
negotiations over a free trade area,
Herbert V^ndrew, Second Secretary at the 
Board of Trade in the early •Sixties, has said 
that at the end of the •Fifties many civil 
servants were seeking Ideas, Partly by 
accident, a set of people more Europeani-ininded 
than Incumbents of five ye<\rs before were 
occupying important poets. This was a imln 
Input Into the situation - people had begun to 
talk of entry to Europe in a serious manner.
Sir Eric Roll romarked that Macmillan was 
easily persuaded about Europe; he had pride 
in his vision and historical sense. The crucial 
fact was that, as Andrew says, the Foreign Office 
had woken up.
(1) See p, SU , for Macmlllan^s commenton the Foreign Office memorandum of 1952.
Foreign Office Interest was only aroused 
by the deterioration of relations which occurred 
after the breakdown of the free trade talk* 
and became narked when the 81x began to dl&cueo 
seriously political unification.
Lord Dtrong, until 1955» îorr.anont Secretary 
at the Office, made a declaration In I960 whichb t l«rWshowed the evolution of view (aWve, p. ).
Here, in the Foreign Office, was the greet 
change sayo Sir Prank Lee.
"The permanent head of the foreign Office, 9ir Frederick Uoyer Killar, former Anbaeoador to Bona, always remained sceptical but the new arrivals In the European Departruent - Sir Evelyn ShuckUurg!:, back froiz Paris In I960.Sir Roderick Barclay, appointed that year to be opoclal auvioer on European trade, and dir Patrick Hciliy, o%-'Æbaasador to hoscow - ware all Community minded. One of thoue recall* hiu astoniciu&snt when, tü turning In I960 from a three-year stint abroad with definitely Europeoii ideas, and expecting to find himself in a berctio&l minority, he discovered on the contrary that all his colleagues agreed with him. In ite months before the irine Kinlstar announced the Government*s deoielon to seek entry, a senior official of the Poreign Office complained that he really hardly knew howto prevent come of hi» staff * fullingovorbou d In their European frenzy*".(2)
Herbert Andrew confesees that his attitude 
to Europ'C had at first been sceptical. While 
at tJie Board of Trade he had been affected by .
the view* of younger and more Junior civil
servants on the Romo Treaty. He had watched 
the prceees of seeking answers to practical 
questions on the continent and had come to feel 
that Britain could *put something la*. It was
smorol Zo. 196!, )(3.) B.loXf,R.t fiitfgP,Pi #69-90 aiid note reference abovt (p.ito the * planning mood*.
, 'à:
so
not Just a etatter of Leaking more - there
would be tt big future If w© could help break 
doim tlie bouodnrieo of natlomXiuis* Before 
the tcid of the Bruaaelo nogotlatlonu he felt 
quite positively that it would be a good tiling 
for Britain to 'tike e. seat at tiie r.f.O* table#
AndrcT' déclarée that he Ic ulwojc 
inclined to question the Idea of ' de;*urtmental 
tradition* - in the depnrtaonto txexi can onke 
a lot of difforonoe# A oacc in  ^oint would 
appcro* to be t W  Treasury ^mder f>akine then Lee# 
Roger Kfiklna (later to become the flr^t 
Boron Bherfleld) had had Iwig experience of tiie 
Foreign Office and the DlpXonatlc Service before 
coninj to the Treasury, in 1956, as Joint 
Permaneut Secretary# He enjoyed considerable 
influence and v*ns indeed a key fi^ ;ui*e# His 
fomutive years had been opent In the United 
States and he had tiorrled an Ancrlerjat He was 
notoriously luke^warn towards 2uroje und liie 
influence ccunted a great de.il# This was 
iUuotrated, suye Sir frunit Lee, botli in the 
attempt to found a free trade e.rea (r cheap 
way into buro#), and in the foundation of 
%#y#T.'« (a tclatake)* The great ch^n^e at the 
Treasury cwae when Mokins left; the date of  ^
his daiwirturc wia "a Jiapiy chance" #
%lth twenty years* experience of inters 
national financial wid eoonosilc problems behind 
him, the energetic Sir Fr&nic Oodbould Lee 
became Joint iernaneat 8aof*t&ry at the Tre.^aury 
in early I960. He had been inclined toward© 
Europe while ut the Board of Trade; he now 
made up hie aind. The confidential and 
reassuring nivloe must have influenced 
Uaemlllsn -routly# In I960, says Sir Prank, 
people at the Treasury • e ive himself- wore 
logging behind the Foreign Office in their 
oonoem for « ixusve toward a ^wope# This was
to
"The cpeod and extent of the change of official opinion on Europe should per­haps partly be attributed to the force of fashion# A young Treasury official, long a oonvinoed advocate of Britain** entry into Europe, reoalls that whereas in 1959 the very idem was enough to cause him to be written off us a long- ' haired ocaentrio, in I960 it was getting to be all right, and, by 1961  ^you were a etick-in-the-fsud if you thou^t otherwise#"(4)
Sir William Goroll Barnes, Deputy Under 
Secretory at the Colonial Office In tho early 
•Sirtias, traces the evolution of his pro- 
European views from the time that he aosunod, 
in 1959, economic as against political duties 
within his depanoent# He found that the 
Ooverzmcnt was conducting a *ve%i:otta* against 
the Six relùtod to their elaboration of associa­
tion provisions for former French territories# 
(The difficulty had been revealed with tbs 
publication of the Rome Treaty in Mnrch 1957 
clt ough the association of t e  foraer territo­
ries had been announed on 13th February# This 
inclusion, the price of French acceptance of 
B#E#C#t hod surprised Britain#}
The general thought moving Gorell Barnes 
at the time was that the primary producers - 
and the Colonial Office concern was largely 
with tropical producer* - were more and more 
going to have to sell their coffee and cocoa to 
Europe# Whether or not Britain joined the 
Conmnnity agreement would have to be reached 
with the Six, "tomorrow rather than ten years 
hence" # Basically he was in favour of entry 
to Europe but he also wanted to ease the solu­
tion of Britain*a African problems# n#^%C#*a
(3) OB.cit.. p.89
association arrangements under Articles 
131-156 were to expire on 1st January 1963.
At a time when these arrangements were being 
re-examined, Gorell Bames was responsible 
for a change of view on Europe in the Colonial 
Office*
(iii) Interest Groups. Industry in general, 
and the Federation of British Industries as 
its most influential spokesman, had strongly 
Bupported the idea of a free trade area with 
the Six betv/een 1956-1958. During the vfinter 
of 1958-1959 the P.B.I. had pursued the project 
of a European Free Trade Association with more 
obvious zeal than had government officials. 
Essentially, however, tho overriding interest 
of industry was to find an acceptable arrange­
ment with the Common Market. Some industrial 
leaders pressed for an accommodation with the 
Six in I960 but the prevailing business view, 
as in government,was that time would make a 
settlement easier. The main pressure for a 
move into Europe came in Spring 1961.
In July, 1961 the F.B.I. published British 
Industry and Europe; a statement for F.B.I. 
members * While the pamphlet declared that the 
Commonwealth should not bo asked to pay a 
oubetantlal part of the price of British entry 
and that moral and contractual commitments to 
B.F.T.A, must be honoured, it was by no means 
wholly negative in its survey of issues 
affecting Industry;
Tariffs % in principle tho F.B.I. was not opposed to the common tariff and in practice would not raise substan­tial objections to the level of tariff likely to obtain;
S3
0oncionv/galtht there should he o ppor tunï t£e 8 for the exilons ion of Commonwealth production, particu­larly that of the developing countries (largely an agricultural problem);
Commonwealth ircfereitce; of some Imporiance to most inclus tries, of groat importance to some, the F.B.I. would accept its disappeax^unce with reluctance if Common/ealth nations decided to seek more liberal treatmont from the E.E.O.;
TJratog gl]r.<toB Ic^ort of lotgrcetWhile the F.B.I. recOf^nizcd the need of Asian expansion, a problem of low- cost Asian exports existed. Britain was carrying a disproportionate share of these imports and a spreading of the bui'dcn was called for;
haw ^iterlalo# the F.B.I. would le^ïore sut3tantial increases in costs;
jr iA c U c o e  r r o v is iu ^ s :  tue T‘:.::.c. was plaoin 5^ vjr^-lng inter- pretatlono on provisions and thio would give rise to great uncertainty and end- leoo legal difficulties;
Dumred and subsidised imports: the F.B.I. T/oultt v/ani proapi action agaiist these;
Social goliov; the F.B.I. was against oeed iiurnonization.
The F.B.I. concluded that outstanding 
issues were not incapable of solution;
"A Burope-*ride multilateral trading aye ten has always been our desire and, we believe, t>iat of the great bulk of Industry in Europe. We would greatly welcome an early end to the present division. Nevertheless a large majority of uo are of the opinion that it is right not to become committed to formal negotiations with the Six until existing differences over the problems outlined above have been so far narrowed as to offer the prospect of a satisfactory outcome."(1)
(1) Op.cit., p.3» para.15
The F.B.I# WEIS distressed by the anti- 
BuropeEui interpretation put on its document 
and it repeatedly emphasized that it was an 
aide-memoire for member firms and neither 
formal advice to the Government nor an attempt 
to influence nationsü. or international opinion.
Sir Borman Kipping, Director-General of the 
F.B.I., agreed that the conclusion of the report 
could have been turned Euround to state that 
there should be preliminary discussion to narrow 
the differences between Britain and the Six before 
formal negotiations began.
The Sunday Times. 16th July 1961 noted 
that the F.B.I. conclusions (quoted above) may 
not hc^ ve been intended by the Grand Council of 
the F.B.I. to be as emphatically negative or sus 
feebly positive as they appeared. Further, the 
F.B.I. accepted the fact that the conclusions 
were the result of the strength of individual 
moribor-flrus on the Council - the largest 
firms, more strongly p»-European, seemed to be 
under-represented by the federation's system of 
voting.
Ignoring the fact that Commonwealth trade over 
recent years had increased faster with S.S.C. 
than vfith Britain, the Commony/ealth Industries 
Assoc Lation fought to msdntain the oconomio 
and political cohesion of the 0oxamonwecü.th(2).
In July 1961 it distributed a leaflet to all U.P.*s 
and to the chairman of Conservative constituency 
associations. Sir Tufton Beamish, between 1938- 
1963 Deputy Chairman of the 1922 Committee and, in 
1960-1961 Chairman of tho Conservative Foreign 
Affairs Committee, dissociated himself from 
this xjamphlet - he and his follow-P.F. *0 had
(2) The C.I.A.f Monthly Bullet^ served as amouthpiece for • fifonnonwoaltb• Conservatives.^  b e , p. ^
not bean oonaulted, and the association spoke 
only of the disadvantages of entry(3)«
Opposition came also from Sir Berosford 
Craddock, Chairman of the CoQoenwealth 
Industries Association itself from the begin­
ning of the * Fifties# He and various 
ministers h^d tried to develop Craoonwealth 
trade, with no result - the ComzBonwealth was 
not intereeted# It was ohort-eighted not to 
think of other developments ( 4 ) #
British industry in 1961 was undoubtedly 
conoemed with the deterioration of commercial 
relations with Europe# It was not wholly 
without fear of 2#2#0*s centralized institutions 
and of a loss of British oonneroial and fiscal 
freedom# Entry to Buropo would bring a rise 
in food prices, and thus wages, and might 
damage British competitivenees# But industry 
desired entry, on conditionsi
"Associations representing the motor, iron and steel, shipbuilding and chemical industries, and the British chambers of ooomeroe, all reported a generally favourable opinimi among their members on tho question of the Common Market - provided there are effectivo safeguards to agriculture and Oomcuuurealth trade."(5)
(Textiles and shoes anticipated severe ootbaoks 
if Britain entered Europe#) Hardly anyone, 
said the dunday Tines, mentioned 2#F#T#A##
(3) The Times, 22nd July, 1961
(4) The Times. 20th July, 1961
(5) Eundgy Times survey, 16th July, 1961
f In an era when agriculture had to be main­
tained against possible siege, or severe 
restriction of imports, it was imperative that a 
high level of home-grown food be maintained. In 
conditions of possible nuclear warfare, when a new 
time-scale had to be considered, support for mar­
ginal production had to be questionedt
"These environment changes and the organizational crisis they induced were fully apparent two or three years before the question of Britain’s possible entry into the Common Market first appeared on the political agenda - which, of course, further complicated every issue."(6)
Sir Anthony Hurd, chairman of the Conservative 
backbenchers* agricultural committee, declared in 
Kay 1961 that our system of subvention was one that 
we should not rashly abandon. But the system he 
and the farmers defended was already being recon­
sidered by the govemnent(7). Three days before 
the OoLimons debate during which Hurd spoke, 
Christopher Soames visited the Conservative agri­
culture committee and said that the British system 
was not settled for all time. Indeed, the White 
Paper, Agriculture; report on talks betv/een the 
agricultural departments and the farmers* unions. 
Juno - December.1960(8). had reported; "During the 
course of these talks, tho Agricultural Departments 
have discussed with the Unions in a preliminary way 
the possibility of modification in the detailed 
mechanism of some of the price guarantee schemes."(9) 
(Nothing happened during the Brussels negotiationst 
in the Commons on 11th February 1963, the Irlme
(6) Emery, F.E. and Trlst,E.L.; "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments", Human Relations. Vol.16, No.1.,1965, p.27




Minister spoke of a ohaage from the openm 
ended Exchequer coamitment to agriculture.)
The National Farmers* Union, the Federa­
tion of British Industries and the County 
Landowners* Association were involved with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland and the leaders of the Marketing 
Boards during the preparation for negotiations 
with the Six. The National Union of 
Agricultural Norkero also had a voices Edwin 
Gooch, its President opposed entry as did the 
secretary, Harold Oollison.
The organization that most consistently 
questioned British entry was the N.F.U. It 
had intimate contacts with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and it operated also through the 
European section of the International 
Federation of Agricultural iroducere, and the 
Chambers of Commerce. During negotiations it 
had contact with the S.5.C. Commission and the 
New Zealand Federated Farmers.
The N.F.U. annual report for I960 (in 
British Farmer. 7th January, 1961) mentions the 
above contacts and also the visit, in October, 
of Dr. Siooo Mansholt, Vice-president of the 
E.E.G. Commission, who during a lengthy meeting 
dealt with the E.E.C.*s proposed oonmon 
agricultural policy. The annual reiort for 
1961(10) mentions meetings with M.r.*s of all 
parties and a considerable amount of travel 
by N.F.U. officials to meet representatives of 
various European farming organizations. A 
further visit by Mansholt was recorded; he had
(10) In British Farmer. 6th January,1962
adüreaacd a .^.ublic witli pr^siCent
Harold 'oolley In the chair. (The f. ct tîiat a 
XiTea tlgo lidvertiüiac; c;yrq ul,j*i, .vith tlio 
p r o a l x o a t ' ü  r a - o r t  p a b i i c i h e l  l i h e  a  a i y
rojort for tixo flz-at tiio, l^ZLl^.zd i n  
U i i ®  y o u ^ r  h a ^ i  n o  v u a r w c  L I  u n  u r o - s ,
a c c o r d l i L :  t o  o ^ i i c i ^ l a  a t  ; » g r i c u l t  : r o  h u i u j o . )
G i v e n  t a a  i r i . , o r t . C i C e  o f  a q r l c u l t i i r o ,  t h e r e  
waa o;r^ rlcla/ly little lot lie 1 ooa-vi"urv/.ion 
o f  i t h  i n  i U b l i c  d e b t , t o  u a f o r o
îi i o n i l i u u * a  a ^ a i o u n c c  . a a t .  -Ui v . t t i t u  u  o f  n i n d  
p r e v a i l c J  w U i c i i  * c a c a a i o d  ... . r i c u l t u r e * , v : i t h  a  
• r o v e r c i S  p r o l c r c a c o *  t h e  j.a . e : â t h
t o o  a w f u l  t o  b o  c o . a . i d o r o d *  T h o  î.îov r n a e n t  xran 
under ZiOiic cone Lralat: rul ith the
Formera» dnioao hotl a ;toricr ;tGd fo'^ ivhv-inq a 
t o u g l i  A . a ; u u x  h o v i e -  i a  !..._rch, h j G v .  T h o  
v Ÿ f i i t e  . _î c r  o f  h o b c a b e r , 1 9 G T  ,v-.;d ul . o o t  
a e i j r c n t l a l  u o  t h e  u a l o n s * ( l l )
* l*;e . -V el lion of tim ;r he *i. Ion > w.:: t.. - on 
1936-1961, aw ropre^oatoi tr the T. ; :,,, could 
b© ch; r :cteriacd uo being xi*rtly in i vc .r of 
succeodvo _ovorruncnt lj*itiàt-.vMf< co.n.ri.. 
huropo, t tha b.u.o o w^enrLc^  *1..
le^at one ctox behind* lae C.U..;. was a.' 
ontircl;; conc erned with dor. tic hocl ,1 wid 
eouncb-uic ,^.0 : etc of entry to '.luo^e* tf 
roLTtic.lar ccucor:: wur the acCnten.-. .eo of fult.- 
empl^-yaent: "hi a re., a th© nntonw >i thw \lz
were wiiliuA to rely'- u,on ucuiK-.ia rov/th and 
th© free ovan^^nt of labour to ensure ti ls, t M  
T*b*v. wonLei guuranteos. cor the contxnen&xla 
free :.;: v?r«Tit of labour W'va 3 1 lelf a qu/.r .n"cee* 
Initially at least, th© Dritiah trade ;a‘lunt<
(11) ci tturwidk,". and Rolfe, ..: ?op^.and .thg Gospggn ÆtrketTTT68,i*75
held Briti.'îh collective b'r/qAlntJi:: and 
voiru'e .roviriono in particular cuteom#
Tlio flrot in port ant trade union Aigoasaion 
of ûnttrj into Europe took yl :oo at the 19C0 
Conference of the Confederation of Hîiiib iliilng 
and rkv:incoring Unions# O; , oaition wao hold 
in ohoch iJid there wao no vote on a négative 
motion* Eiuev/horo the 'i tioru*.! Union of 
Agricultural . orkero and Uiu Ti\, ur ort and 
Genercdl Jorkerw* union out r. uiinat urope •
for Pr.wT: Coimius the '# •was a o ; ItaliuL, 
non-3c>ciullnt foroe* c*n 14th July, 1)61 
reprenantxtivea of tnc I,ubnur . ..rty un.1 the 
T*Ü*C. r.iots neither aid© :uu1 u ieolared ;olicy 
and ncit:.or .vwntad to be Z)Aund by a decision 
until tTi'f luverrmeat view veoom© clearer.
un IGth : ..y, ipol the l.U.u. had received a 
telegram I fror; the dew c.\lunu lur ition of 
labour. critioi, entry to d. . . it hold;
suùt not oi.ly spell t e oui of the 
Coxmon c -Itli and roiucc tho .inqioT:! to
minor otutao, bux, also ex; oe© tho hritiah 
workera to a future fraught with uncertainty." 
After thio appeal the General Uouuoil ao’duht 
the viov;3 of other Conaon-c-ulth tr *dc union 
eentreo.(12)
But General Council wye dioro at the 1961 
Congretio wore core roeitivo t:^m the L bour 
spe&keru in the Conaons. The Gener.-d C-iuicll 
•upiortod the dovurnmcnt'B ieoixion to .lejoti- 
ate, while re cervine: Judgijont on the 
deairaoility of nomborahlp vcxtil th” ten?;! 
been announced. Thin lUf'lifle 1 a: /oyaI of 
negotiations represented a olinificimt ohift 
in trade union opinion oince 1936. Thio
(12) T.U.C. Oon? rooo Report, 1961, p.230
arose from a growing appreciation of Britain's 
relative economic weakneea and inoreaeingly 
positive evaluation of the quality of labour 
oonditions on the continent. Yet, in 1961, 
one could not identify a collective position 
among the trade unions. Some influentiaJ. 
leaders favoured entry; the bulk of local 
activists continued to oppose entry, and rank- 
and-file opinion was evenly balanced( 13 }•
(iv) Public opinion and the Campaigners. During 
the period 1960-1963 the British public \7as 
made aware of the complex European issue by 
various groups. On 25th July I960 on the 
morning of the Commons debate, a declaration 
appeared in The Times calling on the Govern­
ment to re-examine the objections to joining 
Europe, and to initiate negotiations with a view 
to eventual full membership of S.E.G. Members 
of all three political parties sigi.ed, includ­
ing Boy Jenlcins, Jo Grlmond, and Peter Kirk.
A similar joint declaration was published 
exactly a year later.
Group activity occurred during I960 but 
campaign publicity inoreaeed during 1961. The 
Government was encouraged to believe that a 
shift in public opinion was occurring but the 
publicists* oversimplifications made its task 
more difficult - ministers had to deny that 
dramatic moves were imminent and their reserva­
tions created anti-climax.
In I960 there existed a United Kingdom 
Council of the European Movement - the United
(13) Beever, B.C.; "Trade Union Rethinking",
b/
Europe Asaoolation was an offshoot organized 
for work outside London. The Oouncil had 
supported the industrial free trade area pro­
posal which Maudling had tried to persuade the 
Six to accept and it had later set up an 
B.P.T.A. Action Committee. The Council had,
in fact, followed the Government - it sailed 
with the wind. Very British and pragmatic, it 
contrasted strongly with continental branches 
of the movement, which were very federal in 
sentiment. For many British 'Europeans* the 
Council could not be relied upon as a spearhead 
and there was some resentment of the autocratic 
leadership given by Sir Edward Reddington- 
Behrens.
Federal Union, founded in 1938 to promote 
world government, had an interest in European 
unity. It stated 'Britain in Europe* as an 
information service. Frank Cousins, no 
marketeer, was on its committee for a time as 
were Roy Jenkins, Peter Kirk, and several 
representatives of commerce and industry.
The Common Market Campaign was launched out 
of dieapi ointnont with the above organizations.
A Preparatory Committee was established at the 
beginning of 1961 after a delay caused by the 
failure to find a chairman. The first two 
people approached had secured diplomatic 
appointments I the third was just leaving one - 
Lord Gladwyn, as Sir Gladwyn-Jebb, in his fare­
well speech as Ambassador in Paris in 
September,I960 had revealed his European 
sentiments.
On 25th May, 1961 the Campaign's Statement 
on Europe was released at a valdorf press con#* 
ference with a hundred-and-fifty names attached. 
On 19th June the Preparatory Committee recon­
stituted iteelf into a Directing Committee with 
Glodwyn as Chairman, Roy Jenkins as his Deputy,
63
Peter Kirk as Secretary and . Jarrett as 
Executive Secretary (recently returned from a 
year at the European College in Bruges). At 
the height of its activity the Cam%#ign was to 
employ only three secretaries in London and two 
organisers in the irovincs. (Britain in 
Europe and the Comon Market Campaign worked 
together and their peroonnel overlapped. 7n 
Maroh 1963 they merged.)
* Between the failure of the free trade area 
idea and the building of B.F.T.A. some news­
papers had flirted with the notion of joining 
Europe. By I960 debate was different in kind 
&BÛ in d«gr.o. th. Flnanoial tinea. Sunday 
tlgeo. Pall:,' toLfO-aPh and Pall? Mirror booted 
negotiations many months before this become 
official policy# On 11th June, I960 the 
economist made up its mind for full-scale 
participation# Daily Herald editorials fav­
oured entry fitsa June 1961# on 31at January, 
1962 it attacked the Opposition's waiting gome, 
its dodging of an historic issue#
During the l.T.T. broadcast on 
20th February, 1962 Woodrow Wyatt recorded that 
two members of the Covemrient had assured him 
that the Daily Kirror oami^lgn for entry had 
been tho "tii^ »-over factor" which had decided 
the Government to stop havering about entry and 
to start negotiations# If the Daily Mirror 
was behind then then, as far as the public was 
concerned, they would probably be all right. 
Hyatt boa oenfirmed this story and has added 





Popular opinion on British entry into 
B.B.C. in September 1961, as revealed by 
Gallup (2) and Daily Express (3) polls was 
as followst , i






(Gallup asked, "If Government were to deoide.." 
while the Daily Express asked the direct 
question "Are you in favour.. '
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(2) fubllshed In Sunday Telesranh. 17th Septeaber.lijgl "
(3) Published in Daily Express.4th October,
.. - -^v
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4.3 The External Bnvlromaent
(1) Eneouragement from Europe? The Conzaon 
Market was undoubtedly affected by Britain's 
presence on the side-lines, Germany had 
important intereeta outside the community - she 
had built up impreaeivc trading surpluses in 
Commonwealth and B.F.T.A. oountries. Her busi­
ness and banking circles favoured an accommo­
dation with Britain and Dr. Erhard, German 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Deputy 
Chancellor, was very keen that Adenauer should 
seek terns. (At the end of I960 and the 
beginning of 1961 the LIueller-Armack ilan was 
receiving attention in Germany. According to 
this, the Six and the Seven would remain sep­
arate but would largely harmonize tariffs 
against third countries. It was a cross between 
a free trade area and a customs union.)
In the summer of I960 German farmers added 
their voice. Action on the coTanunity's
b  ^
agrioultural policy - the basic proposal#
had been diaousoed at the July, 1956 ntreaa
Cooforenoe under Sioco Mazuiholt - had to be 
token#(f) Much wo# at stake# Fronoh agri­
culture had flourished after a late technologi­
cal revolution: the problem was to dispose of
the surpluses ireduced by extremely fertile lane
The French peaaant-famer would flourish in a ^
Europe where prioee were low enough to dis- 
oourage over-; reduction in Oerx&any and levies 
high enough to discourage imports from outside 
the oooDunity# A million German peasants were 
threatened by French cereals# // On 
14th January, 1962 the £«E#C#'s first '^Agricu­
ltural marathon' ended after seventeen days' 
and nearly as many nights' discucsion# the 
basic features of the Comnon Agricultural 
lolioy were agreed and France had gained a 
Vic Lory# (The first regulations took effect 
from 1st July, 1962) # This Franco-German 
battle lay behind subsequent negotiations with 
Britain# when Britain negotiated on behalf of 
the Coc3oonweulth countries on a quantitative 
basis she was questioning a principle which had 
been established with great difficulty#(3)
♦ Disouseion of political developoent in the 
K#E#C# and ito repercussions on the British 
relationship involves, first, some ention of 
French and Geroon national attitudes# French 
posture must be seen in the light of the 
liquidation of the Algerian problem - Algeria 
secured her independenoe in 1962 - which en­
hanced national freed^ just as departure from
{i) Butter-tiok, M# and Bolfe, H#B#t Food.
(§9 Dixon, iiera,: Double lomap.287, and see ::ote Ë, p# ( f ^
Xndo-Chlxia had enhanced freedom. Qaullist 
nuclear aspirations must be remembered.
(But note; "The major decisions, with regard 
to both atomic weapons and disarmament, were 
mode before de Gaulle returned to power on 
Juno 1st, 1958*.O )  Above all one must 
remember Gaullist flexibility;
"In the name of btilonoe, de Gaulle has in the course of less than twenty years envisaged the following: alliances;(a) with the British, in order to oreute an independent bloc vie-a-vio the Russians and the Anerioans; (b) with the Soviet Union, in order to maintain French supremacy in Xurop# vio-a-vis Germany} (c) with all agiinet the revi­val of a unified, militarized, und sLrong Germany; and (d; with Jest Geniany r&nd the Nest European states, in order to create an independent bloc - a Third Force in Europe that might leud to drastic changes in the bounce of power. **(1^ )
On 3xst May, lybv de Gaulle delivered a 
broadczist analysis of the reason for the summit 
failure. He ei^ oke of the possibility of an 
imposing federation - a European entente 'from 
the Atlantic to the Urals.* With no risk to 
the Independence of each mition, this would be, 
*.. une cooperation organisée des états". 
Although they had not been specifically men­
tioned, the British were optimistic. During 
the summer of I960 de Gaulle gave voice to the 
idea of * troika' leadership of N.A.T.O. and 
developed the theme of its reorganisation at 
his Gtfi Ueptenber press conference. At this 
conference the iresident outlined his ideas 
for oommunity institutional development, ideas
(3) nacridis, C.i "The French Force de l^rapp.", i;oa«m ’iniroa.an aQv.rna<int..1968, p.69
(If) Kaorldia, fl.i .&%, .MidiOlltlca. ed., 1967, p.84
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whloh left in doubt the future of the existing 
ooinnunity institutiona, and of intex^ 
governmental co-operation through N.A.T.O. and 
*#E.U.# (The principal organisations of co­
operation would be a Council of Heads of 
Govemnent; a Permanent Secretariat based on 
Parlai four Specialised Oommissione - politi­
cal, economic, cultural, and defence; and an 
Aeeeobly attended by delegatee from national 
aseembliea - the idiole scheme to be approved 
referenda.} The remaining members of the 
community felt hope and fear.
To understand the Ueman posture one may 
simply note that, altliough sovereignty had 
been regained in 1955, in the etirly 'Sixties 
she was not yet complaining of being an 
'economic giant treated as a political pygtay'. 
The German attitude towards France throughout 
I960 was nervous. The imminence of the 
American presidential election created a ivoliti" 
col vacuum# while de Gaulle saw thio as an 
opportunity for leadership, Adenauer felt tho 
need for a closing of rmke. Perhaps .inerioa^ 
would weaken her commitment to Europe. lorhapc 
Russia would develop a Berlin offensive.
Be Gaulle rooked the boat# in October I960 he 
declared that H.A.T.O. members not equipi>od 
with nuclear \teapona were 'integrated satel­
lites'.
There were thus external factors adding 
to those domestic pressures on Adenauer which 
indicated the need for a rapprochement with 
Britain. On 10th and 11th Auguut, I960 
Adenauer talked with Macmillan. Having pre­
viously encouraged his economic advisers to 
make a thorough re-examination of tlie community 
relationship with Britain, Adenauer now agreed 
to Anglo-German talks which, in fact, lasted
oeveral months. (Sir Roderick Barclay conducted 
bilateral talks with the French and the Italians 
as well as with the Germans.) There was, as seen 
above, some tension between Germany and Franco over 
agricultures when, in December,I960, an account 
was given of the Anglo-German talks Adenauer was 
ill and the pro-British Erhard, urging the Kueller- 
Anaaok Plan (above) was rebuffed by the French - 
the British were still trying to gain maximum 
commercial advantage at minimum political cost.
Nora Beloff believes that British trust in un­
stinting German support was misplacedi although 
the conviction that Adenauer had changed his mind 
and had joined Erhard in promoting Britain's ad­
mission to the cozmaunity was certainly one of the 
great factors influencing I'aomLllan's decision to 
seek full membership of Adenauer was in fact
merely giving himself a little domestic leeway - 
and this was demonstrated by the signing of the 
Franc0-4}erman Treaty in early 1963(5).
At the end of I960 there were numerous mini­
sterial meetings in Paris in conneotion with V.E.U., 
the Council of Europe, E.B.C., and the newly- 
convened O.B.O.D.. There was resistance to the 
French ideas for institutional change. However, 
defence of E.B.C, institutions against France made 
it difficult for any of the Five to press for an 
accommodation with Britain.
(ii) The American Connection. Much of 
Macmillan's first year as prime minister was spent 
in ro-eetablishing relations with the United States 
after the Suez rupture. Under Macmillan and 
Eisenhower the 'special relationship' subsisted with 
the help of the personal understanding of wartime 
colleagues. Arthur M. Schlesinger has recorded VaaX 
the failure of 'Skybolt' offered Kennedy the grand 
opportunity to terminate the special relationship
(5) Beloff,N.; The General Sa.vs No. 1963,p.101
and force Britain Into Europe.(1)
At the end of 1959 and the beginning of 
I960 the Dillon propoeals for reorganization of 
O.B.B.O. were under diecusaion.(2} The 
Amerioane were not prepared to go aa far ao 
Britain in freeing trade and co-ordinating 
pGliciee and the limited character of American 
commitment for re-org(miaation helped to dia- 
illusion those who had hoped that an Atlantic 
framework would be created soon enough to 
obviate the need for a British decision on 
Europe. The Aoerioan initiative for an Atlantic 
relationship was to be a supplement, not a sub­
stitute for a European settlement.
As far as the narrower .Europe of tho Six 
was concerned, Kennedy supported acceleration
(1) "The isoue wac, in its firot appcurance, technicalt the decision of the United States Government to cancel an agreement made by iresident Eisenhower with Maonlllan at Camp David in I960 to pro­vide Great Britain with Skybolt missiles. But the j^roblec very quickly became pro­foundly political ... Its ooluticn... compelled the Ireeident to ohooce between those in hie own Government whose main interest lay in traxisforming western Europe, including Britain, into a unified political and economic entity, and those whose main interest lay in guarding the ,Vnglo-American special relationship and integrity of the deterrent." schlesinger, irthur,I^.i A Thouaand Javs.1965.pp.730-731
(2) Douglas Dillon, American Under- coretary of State. During the autumn of I960 the G.a .T.T. oountries ware negotiating 'oompeneation' for tariff changes when the common external t^iriff was applied by the six. The 'Dillon Hound* of negotiations was scheduled to begin early in 1961.
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plans (above, p# and failed to eupport 
Britain's desire for a wider, inoluaive coma- 
unity# llaomillan'a concern was shown in a 
draaatic manner. K leak in the vishizLiton ; oet 
in Büo^h, I960, given much publicity in Europe, 
asserted that the Frime Minister had declared 
Britain's hietorio role to be the crushing of 
Napoleonic ambitions to integrate Europe. If 
i^ranoe and Germany continued on this road 
Britain would have no alternative but to lead 
another peripheral alliance against then. Vith 
u widening division in iJurope Britain might 
withdraw troops from German:,’ and with further 
diserimination against Britain night occur a 
restriction of dollar inporto.(3} The foreign 
Office issued a denial and Macmillan mode a 
statement in the Cozaaons on 1st April, I960.
The leak attributed to Macmillan a fear of 
a revived Nasi movement after Adenauer's dep­
arture; certainly the fear of instability in 
Europe after the departure of -rench and German 
leaders was present in both British and 
American minds. "The United States wantedev t*<rvrCstability," says Sir Prank lee (-b*ç^w, p.5ô )
If Britain joined Europe the eccentricities of 
laris and Bonn could be offset by London.(4)
If the United atateo supported the political and 
economic unity of Europe in preference to a 
steoial relationship (which would get in the way 
of her relations with Turope), perhaps Britain
(3) K.* th. ^-uroL.anE o % m i ty. P.X04 and Eas:oon,A.i racnlllan. p.211. And conpore the 'Chalfor^ 
Vfisar* of October, 1967.
(4) Sohleeinger, Arthur, U.t oL.olt.. p.72C
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ought to DOTO away fron Churohllllan ideas of 
the 'three interlocking circles'. Macmillan 
was attached to the Americans; he did not 
regret the passage of power to the other side of 
the Atlantic - Biurope and the U.S.A. were like 
the two halves of the late Roman Em^tre.(5) 
American influence led llacnillan forward t
"The reflection that the shortest, and perhaps the only, way to a real Atlantic partnership lay through Britain's joining the Common.Market seems to have been a very important - perhaps the controlling - element in Mr. Macmillan's own decision that the right course for the United Kingdom was to apply for membership."(6)
The Kennedy inaugural in January, 1961 had 
included a mention of possible ' bridging  ^
arrangements' in ii)urope and Macmillan's April 
visit had revealed American enthusiasm for 
British entry to S.S.C. In a televised press * 
conference on 14th April, Macmillan said that 
the Americans would accept resultant discrimina­
tion against themselves s
"I don't want to criticise the last Administration but we've always had a feeling that the Amerioane were rather anxious that we shouldn't do this /inter/ on economic grounds. I think the new Administration would accept the degree of discrimination that would result on a wider field, against American goods, if the Bight and Six got together, because they would feel that the political advan­tages are on a more solid base."(7)
(5) Rees-Mogg, The Times. 9th February, 1964
(6) Camps, Ms op.cit.. p.336
(7) (B.B.G. Television, quoted Wiesner, Hans Js
Lveraity)ie britlahen larteien und die europtflache [ntegration. unpupliahed tnea^s. unive: !rlangen#?urnberg, 1966, p.157)
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During the winter of 1960-1961 American 
officials doubted whether Britain was yet ready 
to n&ko the conoeseione necessary for entry into 
£#3.0# In March 1961 Under Hecretary of State 
George Ball, visiting Europe on the ireaident'o 
behalf, had witnessed a quickening of British 
interest. He had asked to see Edward Heath and 
had expected a quiet chat. Instead he was 
ushered int^large conference room where all the 
key civil corvanto concerned with the shaping of 
Britain's European pclioieo were assembled to 
hear hie views of a British bid. Ball proused 
the political advantagee of Britain going into 
Europe. Its had great influence, aaye 
Sir Frank :;##(: 9), and he wto» taken very 
eerioualy.
(iii) Tho vuu\ony/ealth. In 1961, for the first 
time in history, the United kingdom was to 
export more to western Europe than to tho whole 
of the Com2üom;eulth. Uncertainty about the 
cohésion of the Commonwealth had growth and, 
while GOiiio saw potential for political and 
économie ^growth, otiiere were anxious to examine 
the eueontlul ciuuæteriotioa of the association, 
to know the linits of friendship.
Awareneeo had grown that the Commonwo^^üLth 
had ceased to provide Britain with tdic eeononio 
strength and politic:-! influence it once had, 
and that the illusion of global power it jb^ ro- 
vided should be shed. In any step towards 
Europe I^ornillan chose to t iko he would be 
helped by a certain Conservative demoralization. 
Protective measures were being tnken againat 
British exports and new commonwealth members 
were not anxious to accept 'guidance'. (Until
( .8) Interview
1964 sug£;dotieno oS & joint ConiTiOnwoalth 
Secretariat were reeluted on the grounds that 
such an organisation .. would inevitably out 
aoroes the diroet personal relations betv;een 
ministers and officials in different Ooronon^ 
wealth ooixntrios# which is such a sx^oial feat­
ure of our association* **){1)
?ho M&y I960 iriise Minietero* Conference 
discussed :urope wily perfunctorily - Britiah 
ministers indicated that negotiutiono with the 
Six were unlikely to be resumed for some time* 
There was given a promise to safeguard existing 
entry arrwigements for Commonwealth foods into 
the British market# It waa outuon before there 
occurred any serioue discussion of the implica­
tion of Britain* 8 entry into a oustocns union#
Very little was made public after the 
September I960 meeting of the Oounoil of Cou:.on- 
veolth finance J#inistero - preceding# an usual# 
I#B#H#Ti# and !#%,?# oonferoncee - since talks 
with the uix were# at thiu stage, purely 
exploratory# Britain hod not yet triken up its 
position and the H#;*#C# had not yet settled its 
own agricultural eyutem# It was assumed# how­
ever# that in the event of Aritish entry into 
Europe proferencea between Britain and OOëZaolM 
wealth countries would vanish# Tlie iioet signify 
cant development revealed by the coafsrence 
oomuuaiqu^ was an evident dilution of British
(I) Gross1967 (Inamen tally# the Commonwealth v/as not a decision-making machine# what distini^uishe^ the organisation was its •iiitiriacF of exchange*• The TimeB# 15th November,1968)
75 "
coasütnent au seen In the appearance of 
reference to the safeguarding of *eoaential 
interests of the Oonnonv/c&lth* in place of the 
earlier oonnitnent to maintain *exiuting entry 
arrangements for food# drink and tobacco* #(2)
In iUarch 1961 in London# Commonwealth 
prime ministera concerned theneelvee alnoet 
entirely vrith South Africa* South Africa* s 
exclusion# imposed by the ne\7 states on the old 
dominions# might be used as evidence of the 
cohesion of the Commonwealths Nora Beloff 
asserts that# from this time# for many Tories 
the Commonwealth remained an object of hope and 
charity, but not of faith.(3) Any diversion of 
Gossnonvroalth attention fron the "ùuropean 
question was remedied by the Hay 1961 meeting 
of OoomonwsEilth economic experts who reviewed 
the kinds of arrongw&ent possible if Britain 
entered Europe for five main categories of 
goods - i.e. basic materials ; temperate zone 
foodstuffs; tropioal products; nanufacturee 
from developed countries; and# manufacturée 
from the less developed countries* At this 
tine there was presuuro in the Oonnons for a 
new prime ministers* conference since# it was 
felt# a decision on principle was to be exr>eoted 
from Britain* The British ^iDvemment resisted* 
bi-latcrial discussions were best since 
Commonwealth interests wore so diverse - an 
argument rejected by, azion/?, others#
Mr# Pief en baker in the Canadian House of Uozm^ ons^  
Civil servants believed it would be dangerous 
to summon all Commonwealth leaders to London*
(2)C a m p s . a n a .  2%rop«an Coacaunity.
(3) General ?aye So. pp.90-91
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HaonlUan countered domes tic and Cossaon- 
wealth rr*8*ur* by azinounolng, on 1st June 1961# 
the ministerial tripo irhicb tool: place in the 
first fortnight of July.(4) Duncan ondyo 
had the moot difficult time with the old 
dominione# ao expected. The New /Zealand 
OQSsauniqu^ used the expareosion * cwi^arable ont- 
le to* in roBpoot of the diveroicm of future 'few 
Zealand exports* like tl:e. phrase *aafegoarding 
of vital intcrcate* this represented a oubatitn- 
tlon of a general formula for an earlier out­
right ooESDitment to preserve cxiLting entry 
•rraa, «raent«# The phrase *oocparable outlets* 
woe to figure irodnently in subsequent ne(;otia— 
tlonu in Brufioele. In Australia àandys found 
talks to>;gher. The coalition of Conservatives 
and Country Tarty# i#e« farmers* party# was 
facing an election. The eventual cofsauniqud^ 
was a atzitenent of th^ view of both aides rather 
than an agrewcent. An example of its tougluieas 
was aeon in the declaration by Australia that# 
^Aboenoe of objection (to the ox«ening of negotia- 
tions) should not imply approval". Australia 
even i>reeoed for representation at the Brucjols 
negotiating table where her interests would be 
discus sod. rtcjidya j'tve no undertaking* this 
«08 a matter for the Six. (7.A. v/et>tomann# 
Secretary of the Australian Department of Trade# 
was in fact hecurd in Brusoolo.) In Canada 
^ondys found ooacem about a stagnant economy# -
(4) Duncan Sondye# Commonwoalth lielatlonevisited ;?e« lealand# Australia and Canada# leter Thomeycroft. Minister for Aviation went to India# -aAistan# Ceylon and ::alaya# Jghri Hare# Iliaieter of Labour# visited Sierra ceooo# Ghana# ITigerla and the Central Africa Federation#Lord lorth. Minister of State at the ;creiga Office#vieited tlje Weot Indies.Kdward Heath, Lord irivy Seal# visited Cyprus#
T7
About laoreaaad dependenoe on the United States# 
and about a oeoing election#
à White reper(5) reproduced the official 
ooisnuniquse. Gaitakell m&s dioappointad# 
having preseed for details of the various talks. 
It was evident that the Cocuaonwealth oounLriee 
received their vicitorc feeling uneasiness and 
resentnent oince they Imagined that Britain bad 
Already reached her decision. In truth# Eao- 
nillan now felt that the only thing loft to do 
was to negotiate with the Six. The visits zmy 
have been ill-advised. Commonwealth views 
were iaiovni and the visits merely added to don- 
ondo for special arran^ Amonts# Ho alternative 
arran ;cîitnts were put to Britain. Only New 
feoland# possibly# etrengtliened her jposition. 
Duncan Gandys deelareo that the vial te were 
essential* **We said we oust do what we could 
for ouroelvoo.'*(6)
(Iv) -.nia Juravtoaa ?r** Tr,«la Aaeoclatlon. 1959 
was the year of the construction of 
The Stockiioln: Treaty was signed 20th November 
and the aaoceiation c^ne into operation in 
July I960. The founding of K.P.T.4. followed 
quickly on the failure of tlio O.K.B.C. talks on 
a free trade area. Two days after the 
Sous telle statement ^,<46 ) which ended
hopes of a free trade area in industrial goods 
the British thooselves declared the ne&ctictlons 
closed. At this O.B.H.C. ministerial nesting 
Sir David .coles# 1 resident of the Board of • 




suppllod for bl8 use# delivered a speech which 
ooRtained a hint that if France did not co­
operate in making tru^ je axran; enontc she might 
regret it# Couve de Uurville# the Trench 
Foreign Uinieter# left before tlie speech was 
ooKpleted - France wae not in the habit of 
negotiating under durees.d)
The noming after this epieodo menbere of 
who did not belong to S,%#C. met at the 
British cnbiiaoy - tho meeting was a opontaneoue 
result of a shared concern over the future of 
Ikuropeon trade. On tho British side there had 
been no i relialnary discussion with the Foreign 
Office or the irime Hiuietor. From this email 
meetioc emerged B.F.T.A#. (The brief period of 
mutual back-turning bit;tv/een the Six and the 
G even produced a period of inactivity for 0.5.E, 
- there was a drying up of daily contacts at 
woidring level which had been tho rule since 1948,
The United Kingdom# unlike the Swiss and 
the Swedes# had little enthusiasm for B.F.T.l# 
as an end in itself. Tlxc Conscrvatlveo aer# 
impelled to accept tho association partly out of 
fear that some of their new colleagues niglit 
make separate deals witii the Six. The Labour 
Opposition# liaving urged the Government to 
oo-operation wit’5 the outer ring of otatoo# now 
doubted the ability of B.F.T.A. to improve 
relations with the 3ix - this was a period of 
talk of * bridging arran emonte * -and vao 
eoeptiool about the pure free trade area fora 
given to ttJLC convention. When S.F.T.A. was 
debated in the Commone on 14th December#1959 
tho Opposition abstained in the final vote.
At the end of October# I960 the second 
B#F.T«A. minicterial meeting «as held in Beme.
(1) Ih. Jenoral .-yo :;o . p.d2
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The cutting of tariffs parallel with those 
cute m W e  by the Six wao disouosed. The Bwise 
and the uwedea were anxioua to build up the 
aeeociatioa and were the moat sceptical of the 
pooeibility of chances of negotiatlono taking 
place with the Six#
At the Geneva meeting in February 1961 
alni&tors again diacuoood parallelism in tariff 
cuts as well as the entry of inland into the 
association. On relations be Ween the r»ix 
and the Eight(2) it was generally felt that it 
was desirable that an agreeoout be concluded 
between the two groups. Althou,^h British 
opinion v/as by this time moving away from ideas 
of such 3gz*eer.enta and towcirds Britain*s join­
ing Kuroi>C| Maudling (Board of Trade) was able 
to note differences of approach in the way the 
two groups sow integration and to declare tliat 
aociethlzig less than a merger wao needed. The 
Bvlsu and the Owed so wanted to leave it to the 
Six to initiate proixisula for diaoussiona* the 
Danes and the Austrians# both of wliom conducted 
a largo amount of trade with tho Six were 
increasingly disturbed by exclusion from their 
markets I wanted B.F.T.A. to moke active brid^:e- 
buildin/s efforts.
During the spring of 1961 there 
uneacinesc in S.F.T.A. ac Britoi^x occupied her­
self with thoughts of entry to B.3.O.. While 
Danes end Norwegians thought of Joining along 
with Britain (Denmark announced her decision 
the day after Macmillan* s announcement) # 
Portugal thought of association but the Avlas, 
the Auatriano and the i^wedes showed fear of 
major political initiatives.
(2) Finland associated witli B.F.T.A. in 1961
Tlio E.P.T.A# oounoil mooting hold in 
London bot>voon 27th and 29th Juno# 1961 v/ns 
hold on tho ove of tho an*^uno«&ont by 
Maocillan. ào with tho Ooaaomvoalth talks# th* 
British Govomœcnt did not put fellow<^omboro oi 
the uooociation in tho poaition where they had 
to %reo with or veto Britiah plans. It was 
procisod that they would oe kept informed. 
K.F.T.A. would rezWJi united throughout the 
coming negoti&tiona and aotionn would be co- 
ordinated. Xnore would be no running-down 
of 2.F.T.A, obligutiona until all could benefit 
from the ootablishisent of a eingle uropcan 
market - on cconotaic division of Europe muot not 
occur.
The United Kingdom had definite obliga­
tions to Ito fellow-nemborc in E.F.T.A.# 
obligations very recently asauaed. *ith this 
* London A^ireoment* # however# she o&y have rone 
too for. A*as B.iS.C. to accept a market of 
fourteen?
(v) (J.iUflcll of ufOM VmtXBTn. 3itrop.aB 
Union. The Uo unoil woo founded in a flush of 
*Lui'opcnn* ambition in 1949# t):e Union in 1954 
ao a substitute for the failed defence 
oomnunity.(l) Both had assenbliee which baoaoa 
platforms for jOlitical discusaion of some sig­
nificance in relation to Britain's European 
aspirationa.
On 21at January# I960 Selwyn Lloyd# Foreign 
Secretary admitted before the Consultative 
Aeeeably of the Council of Europe that it had 
been a aietoke for Britain not to have taken 
part in B.C.8.0# negotiations. Before the 
aaoe aeeeably on 27th aeptskjber# I960 the
(li y a p *  ##iOL.r.
A a a a a m a a »
g I
Vq  ^ e ort. containing propocala for a modified 
cuâtons union between the Six and the G even# 
waa debated. Heath# Lord irivy Seal# woo 
careful not to endorse the proposais# although 
the HrJLtod Klngdon itself hod been advocating 
this kind of action. George Brown was more 
welGoaing.
British entry to Europe was discusoed in 
Juno I960 at Western Kuropean Union on tl:e 
basis of the Conto : e:ort. Here, John irofuao# 
Minister of State at the Foreign Office# was 
olrcunspect. The suggestion that Britain 
night join B.C.B.C. and ^Juraton as a first step 
created suaiioion. Tho merging of tho tlxree 
Thu*opeon conmunitios - B.^.O.# K.ü.S.C.# and 
Euratom - had been under active discussion for 
some tine. Bonnet declared that Britain 
should join the procession# not just a part of 
it.
In a Cozsnoxu) debute in July I960 Belwyn 
Lloyd and Legiaald Maudliag, Board of Trade# 
stated categorically that the 3ix had Qho\m 
theuaclvcc to be unready for negotiations. By 
now# however, üacaillan making active use 
of Oonocrvutive Kenbera with ucceoa to tiie 
Oounoil and Union aooenblleo - hlo ovm son 
Maurice# Peter Kirk,(2) and Robert Mathew 
aaonc then. The Foreign Office was active tool
"For several weeks in tho autumn of 1^60 B.B.U. Coaaervatlve H.P.'s were in pri­vate oolluoion with the Foreign Office diacuoGing the text of a bold resolution flatly raoomucnding Britain* s entry into
(2) Peter kirk# whose father had been Bishop of oxford# had special links with e&inent r;uroi)can protestante - includingWalter Balia twin# Ur. Luno, uad Oouve de Lorville - through a private society.
the CoQzaon Market. A W.B.U. * general affairs* Oomlttoe (of parliamentarians only) was then arranged and located to coincide with a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Six scheduled in Brussels on 17th November,I960. As soon as the W.B.U. Committee had been prevailed on to adopt unanimously a British draft, a telephone call was put through to the villa of the Val Duchesse, v?here the ministers were sitting, with a request that the K.E.U. group should be allowed to cone and express their views. By the tine the discussion had ended it was. and was meant to be,.very plain.to the six member countries that the British Government was by now very seriously - considering Britain's entry.**(3)
On 30th November, I960 the Assembly of 
W.B.A. adopted a recommendation from the 
general affairs committee that urged the 
accession of the United Kingdom to E.B.O. and 
Peter Kirk supported this by visits to a number 
of S.S.C. members* foreign ministries.
Before a J.B.U. ministerial meeting on 
27th February 1961, Heath stated that he wanted 
Britain to be consulted, not merely infoimed, 
on the political discussions of the Six. But 
he oifered only tho idea of a modified 
customs union as a bridge between Britain and 
the Six - there would be a common or harmonised 
tariff except for goods from the Commonwealth. 
Political and defence arrangements would be 
developed through Vf.S.U. and the Council of 
Europe, not tlirough the B.L'.C. in isolation.
(3) Beloff, N: op.cit.. p.103
4.4 The Initiative
% s
Following his tallcs with Kennedy 
in April 1961, Macmillan spoke at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology on 
the unity of the Western Alliance. He indi­
cated his concern at the division of Europet 
the consequenoee of economic division were 
only just beginning to make themselves 
felt in the political field. If the 
economic division persisted, the political 
rift would inevitably widen and deepen 
and, sooner or later, affect
nilitOvry coliorcncc c.nd strength. Kacmillan’s 
i&roir inlo::* bultreosoi Atlant-icio^t diocuaaion 
la . oi’ felorul leYclo^aznt v/as :. spur to
e:-?iy Drltiah action.
At the start of the leVite the ecvnozulo 
advantages of entry were emphaolged. Durlnf^ th< 
14th April i960 adjoiumaent debate, Anthony 
Barber, ecr^t ry of t,ito at tho rroaaiu:^, 
referred Ic '•rhia 'uro^ear trade probloa' •
W h e n ,  in tho of 1961, Jo'm icKo-*s>vidao
raised the .sovereignty laanc both ^aoalll^n and 
TIeath coimtered by presently." .# . ac an 
economic oomnuaity* I'dwarcl du Farm - Iron 
July 1962 to be i wrliementary . «c etary to 
the Treasury - in his Taunton apeech of 
27th r^ ay, 1361 demanded to îoiow if wo should, 
surrender to a y extent the rl&ht to decide 
our destiny ourselves - delegating it inatead 
to other ouiioas less politically otatle?*'
Lord Altri-'iohan, kins elf a pro-!.îarket oan, 
declared Wmt tho nation ought to be iitXorsed 
of the jtoXltiOvil Goaoe xuencea of entry#
The eri®’g;;cnoo of divigicim and .alignements 
in the parties v/ac evident during the tv/elve 
months before the July 1961 debate# There vna 
concern over tho lirusoels bureaucracy, poauible 
danage to the Aaerloun connection, and to our 
rolo ua eiiator between :laot vmd ent. Lord 
Hinohingbrooke made the sharpest uttaciic on 
tho Govcriruent) we oo Id not enter :urOiC 
without . iPui .tc from a général oloctlon - 
there been no word on orops in t!ie last 
manifeoto. There were ot-Hcr c:iir;palgners 
against :uroM - John Big, avid son, Robin 
Turton, ietor .alker, dir )are:: alker-dLiith,
and laul llliams.
before July 1961, aowevcr, : acnillan v/uu 
subjected to neither campaigns cenonstrating
goner.JL for ontrp^  nor those demonstrat­
ing vielcat antipathy. Opinion wao not yet 
tiObiilccd. Agriculture was obviously going to 
be u wujui  ^roUle:^ bat tixo Gov^ irra-sat w. -s aware 
of problems to be solved hare, in or out of 
Kuropo.
S8 for OS tlne-oeale is concerned, until 
1959 the order of priorities held by noet 
influential poodle iu vhiteinilA h-d nos evriouslJ 
changed froiv wbat It hud been in 1)47. By 
1959, h.o./ever, it %/ac. becormi2V5 no re difficult 
to disniss t}*e reality of tho klve towards 
e uropeon intc;:rutioa.( / ) In curly I960 t'.cre 
wao general ;,.overiimc:it ix^ e—occupation wit the 
Aurope^ui trade probloi.» and ...t jono t i n e  during 
the ciTin.‘ncmillan HIb first decision -
to diocuDs oneible < rtry into • . . ;it tho 
fovcrjiments of the Six.
ny mid—1961 hacaillan isud a lev. other 
members of the Cabinet, with a few Ley i.ec.le in 
the upper reaches of hxe civil service, had 
come to feel that, at the rip.M tlr:c, it ..i. ht 
be wise to join . •-hC.. /at t: is did no L yet 
constitute a yoverra eut iclicy, ti orc / o to be 
no panic move.
In 1959 the Colons haudllur had declare 
tliat ho could think of no core retrograde s-tep 
econonically or politically than the signing of 
tho Trouty of Home, in July 1961 tiie 
Conservative Kawa : otter, cam. .onting upon a
( t )  " I t  i o  p o a c l b l c  • •  t V i à t  t h i s  o l u d y  l ob e i n g  . v r i t t o n  a t  a  t i m e  w h e n  t h e  g e n e r a l  f r a ' . t r w o x h :  o f  i d e a s  a t r > u t  B r i t i s h  ^ * o l i o y  i o  b e i n g  s u b j e c t e d  t o  n e r l o u a  r e c o n r i d / r .t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  s i n c e  1 9 4 7 , "».«lorf, : .'i«R Dlnoiialoaa iz%i o l l c . 7 .  1 9 0 1 ,  p . 2 1
Liberal oall for entry, eaid that the 
Government were wise to reject suoh foolish 
advice. Thus was Central Office caught 
out (2). At the end of the same month 
Macmillan revealed the second decision - 
to try to edge into Europe while edging 
out of Africa.
+ Macmillan announced his intention to 
initiate negotiations with E.B.C. on 
31st July, 1961#
"The future relations between the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and the rest of Europe are olearly matters of capital importance in the life of our country and, indeed, of all the countries of the free world.
"This is a political as well as an economic issue. Although the Treaty of Rome is concerned with economic matters it has an important political
(2) As with economic planning, see p. W.
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objective, nanaly, to promote unity and stability in Europe which is so essential a factor in the struggle for freedom and progress throughout the world# In this modem world the tendency towards larger groups of nations acting together in the common interest leads to greater unity and thus adds to our strength in the struggle for freedom#
"I believe that it is both our duty and our interest to contribute tov/ardo that strength by securing the closest possible unity within Europe. At the same time, if a closer relationship between the United Kingdom and the countries of the European Soonomio Oomunity were to disrupt the long­standing and historic ties between the United Kingdom and the other nations of the Commonwealth the lose would be greater than the gain# The Common­wealth is a great source of stability and strength both to Western Europe and to the world as a whole, and I am sure that its value is fully appre­ciated by the member Governments of the European Economic Community# I do not think that Britain's contribu­tion to the Commonwealth will be reduced if Europe unites# On the con­trary, I think that its value will be enhanced#
"On the economic side, a community comprising, as members in asso­ciation, the countries of freo Europe, could have a very rapidly expanding eoonoiAy supplving, as eventually it would, a single market of approaching 300 million people# This rapidly expanding economy could, in turn, lead to an increased demand for products fron other parts of the %prld and so help to expand world trade and ini rove the prospects of the lees developed areas of the world#
"No British Government could join the European Economic Community without prior negotiation with a view to meeting the needs of the Commonwealth countries, of our European Free Trade Association partners, and of British agriculture consistently with the broad principles and purpose which have in­spired the concept of European unity and which are embodied in the Rome Treaty.
"Â8 the House knows, Ministers have recently visited Oosuaonwealth coun­tries to discuss the problems which would arise if the British Government decided to negotiate for membership of the European Economic Community#We have explained to Commonwealth Governments the broad political and oconomic considerations which we have to take into account. They, for their part, told us their views and. in some cases, their anxieties about their essential interests. We have assured Commonwealth Governments that we shall keep in close consultation with them throughout any negotiations which might take place.
"Secondly, there is the European Free Trade Association. We Imve treaty and other obligations to our partners in this Association and my ri^t hon. Friends have just returned from a meeting of tho European Free Trade Association Ministerial Council, in Geneva, where all were agreed that they should work closely together tliroughout any negotiations. Fliuilly, we are determined to continue to pro­tect the stand:ird of living of our agricultural community.
"During the past nine months, we have had useful and frank discussions with the European Economic Community Govern­ments. We have now reached tho stage where we cannot make further progress without entering into formal negotia­tions# I believe that the great majority in the House and in the country will feel that they cannot fairly judge whether it is possible for the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community until there is a clearer picture before then of the conditions on which we could join and the extent to which these could meet our special needs,
"Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome en­visages that the conditions of admission of a new member and the changes in the Treaty necessitated thereby should be the subject of an agreement. Negotia­tions must, therefore, be held in order to establish the conditions on which ws might join. In order to enter into these negotiations it is necessary, under the Treaty, to make formal application to join the Gomunity,
although the ultimate decision whether to join or not must depend on the result of the negotiations.
"Therefore, after long and earnest con­sideration. Ker Majesty's Government have cone to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to nal^ e & fomnl application under Article 237 of the Treaty for negotiations with a view to joining the Oonnunlty if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet tlie special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association.
"If, as I eaLmeatly hope, our offer to enter into negotiations with the European Economic Community is accepted we shall spare no efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. These negotiations must inevitably be of a detailed and techni­cal character, covering a very large number of tiie moat delicate and difficult matters. They may, therefore, be pro­tracted and there can, of couz'se, be no guarantee of success. uheu any negotia­tions arc brouglit to a conclusion then it will be tiie duty of tho Govemnont to reoommond to the House what course we should puTBue.
"Ho agreement will bo entered into unti3 it has been approved by the House after full consultations with other Oomuonwealth countries by whatever procedure they may gener?fLly agree."(1^)
In debate Macmillan expressed the problem 
of entry in essentially political terms but 
spoke against federalism and denied that 
delegation of sovereignty would be exoeeoive.
He said that he did not feel that Britain would 
be obliged to ^reserve the Ottawa /Pgreements 
and that, at home, the method a of ensuring the 
continued health of agriculture would have to be 
ohfinjed whether Britain wore in Europe or not.(f^
3(14) 645 B.C. Debates, Cols. 928-931
( 1 5 )  ' *eC Rotf' u, p . 1
While Maudling was unable to hide his pref- 
srence for arrai^ements other t ran with 
Europe - "There ie tho whole of the rest of 
the world for us to make a livinr, in if we 
want to do 30 and have to do so" - Uoath was 
notably full of understanding and s^napathy for 
the European stmdpoint. He explained why 
association with Europe, under Article 238 of 
the Roxac Treaty, was not preferable to entry 
under Article 237i application to associate 
would indicate a desire to maxii^isc benefits 
and minimise obligations and would not earn us 
the rlglit to participate fully in dec is ion-nakixy
Galtskell declared that the Opposition could 
not possibly come to a decicion before con­
dition:» of entry were knov/n - there would be no 
vote agalnot the Govcrruccnt. Jllson ai.d tliat 
Labour would ’utterly reserve its position’#
The iK'.bour leaders betrayed a considerable 
fear of EurOi^ eaji federalism - of the Commission 
with Ito ’peculiar independent status’, of the 
sycteu of qualified majority voting - and the 
Labour amendment (below) to the government 
motion was specific in demanding general 
acceptability of negotiated conditions to a 
Commonwealth prime ministero’ conference#
There should be a commitment to the Commonwealth 
akin to the pledge given to E . ?. T * A > p •
(below, ~F# 1 — ). Labour regretted that the
Govarnmsnt would be negotiating from a position 
of economic weakness#
(During the summer of 1961 the Labour 
party had awakened to the European iuoue and 
there was conoem over possible party-aplits#
The Caai>aign for Democratic Socioliom - whose 
I960 manifesto had stated that ito members were, 
"convinced Europeano, certain that Britain’s 
destlnioa were inexti'icably bound up with those 
of a resurgent and united Europe" - stressed the
need for party unity#)
7/
The Government*8 motion of 2nd Auguat,1961 
road *
"That this House supporta the decision of Her Majesty’s Government to make foiual application under Article 237 of tlie Treaty of Home in order to initiate nego- tiationo to see if satisfactory oi'ronge- mcnts oon be made to meet the special interests of tho United Kingdom# of the Gounonwcalth and of the luropean Freo Trade Association) and further accepts tho undertaking of Her Majesty’s Government that no agreement affecting . those 8 pooial interests or involving British sovereignty //ill be entered into until it has been approved by this liouaa after full consultation vith other CojL^on- . wealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally agree."(lér)
The Opposition put dora the following 
amendment ;
"To strike everything after House and substitute 'notes the decision of Her Majesty’s Government to make forral application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrazigemonto can be made to meet the special inters ta of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the S.F.T.l.) regrets that Hor Majesty's Govemiujnt will be conducting those negotiations from a position of grave weakness) and declares that Great Britain should enter the European Economie Community only if this Houso gives its approval and if the conditions negotiated are generally acceptable to a Comiionv/e^th Irin* Ministers* Conference and accord with our obligations and pledges to other merabero of the European Free Trade Association."(3^)
The ancndmont was defeated in both Houoee.
In the Commons tho majority of Labour membere 
and tv;onty-five Conservatives abstained whon 
the Govomment’o motion was put. Four Labour 
member0 and one Conservative voted against the
(16) 645 n.C. Debates, Col. 1480 *+-
(M) 645 R.O. Debates, Col. 1404
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Government - the ConBervatlve, Anthony Pell, 
declared that Maoznillan wao a "national 
disaster". Hoy Jenkins, who had resigned 
from the Opposition front bench in order to have 
greater freedom of expression, lent support to 
the Prime Minister and Jo Grimond greeted 
Macmillan’s statement unreservedly.
Sir Derek Walker-0mith was notable among the 
anti-marketeers and made an elegant speech 
of opposition.
The Government’s motion v/as approved 
without a vote in the Lords. Lord Chandos 
(Oliver Lyttleton), opposed as he was to the 
•tranquillisers’ of such Europeans as Lord 
Gladwyn and aware of the stark cost of entry, 
declared nevertheless that Britain v/ould be 
stronger, richer, and happier for joining 
Europe. (Of. the Lords debate twelve months 
before* Lord Strang rehearsed the obstacles 
to entry but thought that there might be no 
alternative but to try.)
Gonoriilly, in both Houses, there were few 
strong speeches. The prevailing feeling 
appOioTed to be that the Government’s initiative 
v/as correct given the lack of policy options.
In debate the Oommonwealth was a first concern, 
then sovereignty, with agriculture a poor third.
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S', I ;h. Cabinet. In July I960 Kaomlllon node 
Cabinet changes Involving what might be teraed 
"positive* and "neutralising* appointments.
The Earl of Home becane Foreign Secretary. At 
this tine Hone woe more oandid and a little 
bolder than Maosiillan on entry to Europe but, 
through the coming negotiations, he w*o loyal 
rather tiian enthusiastic. Maonillan countered 
Goitskell’s oriticion of the secretaryship 
bein^E based in the Lords by declaring that the 
time a Foreign secretary could evote to larlism 
ment was, in any oase, limited. (At one otage, 
Iiaoioillan was to t*Jce major Common Market 
questions in the C<KanonB.)
At this time Edward Heath, previously 
Government Chief iThip and thereafter Minister 
of Labour, was named Lord ^rivy Seal and given 
special responsibility for Ktiropean affairs#
"It ie an ancient office with few apeolfic duties of ito own. The irime Minister can therefore give to the Lord irivy eai reo-onsi- bility for any problem of opooial importance. By qy appointment,Mr. rvocnillan has shown in the most poeitive and pr tctiool way that in his view the portloular need today is for a Mini ter to deal with European queations.."(1)
Meath’s base was, possibly, of more sif^nifioonoe 
than hia titular appointment#
"He was to be, as well, a Foreign office Minister and Foreign Office siohesoan in the House of Cwuoons. The concentration of responsibility for European
(1) Heath before Council of Europe Assembly, 27th September, I960
questions, political ae well 06 eeonomiof in the hands of ozie alula ter was important • More­over, the fact that Kr. Heath was to be in the Foreign Cffiee (rather than functioning in a kind of linbo outside the estebiiehed departments as Ut  ^Maudlins had done during the free trade area negotiations) was evidence that Britain’s relation­ship with the Six had now beoo&e a key foreign policy queation and was no longer looked at primarily as a commercial problcm#"(2)
(Reginald Naudliag has oomuented# "It is true 
that Hr. Heath was a Foreign Office Minister 
and 1 was non-departraental, ooabining with my 
work on the Free Trade Area, the jobo of 
lurliamentary spokesman for the Ministry of 
Fuel and lover, assisting the Ohinoellor of 
xohequer and deputising for Mr. ^laoaillan in 
the field of Atonic Energy. uhile there was 
this differenoe, I an not sure it handicapped 
me in any portioular woy."(3)
At the tine of his appointment Heath may 
not have seen with full olarity the revolution 
in the rime Minis ter’s policy-making that was 
occurring. He has stated that he hod not made 
up his mind about entry to 3.E.C. until after he 
was in office and had had time to examine the 
dossier then being prepared by an intez^ 
departmental committee under Sir Frank Lee 
(below, pW0(O).
Dunoon 3andys, one of the most European- 
minded of Conservatives, secured Commonwealth 
Relations and Cliristopher Eoames the Ministry of 
Hgrioulture. These were key departmentst the
(2) Camps, k.i BritmÊm  and the EuropeanCommunity. p.2i#
(3) Letter, 16th April, I960
attitudeo of the Ministère would he crucial 
when the time came for a final deoieion on 
entry# However, while Maonillan made hie die- 
positions with the intention of gaining a 
certain sympathy for a move towards Europe, he 
himself was not a ’European’ (below pp# )
and his new Cabinet was by no means so- apart 
from dandys, the Cabinet held no oonvinoed 
Europeans#
Macmillan put R#A#B# Butler in charge of 
th« Cabtn«t*o OoBaon Tlmotlutlaie
connitt... Thl», U  anything, could be 
labelled as an astute strategic move# This 
act of diplomacy at home may possibly have 
slo%?ed down progress in Brusoels but, domestic­
ally, it oode sense# Butler, the Member for a 
solidly agricultural oonstituenoy during thirtiy- 
five years, was p&rtioularly sensitive to 
electoral opinion# The Butler Committee of 
ten or a dosen Minis tors back-stopped the nego­
tiations and, occupying the chair, Butler’s 
lack of enthusiasm for Europe was to a degree 
neutralised#
Sir Frank Lee points to the appointment as 
a oh&rukCteristically dexterous move on the part 
of the Prime Minister# If brought to realise 
that the majority of his colleagues were in 
favour of a European entry, Butler might r ove 
the same ways if he aooep ted the ohalr of the 
Cabinet Cocomlttee he would be conscientious#
"His acceptance was a relief#"
Sir Eric Roll declares that Butler was won 
round primarily by an early I960 B#B#G# report 
on agrioulture and then by a more detailed list 
of pro^osLils which appeared in the spring of 
1961# Both Macmillan and Butler vers 
influenced by these publications, believing 
that British formers could operate perfectly
well within the franework preoioed# Butler 
continued to "exhibit publie, eeeptloiexa" oa 
before - witneea hie 29th October, I960 
Reading epeeoh devoted to poesible high food 
rrioea#
Macnillan never pereuoded Lord Iteilehaa, 
I«ord President and Minister for uoience and the 
party’s philosopher, to speak publicly for the 
European connection# several attenpts were 
made to harness nailehan’e oratorical talents 
without ouccess but he was persuaded against 
publicly announcing his opposition - his chief 
concern was a lose of national sovereignty - 
and thus making himself available os a leader 
of hie dissidents# From the 1962 ’European’ 
Oonservative Conference he excused himself - 
his wife was expecting a ba^y#
Reginald Maudling offered the oharpeat 
oritioiam in public debate, altiiough his atti­
tude towards Europe never hardened into militant 
opposition#(4) Ue acoepted the idea of a move 
from the Board of Trade, in October, 1961, to 
the Colonial Office where his preforenoe for 
’ bridge-building’ and his scepticism of the 
eoonomio capacity of the Six would not be of 
such import#
Two furttwr appointments need mention# In 
July 1962 le ter 3oi there was made lorliuoentary 
Under-]ecretory at the Foreign Office - a 
’ European’ api ointment providing additional help 
for Heath# More interesting, William Doodes 
was made Minister without lortfolio in charge of 
government information servicos# Baaed in the 
Lord irivy Seal’s Office, he actually exercised 
multiple functions# Oooesionally he set on the
(4) See above, p#8ô and below, p#^f
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Cabinet oozxalttee. He eetabllohed a snail - 
"relatively unimportant" — parilamentary commi­
ttee with half-omdoeen oolleaguee, its aim to 
tap party thinking# Hie chief task, ae a 
iroifessional journalist, wae the public 
Infox^ation oaripaign# Nith the help of a snail 
tean recruited from the Forei^ Office, the 
treasury, and other department^ he devised a 
good deal of "objective literature" which 
achieved ounaiderable circulation# (this 
rmohinery, based in the treasury Information 
01 vision, was used after January 196) for other 
purpooea - for example, in ooimeotion with 
industrial training#)())
There ap^euro to have been no hietorlc 
Cabinet meeting at which tho decision to open 
negotlutiona with %#B#0# was solemnly and for­
mally taken# mini store diéoovered the rime 
Minister’s intentions gradually, at different 
tiaes# Macmillan’ e preparation of opinion in
the Cabinet, the 1922 Coonittee, and in the 
party generally was executed with skill# With 
the announc^sent of the decision to embark 
upon n»fîoliationo(6) no reeignations occurred - 
the time of the announcement, as the House rose 
for the summer recess, gave no encouragement 
to conspiracy#
()) following a omiplaint related to the need for more infomation on urope from tlie Bationnl Counoil of Comen, repreoenting forty orgaiiisations and two million women, a lanf 9RT .ggmflU — " eetabXisbedto work alongside the Treasury Coxamittee# Here questions relating to Britain and the E.5#C. were disouaoed# The ooanittee woo retained by the Labour Government# to be known as the ^omen’g Nutional Commission it functioned imder t!ic ' inis ter for and social lecurity#
(6) The decision was to negotiate act, at this stage, to join Europe# (See above, p#Sf-)
Â8 far as the cohesion of the Cabinet 
daring negotiations is to be oonsidered, the 
major government reconstruction of July 1962 
must be mentioned. The occasion of the 
reconstruction arose fron the stagnation of 
domestic policies and public impatience with 
official complacency. By his reshuffle,
Macmillan acknowledged the feebleness of Selwyn 
Lloyd at the Treasury and an accumulation of 
’dead wood’ in the Cabinet. The machinery of 
eoonomio management was, with the National 
Incomes Commission and National Eoonomio Devel­
opment Council, to be refashionedi young 
oabinet members were needed to fight an election, 
and, in the oase of defeat, to fight in 
opposition.
The government reshuffle, it is held, was 
forced upon the Irlme Minister. Martin Eedmayne, 
The Chief Whip, was most active in demanding 
government changes* Maoleod and Butler were also 
involved - Macmillan is said to have feared a 
plot when a leak about ’impending changes’ 
appeared in the Daily Mail (7). (Butler enhanced 
his position by becoming ’First Secretary of 
State’.)
Maomillan’s action in rebuilding his cabinet 
has been held to indicate a loss of nerve and a 
cynical conoem for the retention of personal 
power - the party was left bewildered and the 
spell of loyalty broken (Anthony Sampson) • The 
successful Conservative Conference of 1962 
(below, p./^) contradicts this view. \7hat does 
seem to be true is that, during the latter half 
of 1962, the Prime Minister was leas physically
(7) For discussion of the role of the press in this matter see; Seymour-Ure,0.i The Press. iolitios and the lublie. 1968, pp.2â§-55Ô.
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Btrongt 1088 able to llaten, and wae showing his 
oge(8)* The Cabinet enjoyed a certain accretion 
of European strength* Duncan Sandye took on 
responsibility for the Colonial Office as well 
as Commonwealth Relations and the William Deedes 
and Peter Smithers appointments (above) were 
made.
As far as the final decision on entry is 
concernedI Duncan Sandys has affirmed that, given 
reasonable conditions, Macmillan would have had 
unquestioning support from the Cabinet - "One 
could not negotiate for eighteen months and then 
have resignations because negotiations had 
succeeded". Sir Michael Fraser, Director of the 
Conservative Research Department and Secretary 
of the Committee on Policy during our period, 
who attended many meetings along with ministers, 
oould "distinguish no great differences of opinion 
between ministers". Reginald Maudling writest 
"I have no doubt whatever that if the French had 
been prepared to reach agreement with us, the 
Cabinet would have enthusiastically endorsed such 
an agreement."
Clearly the above begs a question - what 
conditions were *reasonable*? It costs nothing
to express ex post facto confidence in cabinet 
cohesion but undoubtedly, in the persons of 
Butler, Hailsham and Maudling, there existed much 
reserve opposition to entry.
(8) "3upermao*s" image became tarnished. InNovember 1962 the corrosive T.W.3 broadcasts began. In January 1963 the Gallua poll of voting intention revealed the following percentages: Conservatives 28^1 labour 401Liberal 12;^ . (Butler,D. and Freeman, J.i British Political Facts. 3rd ed.l969, p.162).
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SA Whitehall and th> Bruaaala Tmnm. As far 
as Whitehall is oonoemed one can distinguish 
two major phases of activity - the preparation 
of departmental reviews and the submission of 
an interdepartmental report to the Cabinet| 
and, later, the support of the Brussels negotia­
ting team after work had begun in earnest.
Early in I960 an interdepartmental commi­
ttee of senior civil servants was established, 
with Sir Frank Lee in the chair - on 
1st January he had moved from the Board of 
Trade to the Treasury as Joint Permanent 
Secretary. The committee* a aim was to examine 
courses of action open to the Government, 
including that of a possible attempt to find a 
full accommodation with the Six. Short- and 
long-term implications of various courses of 
action were considered in the light of probably 
developments in Europe, in the Commonwealth, 
and in relations with the United States. The 
departmental reviews were completed in late 
>lay and early June, I960.
The committee concluded that Britain should 
seek entry to Europe. Britain*a long-term 
interests lay in giving a higher priority than 
previously to its European relationship and the 
joining of B.B.C. might be the only way of 
achieving the desirable relationship - joining, 
as against associating, might be the only 
available option. The reasons for the coxnoi- 
ttee*8 conclusions were primarily, although not 
exclusively, political - the political case for 
entry was deemed to be stronger than the 
economic cose. Joining Europe was technically 
feasible providing certain modifications in the 
Community*s arrangements oould be negotiated.
The Common Market Negotiating Committee
n
(Official)(1) aurvived after the July 1961 
announcement to ad vie e Minis tera on the instruc­
tions to be sent from time to time to the 
delegation in Brussels. (A lower 1 vel inter­
departmental committee worked at great pressure 
on detail.) The Bznissels negotiators were to 
return to London constantly but two teams 
existed, although the Brussels team never grew 
to be so large that it represented a rival 
system to London.(2)
Sir Frank Lee has said that he does not 
think of the period 1960-1963 in terms of 
stages of work. After the submission of the 
interdepartmental report in the summer of I960 
the files were put away for a while but, once 
negotiations had started in Brussels the London 
end was busy at all times, with major periods 
of activity when Edward Heath returned to make 
a speech or to prepare a new phase of talk.
The European Organisations Department of the 
Foreign Office acted as the principal briefing 
division and the negotiators found no mechani­
cal deficiencies in the backing they received.
4- By the time that the Brussels negotiations 
began the British Ambassador to the B.E.C. had 
moved from Luxembourg, leaving a Oounoellor to 
represent Britain at Euratom and the Goal and 
Steel Gommunity, and, with a small staff of 
half-a-dosen people he now maintained an exist­
ence in Brussels separate from that of the
(1) Sir Frank Lee headed the Whitehall inter­departmental committee (see above,p.^0 ) from the Treasury. Sir Denis Riokett, a Second Secretary, was a second Treasury representative on the committee while the Foreim Office was represented by sir Roderick Barclay and Sir üvelyn Hhuckburgh, both Deputy Dnder-Secrataries.
(2) Sir Herbert Andrew, interview
I c u
Embassy io Belgium.
The Negotiating team of * Flying Knights* 









Sir lierson Dixon Ambassador in laris
Sir Eric Roll,**Deputy Secretary,Detached duter from Hin. Agriculture
Sir Roderick Barclay Deputy Under-Secretary
Raymond Bell,Under Secretary
Sir Henry Lintott,Deputy Under-Secretary
then, from mid-1962
Godfrey Shannon,Assistant Under-Secretary
Sir William Gorell-Bsumes,* Deputy Under-secretary
Herbert Andrew**Second Secretary





During the initial phase of talks this 
group worked between London, Paris and Brussels 
and it was January 1962 before it finally settled 
in the Belgian capital. This team, too, retained 
an existence separate from the British Embassy, 
but after a period spent in the Métropole Hotel, 
ocoupied a suite of offices in a building also 
used by the Ambassador to B.B.C. This latter 
attended subsequent meetings with the Six, and 
the two British groups co-operated closely, 
taking into account the difference of their 
functions - the one group being oonoemed with 
terms of entry to Community, the other with 
questions relating to B.B.C. as a going concern.
The remarkably small team of * Plying Knights* 
was headed on the official side, by Sir Pierson 
Dixon, British Ambassador to Paris. Sir Erie 
Roll, still on the Ministry of Agriculture books 
after a period away with the International Sugar 
Corporation, was deputy. Sir Roderick Barclay, 
appearing in the Foreign Office list for 1962 as 
*Adviser on European Trade Questions*, was the 
number three permanent official at Brusselst he, 
with the rank of Ambaasador-at-Large, had con­
ducted the bilateral talks with the French, the 
Germans and the Italians.
The staff supporting the negotiating team 
was quite compact. A Head of Chancery, Henry 
Hainsworth, with rank of Counsellor, was resi^onsi- 
ble for administration. Two First Secretaries, 
John Robinson and Christopher Audland, together 
having considerable experience of European 
questions, mode most of the official contacts and
did much of the drafting of agreements during 
negotiations. Separate sources have volunteers* 
the information that these two men were much 
overworked, performing as they did much more ^ 
than was oomuenaurate with their rank or station. 
A Third Seoretary, Rosemary Morre from the Board 
of Trade, wao added subsequently during the 
negotiations.
Donald Maitland handled Foreign Office 
press relations in Whitehall. unlike Maitland, 
Clifford Jupp, a First Secretary in the Foreign 
Office, in Brussels as Press Officer, devoted 
the whole of his time to the E.E.C. negotiations, 
He attended all meetings with the Six, saw all 
briefs, and had knowledge of all decisions, ver­
bal as well as written, agreed by the negotia­
ting parties. The British made a special effori 
with the distribution of information, and Jupp*s 
conduct of relations with the Press has been 
praised. His daily routine was to meet British 
correspondents as soon as possible after officia] 
meetings and, on free days, to fly bock to i 
London to talk to diplomatic correspondents - 
•the Circus* - at the Foreign Office*
The principal negotiators travelled back to 
London during our period and sat with their 
Whitehall colleagues, under the chairmanship 
still of Sir Frank Lee. In Brussels there was 
little attendance by home departmental staffs 
although some help was drawn from London from 
time to time. Since the negotiators were in 
contact with Whitehall so often and since the 
length of negotiations was not foreseen, the 
team were not detached from home duty and, 
originally, no replacements were made in the 
departments.
In the home departments there occurred no 
specific or relevant change of structure to
aocoimodate the Bruseele negotiations.
Departments made different arrangements because 
departmental work varied in depth and intensity} 
but in my search for details of operations no 
important departmental reorganization or invest­
ment of staff revealed themselves. The 
Ministry of Agrioulturô came nearest to having 
a special force working full-time on the question 
of entry. At the Foreign Office there occurred 
little change and few new appointments were made. 
At the Board of Trade no extra staff were 
api-ointed and no change in departmental organi­
sation made.
( C"
5*3 The Timetable and Effeotiveoess of ' Negotiation'
Negotiations between Britain and the Six 
took place on the seventh floor of the Belgian 
Foreign Ministry, and the final ministerial 
meeting of 29th January, 1963 was the seventeenth 
of the series. In the two months between 
liaoaillan* s announcement in the Commons and the 
first ministerial meeting in laris in 
October 1961, British officials worked out the 
details of the arrangements they would seek to 
negotiate.
In the summer of 1961 the British Govern­
ment had the following timetable in mind: the
Prime Minister would maüLo his statement before 
the House rose; serious negotiations would take 
place during the autumn and winter and would con­
clude in the spring of 1962; ratification of 
Britain* s entry would occur during the autumn, 
with formal entry on the 1st January 1963 (1). 
Herbert Andrew, of the Board of Trade, comments 
that these dates, at least during the preparatory 
stages, may have been plausible. Gorell Bames, 
Colonial Office, finds them optimiatio. (But 
see above, p. on the non-replacement of staff 
in home departments. ) Certainly Heath, during 
his first statement on 10th October 1961 
indicated that the British Government thought 
that no formal amendments to the text of the 
Treaty of Home would be necessary - simply cer­
tain adaptations consequent on the admission of 
a now member.
At the ministerial discussions of November 
1961 it became clear that negotiations oould not
(1) Camps, M.t op.cit.. p.341
(ri
get under way until early 1962. There were 
several reasons for this. The first claim on 
E.B.O. Ministers* time was the Common Agricul­
tural lolioy and the move to the second market 
transition stage in January 1962. Second, the 
Six needed to address the United Kingdom from 
an agreed position. Third, the Six had to renew 
their own convention on association (a b o v e , p p .
In fact, the six month period to April 1962 
was one of exploration which included extensive 
surveys, and classification of trade into mana­
geable components for negotiation. No real 
negotiations took place.
The second stage of negotiations between 
April, and August 1962 represented something of 
a breakthrou^. After the slow start to the 
year, (even though, compared with earlier Free 
Trade Area talks, negotiations were given over­
riding priority) attempts were made to speed 
proceedings. After the activity of May and 
June the British Government hoped to keep to a 
timetable that was only six months behind the 
first. Negotiations might finish by the end 
of 1962, with ratification in the spring of 1963 
and entry on the let July 1963. In June and 
July there were several long ministerial sessions 
and, by August, the period of all-night sittings 
began.
A breakthrough nay have occurred but six 
weeks saved in the summer of 1962 might have 
made the difference between success and failure, 
iti. Bernard Clappier, one of the French negotiat­
ing team, believed that if the concessions made 
near to the August 1962 break had come a few 
weeks earlier then success would have been 
achieved* Perhaps the key error lay here. In 
June 1962 it was reported that de Gaulle was
og
"resigned to British entry" (see below, )i
by autumn the odde& were lengthening.
"I am cautious," says Herbert Andfew, "but I 
would have gone more quickly." Duncan Sandys 
now expresses the opinion that, during autumn 
1962, the negotiations had lost momentum from 
being bogged down in detail and should have been 
lifted to prime ministerial level - this might 
have saved the day.
The third stage of negotiations, the 
•agricultural marathon*, moved very slowly and, 
of course, ended in failure. Heath met the Six 
in several extended sessions and, in the latter 
days, officials were conferring uninterruptedly.
+ After the breakdown Pierson Dixon recon­
sidered the idea of an acceptance of the Treaty, 
in July 1962, when a less confident de Gaulle 
might not have refused us. Sir Frank Lee 
remembers that Jean Monnet advised us to join 
E.E.C. first and to negotiate afterwards. But
we oould not have worked with British and 
Commonwealth farmers on any basis other than the 
one we in fact adopted. (But notes having 
complained during the negotiations of •neo­
colonialism*, six months after the breakdown 
Nigeria and Bast Africa were demanding associa­
tion with B.B.C.)
Both sides hesitated to be the first to 
offer compromises*
"The Six felt, not unreasonably, that it was up to the British - as the applicant for admission - to put forward specific proposals. Moreover, it was easier (although still difficult) for the Six to respond with a common voice to proposals made by the British than it
V V  I
was for the Six to reach agreement among themselves on compromises to put forward."(2)
The British difficulty was that it was easier, 
in particular, to pereuade the Commonwealth of 
the acceptability of an offer put to her by the 
Six than one which she^hers^lf had formulated.
Britain had to demonstrate intellectual and 
emotional commitment to Europe at the sane time 
as she bargained for terms. Ho tactical 
approach to the Brussels negotiations could be 
simple. Whatever tactic she employed could 
be counterproductive - too much enthusiasm for 
Europe, stiff terms of entry; too little 
enthusiasm, no terms at all. Resentment could 
easily be created in either Commonwealth or 
Community. At the first meeting, Britain 
refused to submit an initial comprehensive 
statement and reserved her position (3) (4),
(2) Camps,H.* op.cit.. p.389
(3) "The discovery of vehement wishes gener­ally frustrates their attainment; > and your adversary has g ined a great advantage over you when he finds you impatient to conclude a treaty. There is in reserve, not only something of dignity, but a great deal of prudence too. A sort of courage belongs to negotiation, as wellas to operations of the field. A negotia­tor must often seem willing to hazard the whole issue of his treaty, if he wishes to secure any one material point."(Edmund Burke. Lettera on a Regicide loace, 1796 ) ----------- -----
(4) In view of what was said (above,pJ^Y ) in praise of the facilities afforded to the Press in Brussels it is interesting to note that the British Government sought to maintain the privacy of the first ministerial meeting, which was held in closed session. The Heath speech, trans­lated copies of which were m de available to 2.E.O. members at the meeting, was pub­lished only in summary. Details were
(oontd.)
[\c
Geoffrey MoDermot, In ooisiaenting on Heath 
and hie negotiating team, refers to their nnln- 
spired, uninspiring and mishandled round of 
talks(5). One may question the competence of 
the British team without echoing the views of 
a Foreign Office man who had been retired early, 
The British tried to secure too much initieilly 
and held on for too long to a position they 
knew they would ultimately have to abandons
"The negotiations contained a number of curiosities. In the e^ irly stages the United Kingdom spent a good deal of time defending parts of Its existing agrioultuz^l policy, unrestricted entry of most foodstuffs, guaranteed prioes and deficiency payments, and low retail food prices, which mi^t well have been modified even without E.B.O. membership. Nor did the negotiations always seem clear about the difference of interest betv/een united Kingdom and Commonwealth farmers.A concession favourable to one was often adverse to the other. Again, it turned out to be important to define more clearly than did the negotiators the reason why special privileges or con­cessions were being asked for. \7hy should Commonwealth countries have access arrangements to the enlarged B.B.C. market for a longer period than was guaranteed to them by their existing agreements with the United Kingdom? Why do tomato growers in the United Kingdom require greater protection than those in the Netherlands? (6}
(4) leaked in The Times on 24th and 25th Oontd. November and the ttover: ment decided topublish full details in a white Paper. (The United Kingdom and the European goonog^ t; ogmmJty. CmnÆ. . NovenAwr, 196l.J This satisfied Con­servative and Labour complainants at home and Commonvvoalth, particularly Canadian complainants abroad.
(5) The Eden Legacy. 1969, p.181
(6) Butterwick, M. and Holfe, M.H.i PP. cit.. p.81
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We were, exoeeslvely careful in our 
negotiating apjoroaoh. For example, the 
January 1962 a^preement on agriculture con­
cluded by Six thenselvoa (above, p. ) was 
drafted in deliberately vague terms. Tlie 
Five felt that they oould argue the matter 
later - as importing countries they would 
manage to get their way with France. In 
July 1962, harassed by parliamentary questions 
at hone. Heath forced discussion on agricul­
ture, then tried unsuccessfully, to shut the 
landora*s Bdx of difficulties*
"Although there was still a chance that British proposals for agriculture would be forthcoming which would have due regard for the criticism or misgivings expressed by the Six, an overall view was still lacking because the Community had reached no decision on certain important products (dairy produce, beef, sugar and rice).
"The Six- themaelvoo wore otill-ao^ agreed on the interpret^ financial regula^ionr^Whloh can be lookedupi»MtS''avery important eXemcCtin the system of eigriculture,
"Similarly with regard to the financial regulation (7), the negotiations v/ith
(7) Two Important provisions of the14th January 1962 agricultural a^^reement concerned •price policy* and the •finan­cial regulation*. A common * price policy* was agreed* in each country of the Community there wae to be a * target price* for grain - these would be gradu­ally brought into line until, by 1st January 1970, there would be but one * target price* for all. However, one vital decision was not t^ iken - the actual level of this * target price*. The other main provision was * financial regulation* which concerned itself with the impact of external food prices. The price of imported gain would be maintained at an artificially high * threshold* (see Note, 8 p. l"RS )
U2.
Great Britain and particularly the views expressed at the outset on the British side had re-opened among the Six themselves difficulties of interpre­tation which they had not yet succeeded in overcoming when the negotiations were suspended*" (8)
Butterwick and Rolfe thus conclude that:
"The main lessons then to he dra\m concern the need to define objectives after careful preparatory study, to work with despatch ignoring trivia, and to bring negotiations to a conclusion as soon as possible, very probably malting use of the package-making skills of the Commission* In this connection the constant reporting-back to parliament, such as occurred in 1961-63 is no help to a United Kingdom negotiator, and might have been curtailed except for the Macmillan government's need to take the Conservative Party, including its landed interest, along with it. .Finally it may bo necessary to take a long view of certain mattors, which, though troublesome in the short run, might be modified tlirough United Kingdom influence after membership has been obtained." (9)
It has been remarked that Heath at Brussels 
was "the master of his brief". However, he 
evidently had a grave fault - he was "too avid 
for detail". A participort in the Brussels nego­
tiations has stated that, keen not to let the 
negotiations slip from his hands. Heath was even 
more ware of detail than his officials.
(Eventually, no time remained - "Be Gaulle swept 




Sir 1 ierson Dixon, official head of the 
British delegation was a man of considerable 
diplomatic experience and ability. He wae 
hampered, however, by the retention of hie poet 
as Ambaeaador in Parle during negotiations. 
Further, not an economist, he betrayed some in­
ability "to get down to details".
Sir Eric Roll, deputy head of the delega­
tion was, by contract, an academic economist as 
well as a civil servant by background. He was 
trilingual and had intimate contacts in Europe - 
immediately before the negotiations he holidayed 
with M. Marjolln, a French member of the 
Commission. Perhaps Roll was too European, too 
good for Drltldh purj>ofiea. "He wae very vola^ 
tile and did not behave like an Englishman. He 
was slightly suspect in Brussels."
4 The arena in which Britain negotiated was 
not ideally suited for the speedy execution of 
business.
The Six, in their preparations for negotiation, 
found difficulties. The Treaty of Rome said 
nothing about methods of negotiation with poten­
tial new members. None of the Six would have 
been willing to entrust negotiations to the 
Commission, but Franco went furthest in arguing 
at one time that Commission members should not
be present during talka (10). Eventually 
Britain found herself negotiating, not with 
the Council of Ministers, but with ministere 
representative of their governments, assisted 
by the Commission (11).
Had the Commission had greater responsibi­
lity, a realistic agreement night have been 
reached more quickly, but this matter was not in 
British hands.
From tine to time during the negotiations 
some ad hoc sub-committees - e.g. on Jute - had 
been established, but there were never any 
standing sub-committoes with Independent exist­
ence. The Six had to stand to,aether and the 
elaboration of agreed proposals slowed proceed­
ings. (A ministerial comoittee under Sicoo 
Mansholt, the Dutch mombor of the Commission 
responsible for agricultural questions, estab­
lished at a late date failed to avert the 
eventual breakdown.)
Sir Srio Roll remarks that the S.B.C. 
members had to move more or less in unison - in 
negotiation they were reasonably compact and 
cohesive, but not monolithic.
The Dutch had reason to be grateful to 
de Gaulle for the sympathy he showed in 1962 
towards Holland's last stand in New Guinea. The 
Dutch were, however, very friendly towards 
Britain - perhaps excessively so. During nego­
tiations, noted Gorell Bames, they were our 
greatest friends but our worse counsellors.
(10) France had also vetoed the suggestion that Henri Spaak should play a key role in the negotiations - as he had done at the time of the setting up of the B.B.C. - because he was too friendly towards Britain.
(11) 'European
More useful than our nilitaat Dutch friends 
were the Italians. S. Colombo, the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Trade wae particularly 
skilled in "carrying the French along". S.Folohi, 
chairman of an ad hoc committee on primary pro­
ducts during negotiations, was very helpful to 
Gorell Bames - the t\70 held similar portfolios.
The Germans did not favour Britain's cause 
quite as much as they pretended and were inclined 
to "hide behind the skirts of the French". At 
the final meeting in January 1963, when the highly 
emotional break-up was in progress and Couvo de 
Murville v/as isolated. Dr. Schroedor was notice­
ably restrained. After all, he had spent most 
of the previous week in laris, where the Franco- 
German Treaty wae being olgned.
At the final session Henri Spaak, Belgian 
Foreign Hini;>ter, had his I rime Minister Monsieur 
Lefevre by his side. It was felt in Brussels 
*Uiat the attendance of Lefbvro, of whom little 
had been heard during negotiations, was meant to 
counter reports that certain right-wing Catholic 
and business elements in the Belgian Cabinet 
were not too unhappy about Britain's exclusion 
from the Market.
Britain had five votes in her favour at 
Brussels for anything that was reasonable, six 
votes against for anything unreasonable( 12).
This comment is perhaps unfair to the French, at 
least to those French who worked in Brussels. 
French officials afforded much help to the 
British, and Gorell B.umes acknowledges assist­
ance from French political representatives also. 
Couve de Hurville had suggested a standstill 
agreement whereby Britain could come into B.B.C.
(12) Clifford Jupp, above p.
11G
without at first imposing tariffs against 
B.F.T.A. members. The Prenoh also shifted 
from their insistence that BritauLn should aban­
don her deficiency payments system the day she 
entered thé Market, allovTing that they should 
continue during the life of the existing 
Parliament.
4 If, technically, we negotiated with six - 
separate governments, nevertheless, our initia­
tive served to spur E.E.C. unification, to 
contribute to a •setting of the bones' of the 
Community. The Six feared that time spent 
talking with Britain might slow down develop­
ment and this, in some ways, reinforced our 
difficulties. Suggestions relating to 
'association' had been discarded (13); there 
could now be no 'half-way answer' to the entry 
question. The problem was not to create a 
new system with some characteristics of the 
British and some of the Community systems. The 
real question was how Britain could effect a 
transition to eommunity-membership.
However, efforts by the Six to further 
political union failed during our period. 
Negotiations to implement the Bonn Jecloi^ation 
took place in the autumn of 1961 and in early 
1962, largely on the basis of tv/o French draft 
projects known as Fouohet 1 and Fouchet 11:
"But the first draft submitted by M. Fouchet .. hardly went very far, and the second draft (refurbished in 1962, it is said, by President de Gaulle personally) retreated even further, and also roused suspicions that the new political union would, by subordinating the existing
(13) Conte Report, above p. Vos Reîx>rt,above, p.VS; Mueller-Armack Plan, above, p.6& and p.65^ .
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Oonmunities to Inter-govenmental institutions, deprive them of their supranational oharaotar* In the and the Committee oould do little more than set out the two texts synoptioally Eind write a commentary on the differences betv/een tho9«"(l4)
The failure of the Fouchet talks in April 
1962 stemmed from a fundamental divergence of 
opinion over the form of political union and 
over questions relating to the defence and 
security of the Six in the context of existing
H.A.T.O. commitments. De Gaulle's offer of a 
•Europe of States' was made again at a press 
conference on 15th May 1962.
(Bilateral contacts between Prance and 
Germany were more fruitful. Plans forzegular 
ministerial meetings and the co-ordination of 
policies were embodied in the Pranco-German 
Treaty of Co-operation signed 22nd January 196). 
Thus the •Europe' of dialogue between the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers, if not 
replaced, was supplemented by institutionalized 
intcr-govenunental action. )
Geoffrey McDermot refers to the "oondea- 
oending attitude of Heath and his follow- 
negotiators". (15) One does capture a hint of 
patronage in this quotation from lieroon Dixon's 
collection of his father's diariest
"My sense of the atmosphere is that they arc rather resentful of our re-writing of their sacred writings, and perhaps a little bewildered by the English. So wrote Dixon to Eric Roll at the beginning of this last meeting. But they are
(14) Kitzingor, U.: The European OoiaaonKarkat and OwMuniLT 19&7. p.247jlnd see 'Explanatory Report on Draft Treaty', OP.cit.. p.108
(15) Op . cit.. p.201
1'^
chattering with interest; not, I judge, with hostility." (16)
If condesconaion was exhibited by the 
British so was ambivalenoe• It is possible to 
argue that Britain exhibited a desire, throu^ 
entry into E.E.O., to dilute the force of 
European growth. In Kay 1961 in the Gom&one 
Edward Heath emphasised the ooomercial nature of 
the B.B.C.*8 Commiesion*8 decisions: in the
following month Joseph Oodber, Minister of State 
at the Foreign Office, declared that, if we 
entered Europe, we would have the power of veto 
over federal extensions. In March 1962 Henry 
Brooke, Paymaster General, said that if the 
United Kingdom entered Europe, then it would be 
"different in character from the community as 
it exists at present".
v/here British efforts were not destructive, 
they sometimes appeared diversionary. In April 
1962 Heath, before Western European Union, 
declared that he looked forward to joining in 
the construction of a political as well aa an 
economic community. A new power, Europe would 
not stand alone but as an equal partner in an 
Atlantic Alliance, retaining the traditional ties 
overseas and fully conscious of its growing 
obligations towards the rest of the world. To 
"play it on commercial grounds" (Sir Frank 
Pearson, Assistant Whip) was bad enough: to
support Europe as a buttress for Atlanticism 
could hardly endear us to the French.
Just before the minieterial meeting of 
10th and 11th November 1962 both Reginald 
Maudling (Chancellor) and Frederick Erroll 
(Board of Trade) at home declared that they 
hoped negotiatione would end in success but did
(16) Double Diploma, p.289
not regard a possible failure as a disaster* 
These statements may tiave been Intended to 
6trengthen the position of the Brussels team, 
or they may have been insurances against 
failure - or both. During a Liverpool speech 
on 21st January, 196), Macmillan reiterated that 
the British Govemiaont accepted the Treaty of 
Rone and aligned itself with the political as 
well as the economic implications contained 
therein. During a broadcast on 30th January, 
after the final breakdown, he affirmed tliat, as 
far aa Britain had been concerned the 'cliallenge 
had been accepted".
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5.4 The Prlnoipals and Their 'Clients'
Compared with the disoussion on the free 
trade area, the 2.E.G. negotiatione were diffi­
cult. Sir Erie Roll notes that, in 1957 and 
1958, we were still dealing with each of the 
community states on a basis of reasonable 
equality. At Brussels it was Britain versus 
the Six. One trouble was that Whitehall was 
still under the influence of the free trade 
area talks. This represented a difference 
between V/hitehall and the team - some people in 
London thouglit in terms of playing off the Six 
against each other. "In Brussels we realized 
the reality of the situation, Whitehall had not 
got the free trade area out of its system."
Sir Eric Roll ways that the techniques 
used and mechanical characteristics employed in 
the Brussels negotiation were similar to those 
used and employed during the whole complex 
post-war era - when Marshall Aid and the 
founding of 0.2.B.C., the establishing of 
R.Â.T.O., and bargaining over the Billon Round 
were at issue. A lot of people had been 
apprenticed.
But, compared with the free trade dis­
cussions, Brussels was a full-scale, major 
effort - more closely knit, complex and com­
prehensive. Sir Pranlc Lee says that Whitehall 
was very conscious in I960 that a major effort 
had to be made in the entry negotiations. 
Interdepartmentally, this was a major diplo­
matic initiative involving more deliberation, 
more regular meetings. Seeing negotiations 
from the Conservative Research Department,
Sir Michael Fraser says that the attempt to 
enter Europe in the early 'Sixties represented 
more than an interdepartmental effort - it was 
a project.
V L \
Technically, says Herbert Andrew, the 
entry negotiations represented a very success­
ful British operation, a "well-played match".
He, and other civil servants, claim that no inter­
departmental brawls or wrangles occurred - "it 
was simply a question of optimisation," (1) It 
must be recognised, however, that the depart­
ments did have distinct interests and one must 
seek to divine substantive and procedural 
differences in the way they conducted themselves. 
The remainder of this chapter xslatea to the 
personal and departmental contributions made to 
the Brussels negotiations.
Reference must also be made to the envir­
onment within which each department worked, to 
the 'clients* with whom each had relations.
+ The Treasury representative at Brussels, 
RajTiond Bell, was in some ways a 'non- 
negotiator' • Independent sources confirm that 
he was highly regarded in the teams when items 
of interest to the Treasury arose- capital 
movements, for example - Bell was helpful and 
willing to settle. But the Treasury role was a 
small one. The Six had not yet reached the
(1) But note; the Treasury secured the press relations 'boss-job' at Brussels but Heath insisted that the Foreign Office should do the actual work and that the Commonwealth Relations Office should be represented, Clifford Jupp of the Foreign Office was thus based in Brussels (above, p, ) but a senior Commonwealth Relations official came out from London to attend important mini­sterial meetings. Lacking continuoue contact with the negotiators, his knowledge was not altogether adequate. The negotiations were not, of course, affected and in press rela­tions an a whole the Foreign Offioe was left "nicely free".
stage of disoussion of advanced monetary issues, 
and for the Treasury, "everything had to be 
played for, once we were a member of the 
Community."
Sir Frank Lee says that there is no organ­
ised 'City* and thus no 'City channel', but 
contacts with the Government were close. There 
was no shortage of City-Govemment relationships
Sir Eric Roll. It has been estimated that 
the City, in tlie early "Sixties, earned Britain 
about £185 millions per annum - without much of 
an inport bill (2). The City, including the 
Bank of England, had hesitations over Europe - 
arising from a concern for Sterling, and for the 
close financial links .Maintained with the United 
States. But, ao Sir Frank Lae noted, there would 
be great scope for City knowledge and skills 
with Britain in the E.S.C.
Sir Eric Soil says that the City, in the 
early stages of consideration of entry, was not 
%:artioularly vocal. City opinion was ambivalenti 
Rolls*s Impression was that the most articulate 
were those in favour of entry. Michael Fisher, 
of the Financial Times is not aware of any 
important contacts between the Government 
the merchant banks, insuranoo companies or pen­
sion funds during the negotiation period.
A flow of opinion betv/een the Bank and the 
rest of the City began only after the Govern»" 
ment had taken its decision to negotiate. During 
the free trade area t^ ilks the Bank had taken on
(2) Clarke, W.M. : The City in the World LcoaomiY. 1965
an educational role(3)* On Bank-City 
communications in 1961-63 as opposed to those 
of 1957-58, a Bank official writes #
"Here there was a real, though not very important difference in that, by 1961- 1963, the idea of entry to Europe was familiar and there was no need to intro­duce the City to it or reooxamend that they should bo taking it seriously and thinking about its effect on themselves.The Bank, therefore, did not revive the meetings held in the earlier period."(4)
The Bank had a representative on the Common 
Market Negotiating Committee (Official) - and 
two on the lower coijaittee - but:
".. as there was very little on the monetary aide in the Treaty which set up the E.S.C. itself, the main part of the work and the discussion fell to ^itehall departments, not to us. At various times we produced papers /o^ ' possible monetary effects and, later, on rather far-roaching monetazy arrange­ments which might ultimately be envisaged if we became full members. But in the stages of actual negotiation, monetary matters played rather little part."(5)
(3) "The Bank let it be known to a few •opinion formers' in the City such as the heads of leading Merchants Banks and Clearing Bardes that we would be glad to meet them and tell them what we properly oould about the general shape of the pro­ject and to explore with them the con­sequences it might have in the City. I remember that t\7o or three meetings wcrs held in the Bank at which I did what I could to say how things wore going and to suggest how they might affect the City#I was asked to lunch at various bcoiks to dieouss the tiling further or answer questions in their minds." (Letter,1.1. Thompson-licCausland • )
(4) L.P. Thompson- cCaWLand, letter.
(5) Op,Pit.
This oonfirsxs what la reported (below, p./fi) 
about negXeot of the balanee-or-»paymeatB factor 
during discuoslons on agriculture•
In June 1962 Grimond a poke of the benefits 
of monetary integration In Europe and of the 
benefits of entry for Britain in connection 
with the solution of economic problème of the 
sterling area* Somebody was looking ahead.
+ The Board of Trade was committed to succeed 
in Brussels. The department was always In favour 
of entry to comments Gorell Bamee
(Colonial Office). Herbert Andrew atood out in
the negotiations - he knew what to give in ad­
vance, what doncesslons to make during bargaining> 
and what to hang on to.
The Federation of British Industries, 
tiirough the Council of European Industrial 
Federations and througli Its own offices abroad# 
had independent sources df information which, 
when it wished, it could ahare with the Govern­
ment. Indue try had good informal contacts with
the Board of Trade and during our period, a Board 
of Trade-Federation of British Industries standing 
liaison committee operated. Its chairman.
Sir William Palmer, a representative of the Rayon 
Products Association, was a former Board of 
Trade man.
Herbert Andrew otatee that hie impression 
was that Industrial support for E.E.C. entry was 
quite strong. (Induotry was already bridge- 
building. In March 1961 it was reported that
I.e.I. were to begin large-scale manufactaring 
operations in Europe with an investment programme 
which would absorbe £100 millions in ton years.)
Andrew says that his ohlef links were with 
Commonwealth industrialists hut that it would 
ho wrong to say that the British Commonwealth 
Industries Association were "on his book".
British industry had taken its decision on the 
common external tariff and knew what its broad 
effect would be. (There was some fear of the 
continued free entry of Commonwealth manufaoturcs 
into Britain. See above, p.^3 ) Some prohibas 
came to Andrew while he raa in Brussels - 
Canadian aluialnlum, Australian lead and sine# 
and Norwegian bauxite were discussed - but not 
many.
On the trade union aide of industry. Heath 
made the contacts. In December 1961 the 
General Council of the T.U.C. met the lord iriyy 
Seal and he suggeated that th^ hold monthly 
meetings, to be held after each round of mini­
sterial talks in Brussels. The T.tJ.C. had 
meetings also with B.E.C. and B.F.T.A. national 
trade unionists. The T.U.C. in meetings with 
the E.S.O. unions in April 1962, found agreement 
on the need for a full-employment provision to 
be Inserted in the Rone Treaty, but not on the 
issue of mobility of labour. Prank Cousins, 
speaking before the Scottish T.U.C. in Aberdeen 
on 20th April 1962 declared that the Labour Party 
should not leave initiative in the hands of the 
Conservatives but should prepare itself to fight 
a general election - he referred, obviously, to 
Ion Maoleod's declai*ution of 12th April 1962(6). 
Motions of all possible shades - for, against, 
conditional - succeeded at the various trade 
union conferences during the spring and summer 
of 1962. The 1962 Trade Union Congress saw the 
General Council’s ’wait-and-see* motion carried — 
the T.U.C. was reserved, if slightly warmer to­
wards Europe than was the Labour Party.
(6) Bee below, p. 4^-^ •
+ sir William Gorell BamesC?), who had 
worked with Monnet during the war, waa left very 
much in charge as Colonial Office repreeentative 
in Brussels. Reginald Handling, his Minister 
(Duncan Uandye took over as joint Ccnninonwealth 
Relations - Colonial Office Minister on 
13th July 1962, four ye^ra ahead of the actual 
merger of the department, had seventeen rounds 
of independence negotiations proceeding at the 
time. Gorell Bames did not feel that he was 
in the thick of the Brussels negotiations. 
Although he spent more and more time in Brussels 
and became more and more * engaged*, he did not 
feel that his lot was as difficult as that of 
some of his colleagues. A mixture of Herbert 
Andrew and Raymond Bell, according to one des­
cription, Barnes mirrored Treasury detachment 
with a Board of Trade realism as to what was 
possible from negotiation.
After the resumption of negotiations in 
Brussels in the autumn of 1962 tough bargaining 
secured from the Six some concessions on the 
association of ex—dependent territories. Des­
pite regular briefings of thoir representatives 
in London, Britain was embarraesed by the 
refusal of Ghana and Nigeria to accept privil­
eges similar to those enjoyed by French ex- 
colonies. The Colonial Office may not have 
prepared these new nations adequatelyt pexhape 
antipathy to •neo-colonialism* would have 
rendered such preparation impossible. (Some 
African states changed thoir minds about associa­
tion with E.B.C. only months after breakdown.)
In a September 1962 publication the Fabian 
Commonwealth Bureau declared that E.E.C. con­
cessions should hot be undervalued;
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"They represent an aooeptanoe of long­term international responsibilitiee which had been woefully muted before the start of Britain*8 negotiations•"
The Labour Common Market Committee, too, wel­
comed the offer of association made to African 
countries.
+ Sir Henry lintott, another close friend of 
H.Marjolin (he had been his deputy as 
Secretary-General at O.E.E.O.), represented 
Commonwealth Uelations. He was more success­
ful in negotiation than his replacement, Godfrey 
Shannon, who came to Brussels after Lintott fell 
ill in the middle of 1962. Shannon was not ao 
high-ranking as Lintott - Assistant Under­
secretary as against Deputy Under-Secretary - 
and "did not carry the weight”. Bothvere, of 
course, senior civil servants but neither, 
apparently, strong personalities. They wore 
supported by a strong Minister, Duncan Saadyo, 
but had to cope with resentment in the Common­
wealth and indecision in the Cabinet. Rather 
like ^Agriculture, they wanted everything, did 
not know what to concede, and ultimately made 
ooncessions tliat offered too little, too late.
The Six had strong oonnorcial interests in 
801:16 Comraonvïoalth countries - they provided more 
investment to India than did Britain - and, on 
French initiative, a comprehensive trade agree­
ment was GUggostad for India, iakiotan, and 
Ceylon. The Six were not so kindly disposed to 
the old white dominions. The French conceded one 
point; they agreed to a statement that the 3iz, 
in perfecting the :: itional development of 
%ricultural production, would contribute to a
hanoonious development of world trade by 
ensuring a satisfactory level of exohangee 
between Itself and third countries, including 
those of the Commonwealth. The British failed 
to secure a more specific oommitment.
fressure to achieve an outline agreement 
suitable for discussion at the 1962 Commonwealth 
Ifimo Ministers conference was unsuccessful, 
despite the all-night sitting in August, but 
enough was achieved to make t>iat conference 
worthwhile.
At the Commonwealth Conference Mr. Diefen- 
bakor made one of the more notable emotional 
appeals to Britain (six months later 
Lester-Peareon favoured British entry to 
Europe) but Robert Menzieo weua the weightiest 
figure and feared by Macmillan. The Australian 
Prime Minister distrusted liis host and resented 
the report Duncan Sandys had brought back to 
London the previous summer that he, Mensies, 
had been more co-operative in private than in 
public. But the Australians would gain advan­
tages from international oomiaodity agreements 
demanded by the French and, ]nowing of American 
concern that Britain should enter Europe, did 
not vfisii to travel on to Washington (as he later 
did ) with the reputation of a wrecker and, in 
the event, he did not lead a revolt of blaok and 
brown Commonwealth members against Britain.
The final conference communique contained no 
demand for a ro-ox ening of agreements already 
nudo by Britain in Brussels, or for a limitation 
of British freedom when the time for a final 
decision come.
Although the Government had suffered a 
decline of support in by-olootions, local
V I
elections and opinion polls during the first 
half of the year, iiaomillan on the morrow of 
the conference, saw fit to declare "we too are 
independent". Commonwealth opposition to 
Britain’s entry expressed at the conference may 
have been counterproductive - many Conservatives 
resented attacks on the Government.
After the publication in the se ond half 
of July of the Kbits Paper on ministerial visits 
to CosmonwejLlth countries(8), differences 
within the Conservative Party strengthened. 
Opposition to the Government now came from an 
alliance of right-wing Conservâtives and left- 
wing Socialists - the former stressing the 
interests of the old, white Commonwealth, the 
latter those of the new, black Commonv/ealth.
The ’Expanding Oonmonwealth Group* of 
OoneorVatives had been active for some time, 
supporting and being supported by the Goranon- 
wetfLth Industries Association. In June 1961 
a motion had been put down in the House call­
ing for a Comnonv/ealth Free Trade Association. 
Tliis motion, and several letters printed in 
the Times, carried relatively few signatures - 
the Conservatives in the majority were waiting. 
While Shinwell called for a Commonwoalth 
Development Fund, members of both main parties 
demanded a Comi&omrealth irine Ministers* con­
ference.
On 25th April 1962, in The Times. Peter 
talker announced hio private tour of Common­
wealth countries, to t.aice place in August, which 
was to rally opposition to entry. Conservative 
Central Office stepped up its publicity 
activities* from she end of Z!ay the cekly 
newsletter devoted much space to the E.B.O*
(8) Cmnd* 1449. See p.^ 6.
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question. The oounterattaok on Derek Ualker- 
Smith*s and lotor î7alker*a QaJLX to Coxamoncrealth 
publication waa, on 20th June, a party politi­
cal broadoaet devoted entirely to Europe.
Loading Labour figure© attacked entry.
Barbara Castle linked entry with the Coimnonwealth 
Immigrants Bill; should continental© enjoy free 
entry to Britain while Commonwoalth citizen© were 
excluded? Messieurs Crossman, Healey, Jay and 
Nlloon each tackled the question of the political 
implications of entry. Under the title 'Still 
Time to save the Empire*, Wileon argued tho ooae 
for an Atlantic Common Market(9).
Betiveen tlio rising of tho Gomnons at the 
beginning' of August and tho Commonwealth u^ rime 
Klnia ters* conforonce 10th and 19th September 
1962 tiie opponents of entry made their biggest 
joint efforts - they even made efforts to secure 
the prescncQ of prime ministers at their rallies 
but failed. On the last day of tho oonfcranoe 
a full-pagc ’kaXly to Coi:a;ionwealth* advertisement 
appeared in the Times.
Gaitskell waa very much impressed by the 
concern of Commonwealth leaders in London and 
during this time placed great stress on conditicne 
of entry. During a 13th September television 
broadcast he asserted;
"If the Government propose to go in on ' terms which seem to us, and to the Common­wealth, quite unacceptable, there is an obvious, clear division of opinion in the country and there ought to bo an election  ^. before Britain commit3 herself.”
During De comber the ’Commonwealth* Con­
servatives rallied. On 13th December altogether 
fifty-five Conservatives, including Sir Donald 
Kaborry, a former Doputy-Chalman of the party,
(9) Sunday Express. 10th Juno, 1962
signed an Early Day Motion congratulating Edward 
Heath on the firmness shown at Brussels, contemplated 
the disoontinuance of negotiations, and called for 
a new major Commonwealth initiative.
■f Arthur X ropper re p re s en te d  A g r ic u ltu r e .  He was an Under-Qeoretary - not until the last phase
of negotiations was the ninistry persuaded to 
send out the more senior Frederick Bishop (Deputy 
Secretary). (Another Under-Secretary, B.C.
Engholra, coma from London once or twice.) How­
ever, it must not be forgotten that Sir Eric Roll* 
deputy head of the negotiating team (himself a 
Deputy Secretary) was on detached duty from the 
ilinistry of ^kgrioulture.
Comment on the performance of the Agriculture 
people could not be wore varied. Herbert Andrew 
(Board of Trade) says tJiat they were anxious to 
get on Witt tho job but difficulties arose booaus# the Six were still evolving their own agricultural 
policy. ^Agriculture, li3ce Commonwealth Relations* says Sir Prank Lee (Treasury) waa in no sense hostile and in no senoe was work hampered — Agriculture did issue "valid v/aminga”.
A Foreign Office estimate of Agriculture is 
that the department wanted the maximum and could 
not evaluate tlie situation. Gorell Barnes 
(Colonics) holds that Agriculture "misconceived
the whole exercise" and was a brake. It was a mystery hov; tho ministry ’stood for* the National Farmers ’ Union whose pressure amounted to harrying. 
The Foreign Office official believed the îiotivity of Agriculture during negotiations amounted to 
"straightforward sabot^ogo". Sir John Vinifrith* 
the 1ormanent Secretary, waa a strong personality and notoriously * anti—Market* - he enjoyed enormous • powers of delay. The great misfortune was that Christopher Soanes ?;as such a weak political 
head. (Aahhr Keingcirten of the N.F.U.s I have always suspected that the Foreign Office were anxious to get into B.E.C. whatever the cost to agriculture. The ministiyj- merely did its job; Vfinnifrith made bcnos about being *antl* but 
many in his ministry were ’pro*.) The Foreign Office were happier when Bishop caine out to 
Brussels: he was opposed to the Market but was
a very effective aegotiator.
A# already noted(lO) the Mini#try of 
Agriculture* Fleheriee and Food* of all depart­
ment#* cane nearest to eetahUohing a special 
unit to deal with the S.3,0# nogotiatione, No 
details are available from the ministry but the 
Civil SfltTle. llrnt 1963, oowring th. prwioo* 
year* shows the Bxtemal Relations Division III 
had enjoyed a modest expansion over the previous 
year. Little preparatory work had been done 
before negotiations startedi
"It remains odd that the n^v minister Soaaes did net immediately form a much stronger %#%,:, section to work on the fundamental problems in anticipation of the decision to apply for membership#Hor did the government make any special effort to encourage research in this field at universities or other non­governmental institutions. This lack of preparatory work was to prove a major handicap in 1962#
"Failure to do in good time the detailed preparatory work on agriculture is all the more surprising beoause in the summer of 1961 it was expected that the negotia- tisas would be completed and the Treaty ratified during the following year so as to make it possible for the United Kingdom to take up formal membership of the B#%.G# on 1st January* 1963#"(^^)
what is even more aurpriaing than anything 
Butterwick and Solfe have said oomee from the 
ministry itselft "## this Department was not one 
of the major ones concerned with the negotiations 
in 1963 although of course our advice was sought," i
(l^ ) Above*
{ii) Butterwick* k# and Holfe* H,i ct.cit..5.76 
Utj Letter* 10th July* 1969
al
"Our relations with the ministry were no 
more /i.e# intensively/ aotive in the period 
1961-1963 than during any prioe-roviev*" says 
one N,P,U. official, Asher Weingarten# Chief 
SconoDist to the Rational Farmers* Union 
declares that there vae no substantial change 
in the nature of the contacts he had with the 
ministry in the early * Sixties but that many 
more informal ao well as teohniool nestings* at 
Deputy- and Uhder-Beoretary level* took place in 
London, (The annual reports of the 9,F,U, for 
1962 and 1963 give details of a continuation of 
those international contoots made before 
Macmillan* 0 1961 announoeeent,)
AS negotiations with the £,S,C, began the 
H,F,U, held a briefing session on the British 
agricultural support system which was attended ly 
two hundred overseas journalists - the press 
statement was issued in Frenoh and Oeroan as well 
as English,
In July 1961 Barold uoolley* the president* 
in a paophlat «ntiUad gritiah Arjiomture and 
the Comuon Market* rehearsed the principal 
reasons for British formers* opposition to the 
proposals put forward by the aix as conditions 
for entry. He said that if a ooomon ogrioul- 
turul policy were accepted by Britain* it would 
be impossible to continue the system of annually 
determining guarantees to account for the trend 
of net income* changes in costs* and other rele­
vant factors. In addition* the famere would 
lose the income security provided by the system 
of guaranteed prices if the E,B,C,*s system of 
establishing * target prices* and aiming to hit 
these targets by controlling import duties was 
imposed. To the extent that production nd ^ t
(M) See above* p,j^
Increase faster than demand * avenge i rices 
received by farmers would be below the target 
prices of the 2#B#0,, Furthermore* because 
Common Market deololen were made by majority 
vote* Britain* as the largest food importing 
country* would inevitably be pressed to concede 
access to the continental formeras growing output.
Heal negotiation with the Six did not start 
in Brussels until 1962 and serious discussion 
relating to food occurred from May onwards,
Gone progress was made on iho key question of 
tmipcrate sons foodstuffs* with the Biz showing 
some willingness to treat Hew Eealand as a special 
case. As far as British agriculture was oon- 
oemed nothing much was achieved in the pre- 
August period* although serious diplomatic 
*ix>»fighting* did occur. An all-4iight session 
was needed to secure a compromise whereby the Six 
accepted the British system of an annual review 
of form prices and incomes* based on government 
reports. If rei>ort8 showed that farmers in 
certain * areas* were not preserving their 
8tandard-of-living* the Comission would be bound 
to help them. Vas an *«rea* a region (French 
view) or a whole country (British view)? The 
conference almost broke up before the French* 
contrary to their usual habit* without having 
made any preliminary joint agrément with the 
rest of the Six* suddenly capitulated - at 
3,15 a,m, on 31st July,
From October 1962 omnu^ds a xmjor difficulty 
immediately encountered ooncemed the transition 
period and the phasing-out of deficiency i>ay- 
aenta. The Six regarded a ohort change-over 
period ao a test* the ehorter the period the less 
tine tiiere would be for Britain to seek to modify 
coQounity arrangements. At a late stage*
Bdword Heath finally cade the conoesoion that all 
transitional arrongenentc for agriculture should
temlnatc by the end of 1969,
The In consul ta tion with the
(Scotland) and the Ulster Farsora* Union* had 
published positive proposals in August 1962 with 
their *Fom and Food Plan*, This plan* t^ diich 
was re*;orted in all the national daily nowopapers 
and nearly two hundred provincial and local news- 
i>apor8* was oojioemed with the disruptive effect 
of surpluses on the British open market and 
pressed for international commodity agreomento# 
the luunaonlsation of national agricultural poli­
cies * and a Vorld Food Programme organised 
through an enlarged 0*3,U.9.. (H»P«U* officials 
are proud that parte of their 1962 plan have been 
adopted, A World Food Frogramne with oonnodity 
agreements and standard quantities is now 
operated# Tho annual report for 1963 - in 
British Farmer. 11th January 1964 - deolareo ttiat 
the plan hod become a plank in the pro^ r^araae of 
the main political portico#)k -
Asher weingmrten asserts that his union was 
positive in its attitude throughout the entry 
negotiations, The union hod hod fifteen years 
of frank dieoueeiona with European oclleogueo 
and now equally frankly declared* as a natter of 
principle, that the European agricultural policy 
must be adapted or modified. The E#£,C#*s own 
policy on which* in the final analysis it was 
going to judge its own success* was still in the 
process of formation. In so crucial and diffi­
cult an area for the Six theaselves* it was 
Inevitable that negotiations with Britain should 
be detailed and protracted - this could not be 
avoided# In on evolutionary situation* the 
1I,F,U, could not always offer detailed proposals, 
Macmillan himself was exploriag# To blaae 
either minister* ministry or the union for caution 
exhibited during negotiation would be ridiculous.
In reporting to the 1962 annual general 
neetinga the union* e president made fairly full 
dec&nda. The R#F,U# required a continuation of 
the eye ten of annual revievo (ao seen above* 
Q&n^oded in Bruoeelo} aa a busio for deteraining 
price guaranteeof effective support of non- 
review oomiioditiee* which received tariff 
protection» end* the continued full use of the 
producer marketing organisations # ( The 
S,f,U« enjoyed considerable influence# (Nora 
heloff reports that* just before de Gaulle*s veto#
M## Doanes had cent a private message to Mr# Harold Woolley* the a w head of the national Formeis* Union* asking whctlior ho ai^t Ixappen to be free toooae over to Brussels# perhaps at the end of the week* to give his advice on a possible package deol#"(/f)
The B#?#U# cannot confirm this story and 
Christopher 8oames will not speak# but cert(%inly 
Woolley* on 21ot January 1963* conveyed the views 
of hie annual general meeting to Downing Street# 
The H#P#U# annual report said that it was still 
for from clear* at tVe end of negotiations* 
whether the British delegation would have been 
sble to negotiate terms vhioh would have net the 
unions* requirements#( A
h«H# Ficher* who covered tlie Brussels talks 
for the Fii^anoial Timee. declares that tho n#?#U# 
links with the Ministry of Agrieulture* of all 
links between intereet groups ond ministries* wore 
of great importunée but#
"#* even here, the key to government %)olloy was not what the 1T#7#U# o.'&id -
(/^) In British 1 armer# 12th January 1963 
(i4) Beloff*H#i The General faz/o Ho# p.146
Sritloli IVigüT. 11 ta January, 1964, p.17
they kept on asking for the noon - but what the govemnent thought it could get away with in political teras vio-a-^o the f a m c M ,  "
Tho famine world waa in & difficult situa­
tion# the 200*000 of 250*000 fumera of England 
and ^alea who bolonied to the looked to
the union to protect then against csarket fluctua» 
tione* through the negotiation of conprehunaive 
deals with the Qovemnent by annual reviews# 
Oovemaent opinion waa moving torvordo the idee 
of a change* towards the limitation of Exchequer 
oormitaent (above* p.fÿ ). This added to 
existing difficulties for faming; on the supply 
side* a small nucbcr of giant firms now supplied 
almost all the requiroamnto in fertilisers* 
naehinery* oosds* and veterinary products and* on 
t!xe marketing; aide equally* a few large firms had 
cone to dominate food iirooeeoinc and distributing 
induo tries - the firmer* s autonos^’^ was threat­
ened from both sides# At a tirxe when the British 
former wee being asked to redefine his identity* 
reverse hie basic values* and refashion hie 
org nlsatiOA* the ooheoion of the *#F#U# vac being 
threatened# (
Butterwick and .volfe consider that tlie 
H#F#U#*c attitude during negotiations* if never 
downright hoctile* was always negative and ultra- 
cautiouc# The industry enjoyed a *special 
relAtlonahip* with i%itehall and ceened unlikely 
to securo a sinllar clooe relationship in Brussels# 
Some denando were unreaeonablet why* for example* 
should guaranteed prices and w. eciol an'on^e- 
zents for horticulture beyond the trancition 
period be ollov/ed - when British farmers were 
technically ahead of their European colleagues?
(/^) Bmery*F#E# and Trist.g#!#; "The Causal Texture of Organisational Environments" * luaofi i.elatlotiB. Vol.la,no.l.l9&S»p.i27
Ferhapo the long dieeuesion of the transition 
period had been Itxrgely for the consumption of 
the R,F#U, oonstituenoyi
"One of the nain preocoupations of the United Kin<3don fiimoro* uniono is to nreserro ^ e  cohesion of the agrioultural industry end to r^event tho creation of splinter groups representing special interests within the industry. The iosue of joining 5,B«C, \>rcsonted the unions with special difficulties, Following adoption of the Common Agricultural Tolley some producers* for instance cereal growers# would benefit# others like hoiticultuialists night suffer. Doubtless the unions felt thv^ t by tnkinc up a very oautiouo attitude, tÿ pointing out all the disadvantagest they would at least run no risk of losing support," (/?)
(I?) Pit,, p,80
I s f
5.5 Dopçqtlc and Szteroal gnvlronaenteC ^ ^  Details of the •public battle* relating to 
the United Kingdom’s attempt to join E.S.C. must 
have a minor place in this thesis. However, 
extensive treatment having been given to the 
Whitehall departxaente and their •clients’, some 
brief mention must be made of the Irime Minister 
and his ’clients’, of the pressures placed upon 
the Macmillan Government, and the management of 
those pressures, during negotiations.
During the summer of 1961 Conservative , 
Central Office organised half-a-dozen regional 
briefings for key party works - eight hundred con­
stituency representatives attended the London and 
Home Counties meeting at Church House. This sig­
nalled the beginning of the process of party 
education. Sir Michael Praser says that the main 
task was to defeat the ignorance of Europe that 
existed, to get the facts across to the party.
"We started from a weak position, but secured a 
positive evolution of opinion during the period 1961-1962".
In fact, special efforts were made by the party 
leadership to carry oonstituenoy opinion. William 
Deedes (above, p.Ef^  ), in addition to the work he 
performed in the Treasury and in Parliament helped 
to prepare material for the Conservative rank-and- 
file. He also chaired the weekly meetings of the 
party Committee on Policy, the liaison between the 
Westminster leadership and the national Union 
executive.
After Macmillan’s July declaration opinion in 
the two major political parties hardened. However, 
on 29th January 1962, The Times was able to state#
the main body of Conservative back­benchers are resisting alike the blandishments of the extreme European
and anti-European groups in their midst. They are also allowing their judgement to be influenced by Mr. Heath. • whenever he deals with a challenge at question time."
The Conoervativos’ party political broadcast of 
January 1962 managed to evade the issue of Europe 
altogether.
Firm opposition to S.S.C. did exist within 
the Conservative Party. In April 1962, reports 
Ronald Butt I
"One senior cabinet minister spoke ..of the Common Market as threatening poten­tially the most fundamental shake-up in the Conservative Party since Disraeli’s break with Peel over the repeal of the C o m  Iaws."(l)
On 20th June Macmillan made his first public 
speech on Europe, stressing the political value of 
Britain’s link with Europe and referring to the 
risk of our becoming a poor, off-shore island.
This was the first shot in the campaign to win 
over the 1962 Conference.
1962 was ’European Tear’ at the Conservatives’ 
conference. Those delegates who wore ’Yes’ badges 
set the tone and overwhelming support was given to 
the platform. Gaitskell’a broadcast declaration, 
on 21st September, enabled Butler to make his 
celebrated and remarkable rejoinder* "For them a 
thousand years of history. For us, the future"(2) 
Labour had enabled the Conservatives to consoli­
date the question of entry into S.S.C. as a party 
issue.
(1) "the Common Market and Conservative PartyPolitics, 1961-62," Government and Opposition. April - Jüïy, Ï9B7, p.382
(2) Conservative Conference Report, p.53
Eventually, of oouroe, no decision on entry 
to E#B*0. Imd to be debated in Westminster# Sir 
Frank Pearson believes that Macmillan might have 
lost perhaps thirty votes had the question of 
entry been put in January 19631 "Even Peber 
Walker was coining round to acceptance of Europe and 
cmly Robin Turton remained as an important oppo­
nent", (Consequent on the Spiegal Affair, which 
began to unfold in October 1962, Lord Boothby 
attacked continental democratic practices and 
demanded a break-off of negotiations. This must 
have been a tactical demand for Boothby was a 
strong European).
Had the Conservatives in Parliament been 
deeply divided constituency opinion might have 
been called into play. Divergencies of view on 
entry did exist in Westminster but were never 
deep enough to occasion a problem in the con­
stituencies - the Dorset by-election was the sole 
example of the creation of oonstituenoy passion 
(below, p . ).
+ Opponents of market entry oooasionally 
argued in constitutional terms but the issue never 
aohieved constitutional status. In the event, 
it was not necessary to put entry to the elector­
ate, but, had terms been secured in 1963, a general 
election would undoubtedly have been held, domina­
ted by the entry issue. During a télévision 
broadcast on 1st February 1962, Edward Heath said 
that a general election should take place before 
entry. At Derby on 12th April Maoleod said: "I
do not mean to indicate that the general election 
will be fought on the issue of the Coiamon Market 
itself. We do not go in for référendums in this 
country.• but when the next general election comes, 
clearly, this is going to be the great issue."
A bipartisan approach to European problems 
was oomnon among the nations of the Ooznzaimity*
Late in the summer of 1961, it was reported, 
Macmillan brusquely rejected a modest Opposition 
proposal that an all-party committee of M.f.’s 
should examine the oonsequencea of entry into 
Europe. Subsequently, in the spring of 1962,
Heath offered to brief Opposition leaders pri­
vately on the course of the Brussels negotiations. 
Gaitskell rejected the offer, although George 
Brown accepted. At the 1962 party conferences 
both Heath and Gaitskell spoke of the European 
issue as being above party politics.
At some time during the summer of 1962 both 
Macmillan and Macleod, the party chairman, 
decided that the Common Market was a potential 
election winner. The Prime Minister may not have 
tried actively to make entry a bipartisan issue, 
but it was only at this time that he began to make 
it a party question. The Market could be 
exploited in a partisan manner. The Conservatives 
would be the forward-looking party. In this con­
text must be read Butler’s oonferenoe declaration.
For much of the period before July 1961 the 
attention of the Labour Party was directed to 
nuclear arms, and to its own constitution, and not 
to Europe.
During a broadcast on 8th May 1962 Gaitskell 
said that the economic arguments for or against 
entry were evenly balanced t
"To go in on good terms would, I believe, be the best solution to this difficult problem. Not to go in would be a pity, but it would not be a catastrophe. To go in on bad terms whioh really meant the end of the Oommonwealth would be a step which I think we would regret all
\ H- ?
our lives, and for whioh history would not forgive ua*"(3)
As late as 29th July 1962 Pierson Dixon 
could note that Gaitskell had said that Britain’s 
entry into Europe waa essentially right and that 
he would probably not make it a party is8ue(4).
During the summer of 1962 must have begun 
the stirrings of doubt in Gaitskell’o mind(5).
There was doubt as to whether Britain’s conditions 
for entry could be obtained* The Oonservativee 
appeared to be developing Europe as a party issue.
Gaitakell’s opposition expressed at confer­
ence was regarded by some as a piece of blatant 
electioneering. His speech electrified the 
assembly. Certainly it depaupted t n m  the spirit 
of the National Executive’s views(6). Gaitskell 
revealed, not simply doubts, but a basically hostile 
attitude to the Six. In making his stand,
Gaitskell turned his back on allies of recent 
troubles - Brown, Gunter, Straohey, Paokenha^,
(3) Gamps, 21.i op.cit.. p.448
(4) Double Diploma, p.287
(5) See Note , p. (2(,
(6) The five conditions of Labour and the CommonMarket 29th September 1962, werei 3irong and binding safeguards for the trade and other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth} freedom to pursue a British foreign policy; fulfilment of government pledges to our associates inII.F.T.Â. ; the right to plan our eoonony; and, guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture.
( 14 X-
Jenklna - and was one with former left-wing, 
unilateralist foee# Frank iaokenham found it a 
heart-breaking experience - supporters of entry 
looked "shocked, beaten and betrayed". George 
Brown tried to redress the balance but the day 
had been lost. (See Note C  . p. (9^1 ).
f The Common Market Campaign (above, p.^ % ) 
was a small, compact all-party body aimed at 
informed opinion - it addressed itself primarily 
to persons in influential positions, to M.P.’s, 
the Press, and industrialists. Robert Jarrett, 
the Campaign’s secretary, says that he and his 
colleagues became "respectable" after the July 1961 
announcement but "not much ministerial support was 
obtained". There was some contact with William 
Deedes, Minister without Portfolio(7), who paid 
tribute to the campaigners at the Conservative 
Conference of 1962, but little else. The 
European Movement (8), by comparison, had close 
contacts with Macmillan cmd benefited from his 
dinner appearances for them. (The Prime Minister 
and Sir Edward Beddington-Behrens had been at 
school and Oxford together and the letter’s fund­
raising was thus faoilitated(9). The Common 
Market Campaign was "distressed and surprised by 
the lack of ministerial help."
The largest opposition organization was the 
Anti-Common Market League, founded by disgruntled 
Conservatives in August, 1961. The League at 
first was unsure of its role. Should its activity 
concentrate on research and lobbying, or should it
(7) Above, p. 96
(8) Above, p.
(9) William Deedes was involved, in an unofficial way, with this fund-raising.
become a militant organization fighting on all 
fronts - otandard-of-living, employment, sover­
eignty, agriculture and not simply Conmonwealth - 
inside and outside the Conservative Party? 
Eventually, the League decided to stir up sus­
picion and hostility to the B.E.O. on a nation­
wide scale.
A great eimount of League literature was 
distributed. During the period between August 
1961 to January 1963 the Conservative Central 
Office published twenty-three pamphlets, leaflets ' 
and such for general distribution, achieving a 
total circulation of just under two aillions.
The League did nearly as well with a much smaller 
and amateurish organization.
Derok ^alker-Smith was the chief voice of 
the "anti’s" and spoke at the League’s first mass 
meeting in Kensington Town Hall on 4th October 1961, 
The largest public meeting was held at the Central 
Hall during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Con­
ference but the high-point of activity came with 
an Albert Hall demonstration on 26th August 1962 
held in conjunction with the Forward Britain 
Movement and Keep Britain Out.
+ The Dally J^ Iirror maintained its support of, 
the Daily Korker and the Daily Express remained adamantly opposed to the Common Market. A Daily 
Express leading article of 26th September 1956 had 
urged the Government to turn its back on old 
Europe towards the new lemde beyond the seas. The 
Express remained consistent over time. Prom the 
summer of 1961 full- and half-page advertisements 
were placed in other nev/apapers, from Tribune to 
The Times. From June 1961 the Express’s own front 
page offered a boxed ’fact a day’ to its twelve 
million readers and its columns were opened to all 
anti-^âarketeera whether right-wing Conservative 
or left-wing Labour. The Express throughout 
the negotiating period fortified opponents of
(y.
B.E.C. by its support for the Cwmonweolth ideal, 
insular sovsrsignty, an alleged superior British 
standard-of-living, and by enoouraging a sus­
picion of foreigners, espeoially Germans.
The Express’s brochure You and the Comon 
Market was published in January 1962 and sold two 
hundred thousand copies. The author, a leader- 
writer and earlier a Conservative candidate,
James McMillan admitted later that this was an 
emotional broedside not a factual statement. The 
Conservatives devoted the whole of one issue of 
thoir Notes on Current Politic* to putting the 
facts straight.
The Times, in a leader published on 
2nd June I960 applauded de Gaulle’s nationalism 
and caused some apprehension on the continent.
There is no evidence to suggest that the British 
i ress mode any impact either at home or in 
Europe during the negotiations (10) (11).
Clifford Jupp, admittedly spending muoh of 
his time in Brussels, says that he found radio 
and television coverage of the Brussels negotia­
tions to be colourless. An analysis of pro­
grammes shows that the main areas of interest and
(10) But note the Y/oodrow Wyatt story, above, p.^3
(11) "Nor is the popular press as influential as might bo supposed. The foreign editor ofa British daily with one of the largest circulations in the world recently has reminded ne that for over a year his paper had constantly urged that Britain join the Common Market. Six months after de Gaulle had blocked this, the paper organised an opinion poll among its many millions of readers whioh disclosed that fifty-four percent did not know what the Common Market was." (Buak,B«t The Craft of Biplcsnacy, p«87)
the major problems of entry were covered by 
experts and political personalities during the 
eighteen months here covered. But Europe was 
by no means a daily diet for,British listeners 
and viewers.
+ Those who sought to make their highly com­
plex estimates of the economic advantage of entry 
into Europe could examine several areas of possi­
ble gain - increased specialization, larger 
scale production, and increased competitive 
stimulus to efficiency. Some economists denied 
that they could provide quantitative analyses as 
an aid to policy-making*
"Given the present and prospective state of Icnowledgc about economic relationships, the labour required for economic calcula­tion, and the fact that the most important decision problems are unique experiemente, it is inevitable that economic policy­makers and commentators must rely to a large extent on guessing at the magnitudes of economic effects."(isi)
Hutchison was not alone in deploring bad guessing. Professor Jewkes declared that, certainly, there
was nothing in economists’ science nor in their
past achievements which gave them any special
claim to be able to foretell the future(l$).
Some economists, like A.C.L. Bay, became 
champions of entry: other, like N. Kalder,
opponents, Balogh first favoured closer working 
with tiie Sterling Area, then with Europe, then a 
•going it alone* policy. The Observer sent out 
a questionnaire to every professor and reader of 
economics in Britain, and to at least one Fellow 
in each Oxford and Cambridge college, and to a 
few economists heading research institutes.
(IB.) Hutchison, T.W.: Economics and Jconomic lolicy in Britain p.l9t
(l5) Hutchison, T.V/.* op,cit.. p.203
Editorial eomaant found that if th# Market was 
regarded as a beginning and as an opportunity for 
new initiatives, then the Government oould be 
confident that it had the great bulk of 
prtfessional opinion behind it(l^.
Chatham House remained a centre of European 
sentiment through the negotiations. After 
January 1963 it published Implications of the 
Brussels Breakdown* it is significant that the 
two, of four, essayists who were pro-European 
were senior officials of Chatham House, the two 
sceptics were outsiders.
Undoubtedly, the academic moot publicly active 
was William Pickles. His publications - Keep 
Britain Out. Not with Europe - revealed the 
depth of his antipathy towards H.B.C.t he attack­
ed its "mixture of bureaucracy and anarcy", its 
agricultural and trade policies. He was influ­
ential as one of Gaitskell’s circle and as member 
of several of Labour’s unofficial committees, and in 
the trade unions. Pickles had links with all the
(lU Of one hundred and twenty-seven question- ' naires distributed, eighty-three werereturned. Opinion on entry divided as follows#
Very muoh against 3Against 9Evenly balanced 18In favour 38Very muoh in favour 11Non-committal 4
( Observer. 14th October, 1962)
oanpailpio opposing entry and eu^aated a 
déclaration by then warning the 3ix on the 
doubtful status of a Conservative adhesion to the 
Rome Treaty# The nation woe being sold "a poli« 
tioal pig in on eoonoaio i>cke**t and the electorate 
should be consulted#
In elite groupe and in popular opinion tliere 
was little Inplacable hostility to entry into 
uurope# The Government moved in a very circuaepoc 
manner and felt it had adeqtuite support for negotiA 
tion# Opinion was never tested hy s positive 
Brussels decision# However# whereas opinion at 
the outset had been quiesoent# hostility towards 
Europe did mount during the second half of 
negotiations#
The state of euphoria in which the Conserva­
tives left Llandudno in 1962 was shortlived#
Polls began to show a swing away froo the Govern­
ment and a hardening of opinion against entry 
became evident# On 12th December the Daily 
Telogruî^h gave results of Gallup lolls showing that, 
since October 1962# the percentage of those in 
favour of joining "on the facts as you know then at 
present" had deolined from forty-one to twen*^f- 
nine# and the paroentcge against joining had risen 
from twenty-eight to thirty-seven# (The i^lX also 
showed that fdy-two percent# as against thirty- 
seven percent in October# expected the Labour 
Party to win the next election# )
If the results of these polls were a check 
on a government which might have planned extrava­
gant extensions of policy in order to gain entry 
to E#B#C# there were also other warnings# Con­
servative candidates did very badly in a series of 
five by-elections in November 1962# South Dorset# 
on the 22nd November# gave the Goverzment cause 
for thou^t#
Lord Hinohlugbrooke had auccoedod his father 
ao Bari of Sandwich and had given up hia Comons 
seat. Sandwich, with a big local following# had 
promised support to Angus Maude the ] ro-I^ artcet 
official Ccneorvatlve candidate at the by-election# 
Ho then withdrew hie support and gave It to 
Sir Piers Debenhnn, a former president of the con- 
otituoncy organization* Sandwich and Debenhaa 
built their campaign on opposition to Common 
iiarkot entry, oiiiefly on the argument that a high 
cost-of-living would ensue. They received active 
support from Lord Beaverbroolc. The Conservative 
vote was splits the unofficial candidate secured 
over five thousand votes, allowing the Labour can­
didate to vfin by seven hundred votes.
Tho Cuban crisis added a new element to the 
Brussels negotiations which is difficult to asses# 
but which nay have boon important. The crisis 
dramatized the Inequality and the lack of balance 
in the Atlantic Alliance and precipitatod the 
debate on role In determining the policies
of the Alllancoj
" •. the somewlxat xenophobic mood that was apiarent in the Halted Kingdom during November and December 1962 can bo explained by the fact tliat both Cuba and the Oocauon Market negotiations were under­lining# in different ways, a cluinged sltuam tion which had been accepted intellect— ually, but not yet ORotionally, tlio mood of the country undoubtedly made it difficult for the British Government to make oonceb.sionV" {160
(Cf. G.KeDeriiiottî Ambassador Ormsby-Goro was 
treated almost aa a member of the Kennedy 
cabinet. ) ( l4)
(15) Camps, M.f op.cit.. p.465
(16 ) The Ivlen Legacy, p. 184
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(11) At the end of his period as Aiabaesador in 
Paris, in September I960, Sir GXadoyn Jebb asked 
de Gaulle what his reaction would be if Britain 
applied to join E.E.C.* De Gaulle replied that 
such a prospect was too remote to be worth 
serlouo considération. At Strasbourg, before the 
Consultative Assembly of tho Council of Europe on 
2nd March 1961, Couve de fAirville said that the 
Common Market was open to any other European 
country wishing to join and for some this was a 
valid possibility. This was taken by Britain to 
mean that, whilo objecting to half-moaeures, 
France’s reaction to a British initiative would 
be favourable.
Pierson Dixon reported that at the Hew Year's 
Day reception at the Slysoe in 1962 de Gaulle was 
more than usually warm towai'ds him; he \70uld 
consider dining privately at tho British Embassy 
(for tho fijTot time). But Dixon believed in a 
French conspiracy. In March 1962 the Algerian 
question v/as settled but an election was near: 
de Gaulle did not relish going to the polls as a 
d e o l c i r e d  a n t c l o x A i o b e . I n  May, Pompidou, the now 
Prime Minister, was convinced by his colleagues 
that it was obvious to the French people that d# 
Gaulle intended to keep Britain out of the Market# 
and that this was an electoral liability.
Pompidou then spoke to do Baulle who agreed to 
be more friendly towards Britain.
The French President appeared to be gen­
uinely aurpriaod by Macmillan during thoir  ^
June 1962 meeting at the Chateau de Chomps, sur­
prised that Macmillan saw Britain's future role as 
being a European one. Couve de Murville stated 
on 13th June in the Aoaembloe Nationale tliat the 
E.K.C.’e and Britain’s intercuts wero perhaps not 
irreconcilable and tliat Prance saw little point 
in discussing political unity until it was known
whether the Hhited Kingdom woo to be in or out 
of Europe• Prance had# perhaps# begun to 
believe in Britlah entry.
Obearvere believe that French representat- 
iveo at Brussels were not working under orders 
from de Gaulle to keep Britain out - they appeared 
to havG the widest freedom within the policy of 
making sure that, if Britain did enter Europe, 
then Prcoioe should exact the best possible toimis. 
The final decision wao tho General’s, French 
officials negotiated in good faith. (Consorva- 
tivca at Llandudno in 1962 bougiit ’Yes* badgesi 
Kora Beloff was anked by a French diplomat to 
bring a pocketful to Brussels for the French 
delegation to wear(l).
At the end of October 1962 the French had 
their referendum to decide on the question as to 
whether tho îresident should be elected by direct 
rather than indirect suffrage: a large majority
favoured a change. In November tho General 
Election gave de Gaulle a clear majority in the 
National Aesenbly. One does not have to accept 
the Pierson Dixon conspiracy theory to feel that 
the French referendum and election (of 18th and 
25th November) created the circumstanoas in which 
a rupture with Britain was pooalble.
On 11th January 1963 Couve de Murville 
lunched at the British Embassy in Paris and wao 
reassuring. On the 14th January came the press 
conference and de Gaulle’s judicial sentence: 
on the 29th, in Brueaels, came the execution. 
Between the two dates Pierson Dixon saw de Gaulle
(1) The General Sa.,^  Mo. p. 142
Ml
three tises without being able to make any Inpaot 
on the ireeldent. Dlxcn reports that some 
French ministers were still confident that a 
positive outcome could be achieved. Couve de 
Murville being among them(2}« Heath was in 
Brusnela **tidying-up the procedural machinery 
which would be set in motion by entry” - dealing 
with the questions of tho distribution of votes, 
tho use of Enrli&h as an official language, and so 
on. On the very day of de Gaulle’s press con- 
foroncG, 14th January, Heath discussed the 
question of the English translation of p^ irt of 
the Ron© Treaty(3).
Sir Prank Lee says tiiat the British, in 
previouG yeuro, had indeed wanted a strong Prenoh 
government. Vie had, however, deluded ourselves 
about the intensity of de Gaulle’s opposition# 
During negotiations v;o always had the hope that 
Prance would see roaaou, that, as Macmillan hod it, 
"Wormsor would turn" (II. Olivier vforraser, a px*o®- 
inent Preach civil servant and representative at 
Brussels. He iiad once explained to his Qual 
d’Orsay colleagues that he could not bear tho idea 
of Britain losing its fine ii.iperial identity by 
merging with Europe). vTe were wrong(4).
♦ The United States had treated Britain as a 
major power and as a close ally, deserving of 
special consideration and trust - as seen in the 
1959 amendment of the KaoTSahon Act which permitted 
the ohtiring of American nuclear knowledge with the 
British. By comparison, Pr:uiee, with an unstable




govenmont, a large Comunist party, a war In 
Algeria, and fewer cultural ties with the United 
States, had long been regarded with suspicion. 
This represented a iai30i\loulation. Prance’s 
power, under de Gaulle, grew while Britain’s 
stagnated: American policies, to the degree
that they were Inconsistent with European power 
trends, made the admission of Britain to E.E.O. 
more difficult and strained relations within the 
Commuaity(l). As for Germany, the United States
had welcomed her inclusion in western European 
Union and in îî.A.î.O. but, in the ’Sixties, 
American links vrLth Germany were not as close as 
they had been under Eisenhower and Dulles. By 
contrast, German links with France became very 
close.
On 4th July 1962 Kennedy made his 
’Declaration of Interdependence’ speech(2). In 
this he appealed for a partnership between the 
United States and a strong and united Europe. 
Inotead of being a stimulus to rapid consolida­
tion of Europe, it contributed to de Gaulle’s 
conviction that the British membership of E.S.C. 
would prejudice his own design for Europe:
"American policies .. made the admission of Britain more difficult and strained relations within the E.E.C.. France, as an internal leader of the union endeavour­ing to reduce American influence in Europe, did not want the most trusted ally of the former external elite in the E.E.C. De Gaulle pointed out to a visiting group of deputies on 24th January 1963 that Britain disqualified itsolf as a European ix)wer at Nassau by allowing one of the vital attributes of its national sovereignty, the British nuclear deterrent, to become
(1) Etsioni,A.: lolitioal Unification, p.246
(2) Kitzin^er. U.: The Buronean Common tîarketand Community, pp.*^"
/ ^ y
dependent on the United States, and by allowing the United States unilaterally to cancel its earlior commitments to deliver Skybolt missiles without even a protest from London. Britain in Europe, the General said, would be like a •travelling salesman’ of United States interests."(3)
Said■Opera Mundi-Europe. on 24th January 1963 
"On peut dire aussi que les paroles prononcées 
par le fondateur de la Vie Republique, le 
14 janvier 1963, paraissent inspirées presque 
plus par sa méfiance envers Washington qu’envers 
Londres".(4)
. i-
(3) Etzioni, A.% op .cit.. p.246
(4) Jouve, Hdmoni Le General de Gaulle et la 0 ons truc tion de 1 * ijuro oe. 196Y. p. 160
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6* The ’Paokage*
The BruaselG negotiations were com­
plex and threw up their own technical 
vocabulary - the Common External Tariff, 
variable levied, reverse preferences, 
décalage, and so on. It was part of 
British reaction to the French veto to 
declare that much had been achieved in the 
way of agreement between herself and the 
Six. Edward Heath, in his final state­
ment in Brussels on 29th January, 1963 said* 
"The plain fact is that the tine had oome when 
the negotiations wore for some, too near to 
success. It is clear to the world that they
IS7
have been halted, not for any teohnioal or 
économie reasons, but on purely political 
grounds and on the Insistenoe of a single 
Government»"(1)
Conservative literature offers a neat and 
almost convincing list of provisional agree­
ments reached with the Six before breakdown*
materiale and tropical foodstuffs would have had free entry into the enlarged Common Market# This offer would have remained open despite the fact that oertrin Afrlcon countries were as yet unwillin^^, for politiosLl reasonsI to aodept it;
ZadAa^  Cwlomi freeentry for India’s and Ceylon’s tea 6xi>ortB, and comprehensive trade agreenents for all three countries’ manufactured goods; reduction of the Common External Tariff to aero in the case of some minor industrial products, and its application by stages for others;
m  the all-important question ofSion e: temperate foodstuffs, tho Community expressed its intention to pursue a reasonable price policy within the framework of world-wide agroomenta; there was recognition of the need for special provisions to deal vflth Hew Zealand's particular problems.Raw Giaterials suoh as wool and jute would have duty-free entry;
accepted the principle of a common agricultural policy for the Community, the Government proposed certain arroüL ements for the United Kingdom in the transitional period; they also proposed, and the Community accepted, that it should adopt the practice of an Annual Review. (2)
(1) Camps, M.t OP.cit.. p.492
(2) Qampoi/ui Guide 1964. pp.467-468
mo
A resolution adopted by the European 
larliaxaent on 6th February 1963 invited the 
European Commission to report to it on the 
state of the negotiations between Britain and 
the Six on 29th January 1963* The report# 
published on 26th February, 1963, offers a 
much more realistic aaseasmeixt of the difficul­
ties still to be solved by the partiest
"Many points left in abeyance may be classified as of minor consequence•In the tariff field in particular# the tactical manoeuvring inseparable from negotiations had certainly delayed in many cases the settlement of secondary problems for which there was no reason to believe that a solution could not be found.Broadly speaking it may be said that the normal provisions of the Treaty and the decision-making powers of Oommunity institutions could certainly have been accepted as providing the means of reaching a reasonable solu­tion of many pointe referred to in this report which stem from minor or quite special economic problena,
"On the other hand# it is important not to nlnimlae certain qucotiona which were still unanswered (apart from the problem of relations with the E.F.T.A* countries, the terms of which were rather special), Hith regard to temperate foods tuff e from the Common- v/eidth, although a solution had been put forward for cereals, its extension to certain other products might still linve raised difficulties, even though the broad lines were already laid do»7n.
"Again# even though some measure of agreement had been reached as to the final stage regarding British agriculture, it would be a mistake to undcrectinate the importance for the Community of effective transit tonal arrai^gements ensuring the progressive integration of the economies of the Member states and the final establish­ment of a single market,"(3)
m,E,K,C« Commieslon. p.llu
If the Commission believed that it was 
impossible to soy that negotiations with Britain 
would have eucoeeded, but that it was equally 
certain that they had not failed, what are the 
mature views of the British negotiators 
themselves?
If Heath was coafifent that a ’package* for 
agreement existed, Herbert «indrew is more 
Cautious. There wac a block of atone there 
for ohieelliiiiE, and o>ilselling wao definitely 
needed. If do Gaulle’s mind had moved the 
other vfay there existed mateviul to work upon. 
Gorell iiameo has said that the elements of 
agreement existed but aevoral Important topics 
had never been touched. There had been no 
final eettlcnent on temperate agriculture.
The always difficult problem of British agri­
culture had received Indeterminate treatment - 
some of tho things diecuesed within this context 
wore ’phoney*I the important question of the 
impact of tho Community’s eyoten of agricultural 
finance upon our balanc©-of-payments "never 
came to the crunch."(4) Looking back, Gorell 
Borneo believes that ilereon Dixon would have 
said that we had not succeeded at Brussels.
jJunoan Jandys hoc admitted that a lot was 
loft unsettled at Brussels. To the items 
mentioned above we oan add#
"... no outline agreement had been reached on horticulture. Lacking community regulations little pro­gress had been made on sugar, although a precise agreement on the status of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was clearly a ’must’. Arrangements for the other E.F.T.A. countries, one of the major pre-conditions of United Kingdom entry lute tho L.L.C., had xK>t
(4) See also p. ^ ^
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been defined•* Moat important of all a satiafactory agreement over the future of Hew Zealand exporte of agricultural produce was still a very long way off,"(5)
Thus, if de Gaulle was wrong in saying that 
negotiations had been at a standstill since 
October 1962, it leans too far the other way 
to say that the break-off cano just as the 
two sides were on the verge of agreement.
In the event, official meetings and un­
told hours of •corridor work’ failed to 
produce a convincing • package* , ^
(5) Butterwiok, M.and Rolfe, B*H«i OP.pit.. pp. 76-79
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7# 0onelueIona
This thesis began with a short review of 
analytical elements necessary to the works refer­
ence was made to the International aysteia, trans­
formation and Integration, and to decision-making 
and policy-making# Mention was made also to the 
post-war development of collective governmental 
action reflected in the so-called *Alphabet 
Politics* and to criticisms of United Kingdom 
adaptivity in the field of forelgn-policy 
formation#
The body of the thesis has been devoted to 
United Kingdom reaction to the * relance européenne* 
and to Macmillan* 8 exercise in seeking entry to the 
European Economic Community - after the Free Trade 
Area failure and the European Free Trade Association 
solution de rechange - while abandoning the * three 
circles* foreign policy#
In this conclusion it remains to estimate the 
activity that occurred in the Brussels negotiating 
arena, to judge how Edward Heath, the ’Flying 
Knights * and dfhitehall conducted themselves, given 
the problems of the negotiating process# Because 
of their influence upon the negotiations, however, 
a few paragraphs must be devoted first to the 
review of options and the initiative#
l U
(i) The Review of Options
Eventually, failure and stagnation at home 
and a recognition of loss of status abroad 
occasioned a review of options# The 1939 election 
victory was quickly followed by a crowding-in of 
problems# As the ’Sixties began the political 
agenda was full; in January I960 the Government 
imposed restrictive economic measures ; in 
February a now formula - seven per cent of G.H.P. - 
was announced for defence expenditure and in April 
the Blue Streak programme was cancelled; in 
October the Monokton Commission began to look for 
a solution to one of Britain’s last major colonial 
problems# The Paris summit came to nothing#
The rethinking of foreign policy was difficult 
and the take-up of new options not simple#
Although British resources were those of a medium 
power only, British interests remained worldwide# 
Britain needed permanent partners, but the partners 
were different according to whether one approached 
the problem from the defence or the economic- 
industrial point-of-view#
Some euseaont of the British dilemma came 
from the United States - she was happy with E#S#C# 
acceleration plans and her attitude to British 
entry was not unfavourable# American views were 
very important to Britain - witness the reception 
of George Ball in Whitehall in March 196I# ^
A few Influential civil servants began to 
re-examine Britain’s place in the world system and, 
along with a few of Macmillan’s associates and a 
few parliamentarians, they wore ready to urge the 
Prime Minister on# The elements within the civil 
service who supported Macmillan’s thinking - none 
more important than Sir Frank Lee at the Treasury - 
were people who had lately arrived at positions of 
influence# There had occurred no deliberate
' H
refashioning of Vhitohall in a European image#
The Foreign Office, which had failed to keep pace 
with European thinking, now developed a European 
conviction, but this development was not mirrored 
throughout Whitehall#
Additionally, Macmillan reacted to events in 
Europe - To E#B.C# acceleration plans, and to the 
French and German rapprochement# From August I960, 
prolonged private exchanges with all governments of 
the Six occurred# Sufficient encouragement came 
from these exchanges for Macmillan to make a 
positive move# The meetings with Chancellor 
Adenauer in August I960 and February 1961 appear 
to have been very important in shaping the Prime 
Minister’s thoughts# German agricultural 
interests and a general fear of French instability 
lay behind an apparently favourable predisposition 
towards Britain#
(il) The Initiative
In July 1961 Hocnillan made a major strategic 
move# Compared with the Free Trade Area venture, 
the E#E#C# negotiations were given a status of 
priority# The decision before Britain called for 
on enormous amount of activity, in many forums and 
interest areas, in a relatively short space of 
time# Important value consequences were involved# 
Decision situations with these characteristics inay 
be oonaidered as orises(l).
Conditions wore not favourable for the 
launching of the new policy# Macmillan’s
(1) Robinson, James,A# t Legislative Influence on gorolnn Policy» larliaayii ^mmon H^ket. Unpublished paper, Ohio É tate University #
initiative was a response to domestic and 
external failure and was launched from a position 
of moral and tactical weakness# Failure and 
stagnation existed at home, and in the E.E.G. an 
inpreesion of dynamic development - the E.B.G. 
discussed acceleration of tariff reductions, the 
first stage of her Common ExtemeO. tariff, and 
political union# For the Xrime Minister this 
represented a • shifting environment’ and the need 
to apiroach the B#B.O# appeared to be thrust upon 
him#
rûaoidlllan Iiad ’ friends at court’ • The Dutch 
wanted our participation on talks on political 
union, and German Interests in British entry have 
been mentioned above# However, the need to defend 
tho B#E.O# against de Gaulle set limits to the 
support which could be given to a British 
candidature#
The announcement of July did not betoken a 
philosophical commitment towards Europe on the part 
of the Prime Minister* In the early ’Fifties he 
had deplored the ’absurd constitution-making’ of 
the Europeans : now entry into Europe was
obviously regarded with something less than 
enthusiasm* The Irime Minister was ahead of most 
of his cabinet but he was not a ’prime mover’*
"In politics, Macmillan was an imaginative eclectic# In the 1930’s he had joined forces with minority opinion in an attempt to solve the economic problems of the period and had given political expreeclon to new economic thinking# In I960, he likewise drew political euetenanoe from the views of groups of ’Europeans’ in public life and power from a wind of ’Buropeanisa’ which (as is the habit with political fashion*) began to
blow from more than one quarter at this | ' time for reasons that cannot be subjected i to precise analysie."(2) - - 
\ ' %(iii) The NeKotiatione tv
‘ ; - - ;
On several counts the status of the Brussels 
discussions was in doubt* Vagueness in the pre- 
July 1961 period on the nature of a possible 
rapprochement with Europe continued over into the 
new ijfcriod» Ho formal oabinet decision about talks 
was taken and Macmillan’s declaration in the 
Commons - "we must make an application to see our 
way further" - did not clearly demonctrate a 
’European vocation’•
Entry to B.B.O, would involve the acceptance 
of a new kind of sovereignty - important decisions 
would bo made in the community instead of in the 
national sphere* It is ole&ir that in the 
Government’s decision to move towards Europe the 
political considerations were the controlling 
ones - the civil service interdepartmental review 
bad stressed the political case (3) for entry and 
this had been aoknowle#éd in the irime Minister’s 
July statement*
Yet the eoonomio case was given greatest 
publicity at home - the tactic was to "get into 
Europe on an economic ticket". Further, Edward 
Heath, Henry Brooke, Joseph Godber and others, 
through 1961 and 1962, stressed the commercial 
nature of the E.E.O* and referred to the
(2) Butt,K*s "The Common Market and Conservative Party Politics, 1961-1962", Government and Opposition* April - July, 1967, p."377
(3) "I had great sympathy with the Foreign Office in their view that the move towards Europe was more political than economic," saysSir Frank Lee* (Interview)
’European trade problem'# It was even stated 
that, with Britain a member, the Ooxamunity would 
be different in shape and purpose - Britain oould 
veto proposals for federal extensions#
In April 1962 Heath stressed the need to 
strengthen the Atlantic Alliance• Britain still 
adhered to * Atlanticism’ • The Atlantic Alliance
might be no substitute for B.E.O# membership, but 
perhaps the latter oould bolster the former.
Throughout the negotiations in Brussels a 
decision on principle was deferred while attention 
was given to detail# Despite tlie extent of 
political activity, for the most part a crisis 
atiaosphere was lacking* The negotiators here 
considering a historic redeployment of national 
resources, did not negotiate with adequately 
informed ardour# The United Kingdom government 
was not quite sure of its strategic purpose 
(above,pp*#^^) - witness the ambivalence of mini­
sters towards political integration in Europe#
(In 1962, de Gaulle’s resorvationa about B#E#0# 
political unity could not, with Impunity, be echoed 
by an applicant country#)
Macmillan launched new eoonomio policies 
during our period - the National Economic 
Development Gouncil was announced in July 1961 and 
the National Incomes Commission a year later - and 
wao vigorous enough to carry through his great 
cabinet reshuffle in 1962. In respect of Europe, 
Gorell Barnes asserts, things were different.
During the negotiations Macmillan was getting 
tired - he had possessed the élan to get talks 
started, but not to see them through.
Edward Heath evidently failed to compensate 
for Macmillan’s lack of 6lai^ . Duncan Dandys’s 
suggestion that the Brussels talks should have been 
raised to prime ministerial level in the summer of
( b /
1962 might be seen ac an implied criticism of 
Heath* What were Heath’s weaknesses as a 
negotiator?
The Lord Privy Seal was evidently not a 
’European’ at the outset of the talks. But, at 
least, his status was clear - he had a brief 
(cf. Maudling’a rag-bag of responsibilities 
during the earlier free trade talks. Above, p.
£dv/ard Heath in Brussels held on too long to 
unrealistic demands. Initially there existed in 
v^hitehall some belief in a relatively short time­
table for negotiation and entry, a realization that 
the Brussels negotiations represented a major 
diplomatic effort. But the United Kingdom team 
were not agreed on ’what to give away’.
M. Olappier’s observation about time lost during 
the summer of 1962 is well made (above, p.^^7).
Edward Heath, personally, betrayed a grave 
weakness - his avidity for detail. His method of 
working not merely alov/ed down proceedings in 
Brussels but also drew the attention of the Six 
to raw questions of principle they themselves had 
not yet fully explored., It ia possible to excuse 
Heath since he suffered political restraints in 
having to report back to the Commons (or in having 
to keep a promise to publish White lapera when the 
Commons was not sitting). Finally, however, one 
must say that diplomacy forgot policy. Remembering 
the maxim that "diplomacy is cobbling rather than 
creation" one must say that generals should not 
allow tactical dispositions to obscure strategic 
goals. In Brussels, Heath failed to maintain 
strategic purpose.
Civil servants executed their departmental 
probes (4) and carried out extensive diplomatic
(4) "I suspect that these examinations in depth which we are always being told have been made into the implications of joining the Common Market have been pretty amateur."(Jo Grimond The Guardian* 18th August, 1967)
Invostlgation with European govemments. How­
ever efficient these probes and inveotigatione were 
- there appears to be soce ovàdonce of an Inadequate 
•operational base* (above, p.77 ) - eventual 
negotiations in Brussels betrayed some lack of 
grip.
Nogleoting the possibility that Whitehall had 
not yet rid itself of Free Trade Area thinking - of 
thinking in terms of * accommodation with* rather 
than * entry into* Europe - demands related to 
entry often failed to show adequate realism.
Some British demands illustrated a lack of aware­
ness of realistic outcomes. With the 2.E.C. 
itself in a critical stage of evolution a greater 
degree of professional awareness was demanded.
.As far as Herbert Andrew (above, p/^f) was 
concerned the Brussels negotiations were a 'well- 
played match*. Some lack of sympathy between 
Brussels negotiators and Whitehall evidently 
existed (see Sir Eric Roll above, p./^^ ) but, on a 
technical level, one cannot find fault with the 
degree of interdepartmental co-operation which 
supported the negotiations* In reference to 
those pressures of multilateral diplomacy mentioned 
above (p. ^ 7 ) only Sir Piero on Dixon appears to 
have suffered significant fatigue as a result of 
double burden of work in Brussels and laris. The 
two First Secretaries who carried much of the 
weight of official work in Brussels were evidently 
overworked too.
Hew may one summarise the substantive and 
procedural differences existing between the 
Whitehall departments as revealed by interviews 
with participants in tho negotiations?
The Foreign Office hod exhibited a conspicuous 
lack of interest in the earlier Free Trade Area 
talks, but, in I960, it was in a • European Frenzy*. 
Herbert Andrew makes the point that the ’Office* 
had "woken up" (above, )• The Foreign
I
Office was taken by surprise when the E.S.O.
began to move at an unexpectedly rapid pace and 
was particularly concerned when serious discussion 
begsui in Europe on political unification. The 
European Organizations Department of the Foreign 
Office acted as the principal briefing division 
for the Brussels Team, two of whoee three 
official heads were ’Office* people (above,
But the early * frenzy* did not convert itself into 
adequately serious dedication. If one discerns a 
lack of grip on negotiations in Brussels, remember­
ing the department’s reputation for detachment, one 
nay lay at the Foreign Office door some of the 
blame for the lack of pace in the negotiations.
The Treasury had suffered an eirly post-war 
diminution of interest in Europe and a revival of 
interest came only with the change from Makine to 
Lee at the top (above, p. 5" )^. At Brussels the 
Treasuiy’s quiescence was odd and so was the fact 
that atorling did not become a •sticking-point’.
But, hero, one must award praisei the ’agree now, 
argue later’ gambit - which would.have been 
eminently reasonable in the context of agriculture(5) 
- apiears to have worked for the Treasury.
The Colonial Office representative at Brussels, 
who had been worried by a Whitehall ’vendetta* 
against the Six on the matter of association 
agreements (above, p . ^ 0 >  displayed "eympatliy and 
engagement* with negotiating problems in Brussels, 
hampered by fewer pressureo, the Board of Trade 
representative nevertheless showed realism in
(5) The Oommon Agricultural lolicy was in the initial phase of preparation* "The United Kingdom side did not really understand much about it," comments a Foreign Office participant, "and the Commission made much of this mystique."
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negotiation* Commonwealth Relatione, either 
from conviction or becnuoe of tho quality of ite 
representatives in Bnisoels, Boemc not to have 
exhibited M :cmillan’s realism towards Comnionwealth 
interests and towards the legacy of •intimacy of 
exchange*•
If a ’community of interest’ did not exist 
at Brussels as far as tho British side vas con­
cerned one must explain this ohlefly by reference 
to the fairly severe criticisms made of 
Agriculture’s representativca. The delaying 
power attributed to Agriculture - and to a much 
lesser extent by Commonwealth Relations - must be 
accounted a significant factor in the eventual 
failure of negotiations.
Until July 1961 tûere had existed in Britain 
an attitude ’excluding agriculture’ from possible 
changes involved in entry into Europe and little 
detailed consideration of the problem of British 
agriculture within tho Common Market appears to 
have been made.
In Brussels the lad: of preparatory'’ work was 
evident and some Foreign Office Irritation has been 
expressed at Agriculture’s failure to "evaluate 
the situation". The most surprising revelation 
to the writer was the ministry’s disclaimer - that 
the department was not a major participant in the 
negotiations (above, p./3i) Weight must be given 
to the opposition to Conmon Market entry shown by 
the ministry’s permanent Sôcrotary(6).
(6) In 1571 a Common Market Safeguards Oommitte# manifesto was compoeed to bring togeiter both opponents to E.E.C. and the sceptics. "There are several surprise names, including those of Sir John Winifrith, who was lomaneut Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture during the Lruooels negotiation of 1967-68 (sic), Lord Woolley, former president of the N.F.U...." (Tho Times, 5.2.1971)
Organisational arrangeaents In Bruesels 
were not ideal but wore not under tho control of 
the United Kingdom team. The U.K. representative* 
negotiated with the nominees of six governments - 
delegation of the negotiating function to the 
Oommlssion had not been possible. The Six had to 
act in unison. Close personal relatlono which 
existed between the negotiators did not com^>ensate 
for the long process of obtaining top-lcvol agree­
ment for everything - very little delegation to' 
oocmiittees occurred. It took six months of 
exploration to classify items for negotiation before 
the Brussels talks began in earnest.
The management of the international arena by 
the United Kingdom government during the negotiation* 
involved relations with the United States, the 
Council of jSurope, ïïestem European Union, and the 
European Free Trade Association. Of most 
importance, in this context, as a wider issue 
obtruding onto the negotiations, was de Gaulle’s 
concern to modify the organizational arrangements 
and the command structure of H.A.T.O.
The French hod emerged as tho strong power 
within the Community. French negotiators had 
secured a Treaty to their own specifications and 
they always knew what kind of Europe they wanted. 
Skilled in the art of negotiating from weakness, 
the French at Brussels were able, despite some 
hostility from their community partners, to exploit 
British hceitation and divisions. But de Gaulle 
was not hostile to U.K. entry from the 
outset (see Note J> , p. ).
Eventually, Macmillan’s major error was to 
act as if defence and politico-economic questions 
were not linked. The French feared American 
’Contamination’ and de Gaulle’s goodwill (see 
beiew, p,')( ) was dissipated when Macmillan con­
cluded his 1 Claris agreement with Kennedy at Nassau.
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The goodwill of France’s coiainunlty partners, 
together with the repeated deolarations la 
Britain’s interest ciado by M, Monnet’s Action 
Committee (an unofficial body), were not enough 
to overcome de Gaulle’s hostility towards Britain.
If in negotiation the United Kingdom team were 
administratively adequate (whioh has been 
questioned, above), their prime minister was “ 
nevertheless politically naive. Macmillan and 
his colleagues foiled to see Issues from a French, 
viewpoint.
The sequence of French domestic events - the 
strengthening of de Gaulle through an election and 
a referendum - did not ’fit’ the British cequonco.
As de Gaulle consolidated his position, Macmillan’a 
became weaker.
Before tho Brussels meetings Macmillan was 
reducing his demands made on behalf of the 
Connonwoalth* during the Brussels meetings 
he made his ’declaration of independence’. The 
result of the 1962 prime ministers’ confer­
ence was that United Kingdom negotiators wore free 
to make their initiatives in Brussels. It is 
noteworthy, however, that for every six hours spent 
by Heath in talking with the Six, he spent eight 
with representatives of tho Comnonwealth and B.F.T.A. 
(The ’London Agreement’ had appeared to constitute 
a major restriction on Heath’s negotiating free­
dom. In fact, E.F.T.A. probloas ware not 
exhaustivoly treated in Brussels.)
(iv) lartlci; ator:/ Donooraoy
Macmillan exercised his prime ministerial 
freedom to act in a typically oblique manner. In 
making his Common Market initiative he gambled 
upon a development of European sentiment in hie 
party and in the country as the Brussels talks 
proved successful.
MaciuJLIlan’B position In respect of hia 
party was strong after the 1959 election. Ho 
was able to attempt policies outside tho psirty 
tradition and, indeed, the party was made to 
shift its interest from the past to the future. 
Hanning, incomes policy, and Europe were part 
of a single revolution.
Nevertheless, tho B.E.C. move flew in the 
face of Conservative instincts, and of many 
agricultural and somo Commonwoalth-industrial 
interests traditionally supporting the party.
An extensive programme of party re-education 
had to be carried out - by William Deodeo and 
others - and was to prove a little too successful 
at the party(s 1962 conference.
In the Commons anti-marketeors organised 
their campaign carefully. In debates in the 
House they avoided either voting against the 
Government or deliberately abstaining on the 
European issue as a gesture of hostility.
Instead they made use of the Order Taper. As 
noted above, a dogroe of harfir>ament in the 
Coiamons fed Edward Heath’s disposition to aocuire 
detailed definition and explanation.
The Labour Party’s official stand against 
an easy settlement in Bruscels engendered con­
tinental doubts about the United Kingdom’s long 
term adhesion to Europe. It has been argued that 
the Labour position stomod from an inherent lack 
of interest in Europe. Electoral calculation was 
also present. Gaitskoll played his part in the 
outcome of tho Brussels negotiations; his 
opposition was certainly heightened by his belief 
that Macmillan was going to use Europe to ’dish 
the Socialists’ (see Hote^ p. ).
Remarkably little con be said about the 
E jiropean preoccupations of induetrialiste during
(1^
our period. In general, Interest groups did 
not exercise nuoh control on govorncient, with 
the exception of the National Fanners* Unions.
The N.P.U. - J.U. Stev/art*6 * beau Ideal* of 
British pressure groups - was very active and 
alive and provides an Interesting case-study 
of effective interest articulation, an encap­
sulated environnant witliin the total process.
Here there obviously existed some control over 
British foreign policy-fomation. The N.P.U. 
at the tine of the veto were still holding firm 
in their opposition. Their representative,
Kr. ^eingarten, elaime they were merely taking part 
in an * evolutionary situation*• While the 
European agricultural situation woo undoubtedly 
evolutionary, so waa the United Kingdom agricul­
tural situation, with potential splits of 
membership facing the 3T.F.U.
In regard to the oampaignei*a one fact is 
worthy of note. In contrasting Ooxapaign and 
League activity one scoo a curious reversal of 
roles. Usually right-wing pressure is exercised 
quietly in the corridors of power while radical 
orators strive to arouse the populace. Here 
the Campaign, on the whole, worked discreetly 
while the League held ite great public meetings.
The * public* is not a passive environment - 
it works on the politicians who, in their turn, 
seek to work upon the public. In the evolution 
of British relations with Europe since 1945 
public opinion was never rallied by government 
action. Informed opinion on Europe slowly changed 
after 1956 but, by 1959$ only a small minority of 
parliamentary candidates even mentioned the 
Common Market(l).
(1) Butler, B.B. and Rose, O.K.: British GeneralElection of 1959. p.132
In 1962 the Government was reluctant to 
mobilize mass opinion for fear of prejudicing ite 
pooitlon In Bruosela, and the wider public 
rene.ined confused. British people continued 
to live on their Welfare Stnte island, not 
deeply connittod either way on Europe (the 
lolls showed a hardening of opinion against entry 
towards the end of 1962). Had the Government 
been able to give the public a strong, early lead 
on Europe, particularly if this had been a bi­
partisan lead, the advantages for Edward Heath in 
Brusselo would have been considerable. (Clifford 
Juppj "The Government did not * plug entry* at any 
time, it seemed to be powerless. This was the 
problem - perhaps more should have been done".)
Kenneth Younger, shortly after the Brussels 
breakdown, wr0te;
it is surely no matter for congratulation that, during more than a decade of discussion, public opinion was never crystallised by the kind of grand debate which regularly convulses the United a ta tea. The result Wc.s that,throughout the Brussels negotiations, it never emerged from its confusion to play a constructive part in the moulding of events,"(2)
Had integration been preached public opinion night 
well have responded.
Having coaxed the nation out of the shock 
of Suez, Macmillan inched the country towards 
Europe while stressing the economic $ains. 
Macmillan’s task was to persuade the electorate to 
accept a diminished place in the world. His l.ck 
of frankness on the political implications of entry 
into Europe was no way to prepare the electorate 
for a historic change of direction, and no way to 
convince Europeans of our commitment. Do Gaulle
(2) Yo^er.K.» "iubllc Opinion and British foreign1 AXlalra. Vol.40,If O • X . xVb4.
ifound It till too easy to point out to Europe 
tho lack of chroigc in tho British national temper#
(v) Tho 'Settlement
Finally one nuat refer back to v/hat was said 
about the ’Package*. Clifford *Jupp believes 
that, in January 1963» the British team knew what 
basis for agreement existed, what degree of settle­
ment had occurred, but that, in Whitehall, 
Coi’unonvtfealth Relations and Agriculture would have 
resisted an agreement to sign tho B.S.G. Treaty.
It is doubtful whether, among ministers, Butler 
could have been porouadod to accept such a signature 
and more than residual opposition probably existed 
in the persons of Hailsham and I.Iaudling.
Sir Frank Lee, at the Treasury in 1963, io 
laconic about the Brussels failure; "Je were ten 
years too late!". Maybe so. But agreements were 
reached in Brussels and, remembering the strictures 
of Butten/ick and Rolfe (above, p. //Z ),one must 
conclude that tho opportuhities of the occasion 
were not seized. . There was failure in organization 
for negotiation and failure in policy-^aaking.
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Noted# Economic Mana^:ement 1959-1963
1959 Cheerful budgetTotal tax outs 6360milllons Elections ’Never had it so good!’
1960 Dank Rate 5> (January) Hire lurohase con­trols (April)Credit squeeze Bank Rate 6^ (June)
Go late out (October)Hire Purchase oon- • trois relaxed (December)
1961 Beginning of speculation against the Pound follow­ing balance-of-payaents deficit and revaluation of German Mark (March)
Stop ihaoeBank Îlate 7^ (July)’Little Budget’ lay pause Credit squeeze £5J5milllons borrowed from I.M.P. (August)
1962 30 rftaaaHigher tax on cars, but Investment allow- anceo and other measures to stimulate economyV 0 o tober-H oveaber )
1963 Bank Rate cutSome purchase tax concessions (January)
Expansionary Budget £2o9million given in tax relief (April)
/ i r
British and 3.E.G. t^loi^tural m t w a i .  The Treaty or Hose eete out the alma or its agricultural policy as follows: to increaseagricultural productivity; to ensure a fair 0toadard-of""living for those enplcyed in agri­culture; to stabilise markets ; to guarantee supplies; and to ensure reasonable prices for oonoumers (Article 39(D)* Government obliga­tions under the British Agriculture Act 1947 are not greatly different# These are said to be to promote and maintain:
a stable and efficient agricultural indue try capable of producing ouch part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is desirable to produce in the United Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices consistently Aie/ with proper remuneration and living" conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture and an adequate return on capital invested in the induatry#**(l)
The position of agriculture in the British economy io small relative to agriculture in Europe# (One in twenty British workers are on the land, in Europe three times as many# The average sise of British farms is seventy acres, in Europe twenty-five acres# Agriculture con­tributes a twentieth to total production in Britain, in Europe a ninth# Britain's depend­ence on food imports per head of population is three times that of the European countries#) (2) Public management of food production is quite different in the two areas# In Britain import duties ore generally low and many types of agri­cultural produce from the Coononwealth enter duty free. This means that market prices ore much lower than on the continent# The British Government makes direct payments to the farmers when'the market price f&lls below the equitable price set by price review boards#
"The fiuidamentol features of the system ore that the farmer sells his produce in the open market in competition with imports from the rest of the world and the differ­ence between the average market price end
(2) Agriculture in Europe# C#0#I. for Treaoury IiKrmation S i v i ^  December 1962#
mthe guaranteed price io met by the deficiency payment from the Exchequer#The consumer gets the advantage or the competition in the market#« at the came time, low food pricea stimulate consumption and widen the producer's market#"(3)
(Deficiency xoyuents are not all# Britioh agriculture gets covemment help in the form of grants for buildings, drainage, and fertilizers# The white paper states that the annual cost of deficiency payments is fIdOmillions, while flOOmillions goes on production and improvement grunts#
This syatem of support has several advan­tages other than keeping dovm food prices - and thus of industrial exiorteg it affords pro­tection against subsidised imports into Britain; it gives stability to on industry subject to weather end seasonal vi^riation# One million people gain a living from the land directly or from the ancillary industries producing machinery, fertilizers, wool and food products# A signifi- oant contribution to exports is made by the farm machinery industry and a small but valuable contribution by exports of food products#)
The E#2#0. management of agriculture, by contrast involves help to farmers through control of imports and employs duties and levies - a system used by the British only to protect horticulture# European farmers can sell produce at prioea which do not need supplements from taxation# and food prices are maintained at a relatively higla level#
Britioh farmers have pointed out tiiat agri­culture is not the only industry to receive state support but that the form the supx^rt for their industry takes inevitably invites contention# Farming io supported in a way which inevitably means that every year, at Budget time, the cost is high-lighted#(4) For its part, the govern­ment has been concerned that expenditure on agriculture could vary considerably from year to year owing to oircumstances outside the con­trol of farmer or government t
(3) Cmnd#1249, p#4, para.7#
(4) Ormd#1249, para#12#
IlSO
"To the extent that the market may be depressed the amount of tlie defloienoy payment per unit of output becomes greater I and to the extent that output increaoeo, the total amount of the owmodlty on which the doficieuoy pay­ment is made again becomes greater#Ae often as not. a fall in pricoo io the ooxisequonoe of inoreosed supplies from hone or overseas# Jhilat for certain commodities the Exchequer comitnent is in some respects limited, for most it io open-ended#"(5)
On a ohort-tera, year-to-year boais tiie government has iiad to calculate apiculture'a efficiency and, bearing in mind the aid it lias given# estimate what proportion of increased profit should go to tne former# Long-term oonsiderationa have grown in importance#
(5) par#. 10
Note 0 Hugh Galtskell. Conditions demanded 
hy the Six were olearly affected by their 
estimate of British conanitcicnt. In this 
coiuieotion the evolution of GuitsJcell* s 
views is important, and was possibly decisive 
for Britain's chances.
In the summer of 1962 the Economist 
estimated that eighty Labour H.l.'s were against 
entry,seventy-five were in favour, and the rest 
would follow their leader. Gaitokell, with 
unilateralist and Clause Four battles so recent, 
had to make a decision on Europe which was 
clearly of crucial iiiportanco for party unity.
(had it neant voting against entry into Europe,
Roy Jenkins and some other strong supporters 
might have found difficulty in remaining in the 
party.) ïïora Beloff believes that suspicions 
that Gaitskell was being loss than frank over 
Bur01)6 were encouraged by many months of aubbr- 
fuge. The Labour leader publicly argued that he 
favoured entry, but only on conditions within which 
Europe v/ould have ceased to be a community - 
Gaitskell was for the Comnon Market but against 
supranationality. (At various times Gaitskell 
advocated greater control by the Council if 
ministers over the Commission, and a weakening 
of the two thirds majority rule - suggestion 
which ran directly counter to the steps 
M. Spaak and other European Socialists demanded 
to strengthen the Communities,] Gaitskell, 
among other Labour Members, paid less attention to 
possible Community achievement than to restriction
k \ -j r f C crw\ , Al' c crvv -j-erC e ,
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savagely snubbed some of his moat loyal followers who happened to be as European as they were Gaitskellite and gave the anti-Oaitskelllte Left a sense that they had scored a victory.f (2)
(Willi Brandt recorded the disappointment of 
friends on the continent on the occasion of the 
conference speech.)(3)
There is no doubt that Commonwealth 
Socialist leaders did much to harden Gaitskell*s 
feelings over entry. Particular influence has 
been attributed to the Indian Ambassador in 
Brussels, B.K. Lell. (Shortly after the rupture 
in Brussels India sought a trade agreement with 
the Six precisely along the lines worked out 
during the negotiations.)
Waa Gaitskell influential? Tiers Dixon 
guesses that Gaitskell in August 1962 may still 
have been in favour of British entry but that, 
by the time of his December visit to Paris he 
was firmly opposed. "He was unable to see de 
Gaulle but he left Pompidou in no doubt of his 
feelings. This change of front conveniently 
played into the hands of the French 
Government.(4) Miriam Camps does not go so
far,# Gaitskell*s position eased the General's 
task of breaking off negotiations $
"Mr. Gaitskell visited laris early in December 1962 and in a speech to the Anglo-American Iress Association was not only very critical of the concessions made by the British Government during the negotiations but very outspoken about the dangers he saw in a European federation* He also had talks with M. Mollet, M. Pompidou, and %. Couve de Murville. After these talks, Suggestions began to appear (emanating apparently from
(2) Rodgers, W.T.j op.cit.. pp.155-156
(3) Rodgers, W.T.i op.cit.. p.139
(4) Double Diploma, p.295
( 8 i
both M. Mollet and French government sources) that It might be better for the British to be associated in some way with the Oomnon Market rather than to become members. Some people have felt that Mr. Gaitskell*8 talks in Paris at this time contributed significantly to General de Gaulle's decision to veto British membership.of the B.E.C. This seems improbably. On the other hand,Mr. Gaitskell's views lent useful veri­similitude to General de Gaulle's case against the British..*(5)
Gorell Bames has said, however that 
Gaitskell*8 position must have made a signifi­
cant effect on the Six. Nora Beloff thinks 
that his status as poadLble next Prime Minister 
gave him an influence at home and abroad that 
finally enabled him to work, perhaps, decisively 
for Britain's exclusion from Burope(6)«
On 7th November, 1962 Gaitskell sought to 
soften the negative impression of his stand in 
relation to Europet he was no isolationist, but 
wanted better and friendlier relations with 
Europe. (George Brown, by contrast, became 
more critical of B.E.C.'s demands upon Britain.
At this time he had to secure continuance of his 
position as Deputy Leakder in the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. However, on 12th January, in 
Dewsbury, with the party election behind him, he 
went as far as to warn Macmillan that if he 
sought to take Britain into Europe on unsatis­
factory terms he would do it without Labour and 
without the large majority of the British people.)
(5) Camp, M.i op.cit. p.469 ft.
(6) Beloff,N.t op.oit. p.135
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Note D.t De Gaulle "Prance is Europe, de 
Gaulle is Prance". This, says Dunoan Sandys, 
was the French leader's belief. The negotia­
tions could have succeeded and we should have 
pressed for a continuation of talks - the veto was 
not real since a comprehensive draft agreement 
did not yet exist. Clifford Jupp believes that 
the veto showed that Prance believed that entry 
was too near. The ground had been well-prepared, 
thinks Sir Michael Fraser, and de Gaulle's action 
was the strongest indication of likely success. 
Miriam Camps commentsi
"On the evidence now available, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Government of General de Gaulle advocated membership for the United Kingdom when they were confident that there was no chwoe that the British Government would apply to join, and that they subsequently acted on the assumption that the British Govern­ment would not, in fact, be willing, or politiceLlly strong enough, to accept the terms which a strict reading of the Treaty of Rome and of the subsequent decision of the Community implied."(l)
Some support for these views is available from 
the Peyrefitte memorandum, published in 
June 1962(2). In this, a strategy with respect 
to the United Kingdom whioh corresponded fairly
(1) Op .cit.. p.500
(2) In June 1962 the Agence Internationale d'information pour la Presse in Luxembourg reproduced a memorandum on how to sell^^the Gaullist conception of a European oon^era- tion which, it said, had been written in the summer of I960 by M. Alain Peyrefitte, who was at that time a Gaullist Deputy but later became the French Minister of Information.In this memorandum ways of exploiting the hopes and making use of the forms of language of the •Europeans' to attain Gaullist ends were very cynically outlined. (Camps,M.I op.cit.. p.500 footnote.)
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closely with that later followed by the French 
Gove:i^ent was suggested. The Oeneraly says 
Reginald Maudling, was at all times determined 
to say "No"(3).
One French historian has said that three 
sets of factors could explain de Gaulle's 
mistrust of Britain: the behaviour of the
English during the war, and their non-participa­
tion in the building of Europe after the war; 
the slowness of the Brussels negotiations; 
and, the excessive demands made by Britain 
at Brussels - "les anglais ne savaient pas se 
plier aux regies". L'Express. 7th June 1962 
observed;
"Au fond, de Gaulle veut fair une Europe dont il aurait la direction.•Si l'Angleterre s'intégrait a l'Europe, au contraire, la France sfurait la une partenaire avec qui il faudrait compter et tout serait changé^."(4)
(3) Letter
(4) Jouve, Edmond! Conatjmctioa
To the above one must add nuclear considera­
tions. At the time of the June 1962 meeting of 
Macmillan and de Gaulle at the Chateau de Champs 
the latter was much concerned with the problems 
associated with the production of Prance's 
nuclear weapons. Suggestions of an Anglo-Pronch 
nuclear partnership had emanated from London but, 
at the meeting, the subject was not raised - 
both leaders spoke in generalities. Until 
December it was possible that a partnership could 
have been agreed;
"Aussi longtemps que la Grande- Bretaigne avait sa force stratégique nucléaire indépendante avec ses bombes A et H, ses véhicules porteurs, ses avions 'Vulcan' pr^ts a transporter des fusées 'Skybolt' un accord franco- britannique restait possible dans ce domaine. Dans ce cas, des informations scientifiques &t militaires auraient dû nous été communiquées, a la suite notamment d'un amendment à la loi MacMahon. Les perspectives changèrent ' lorsque, au début du mois de décembre 1962. Washington annonce que, la stratégie fondée sur l'aviation étant révolue, la fabrication des 'Skybolt' et la construction des 'B70' étaitinterrompue ."(ô)
The French believed that Macmillan, during a visit 
by McNamara prior to Nassau, had been informed of 
Kennedy's intention to break off Skybolt and B70 
programmes. Macmillan had failed to communicate 
the news at Rambnillet on 16th December. ( *.é)
Macmillan met Kennedy during the period 
18th to 21st December 1962 at Nassau to discuss 
Skybolt. Pierson Dixon reported that de Gaulle 
had been told by Macmillan that th- re would be 
need for a substitute ^  Skybolt were cancelled.
CS) Jouve.E.i op.cit.. pp. 185-186 2.
(^) Op.cit.. p.185
Clf) Double Diploma, p.299 —•
De Gaulle wae not invited to Noasau and no 
regard waa paid thire to the two years' work of 
tho H.A.T.O. xemanont Oouncil which had been 
devoted to the Alliance's nuclear armament.(£f)
At the end of December liercon Dixon was in 
London to discuss the impact on France of Britain's 
iolarlo agreement and to find a formula for the 
avoidance of trouble. A rolaris o for to France 
might remove any pretext to exclude Britain from 
the S.B.O. and night tie France to N.A.T.O. 
lîacmillan did persuade Kennedy to z&alre Franoe a 
rolaris offer. The American Ambassador, Charles 
Bohlen, discussed the mat1er with de Gaulle on 
2nd and 4th January 1963. On the 11th the 
General refused the offer.
Franoe believed that the compelling reasons 
for the British attempt to enter D.2.0, had been 
the conviction that the shortest route to a 
genuine Atlantic partnership lay through member­
ship of the Community. Nassau underlined that 
this goal was never far from Britioh minds. De 
Gaulle's refusal of Polaris made sense:
"Ce refus créait une situation paradoxale,
A Londres, les accords de Daosau avaient etc intorpreto'a comme signifiant la fin cleo relations privilégiées avec les State—Unie étant donné que la France faisait l'obiet de la mSme proposition.Cet OvCnenent confirme le président de la Eépubli me francaioe dans sa conviction que le ireiuier britannique préfère une situation de 'aatellite' américain a celle de partenaire européen.Dès lors, il redoute que la Grande—Lrotaigne, si elle parvenait a rejoindre les Six, ne se comporte avant tout comme le 'cheval do Troie' des Etats-Unis."(10)
(Sï) Jouve,B.j OP.cit.. p.185 
fl#) iierson Dlxon, o p .oit, p.301
(10) Jouve, !5.: op.oit.. p.186
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If Haomlllan hinted at the possibility of a 
Joint Anglo-Frenoh nuclear programme within a 
Union of Western Europe (as he may have done at 
the Chateau de Champs), he must have linked it 
with a scheme which made it compatible with the 
North Atlantic Alliance, something which the 
General could never accept* ?/hen, subsequent­
ly, Macmillan agreed at Nassau that British 
nuclear submarines should be provided with 
Polaris missiles, subject to their forming part 
of an Atlantic force, de Gaulle (even though he 
was offered the same facilities) was provided 
with a heaven-sent opportunity to break*
For President Kennedy's extended offer to Franoe 
was irrelevant in the context of de Gaulle's 
principle of total national independence, not­
withstanding the fact that Franoe had not as yet 
any nuclear submarines wherewith to house the 
Polaris weapons* And the General was in any 
case now powerful enough to torpedo Kennedy's 
'Grand Design'*(11)
(11) Lord Gladwyn; De Gaulle's Europe* PP.76-77 ----------------
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